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Essays on Agricultural and Labor Markets in India
Yogita Shamdasani
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on agricultural and labor markets in rural
India.
Chapter 1 estimates the role of improvements in transport infrastructure on households’ production
decisions in agriculture. The Central Government of India launched a large-scale rural road-
building program in 2000, targeting villages that lacked any single all-weather connectivity. Strict
guidelines governed eligibility and timing of program road provision. I exploit the precise timing of
road construction as a source of exogenous variation in connectivity using a household-level panel
in a difference-in-differences framework. I find that households who gain access to improved rural
road infrastructure diversify their crop portfolio, increase take up of complementary productive
inputs and intensify labor hiring. Households subsequently enter into the sales of farm output,
indicating a transition from subsistence to market-oriented farming. Evidence from a field survey
suggests that these effects operate through an increase in mobility of agricultural workers across
connected village labor markets. These findings emphasize the substantial barrier to productive
investments in agriculture generated by poor rural road connectivity that hampers the integration
of labor markets across space.
Chapter 2 (with Emily Breza and Supreet Kaur) investigates whether worker utility is affected by co-
worker wages, which has potentially broad labor market implications. In a month-long experiment
with Indian manufacturing workers, we randomize whether co-workers within production units
receive the same flat daily wage or different wages (according to baseline productivity rank). We
find that for a given absolute wage, pay inequality reduces output and attendance by 0.24 standard
deviations and 12%, respectively. These effects strengthen in later weeks. Pay disparity also lowers
co-workers’ ability to cooperate in their self-interest. However, when workers can clearly observe
productivity differences, pay inequality has no discernible effect on output, attendance, or group
cohesion.
Chapter 3 uses experimental evidence to understand the impacts of providing workers with mean-
ingful short-term employment during the lean season in agriculture. I randomize job offers among
Indian agricultural workers who express interest in a month-long employment opportunity in low-
skill manufacturing, and I follow these workers several weeks after the employment opportunity
concludes. I find reductions in labor supply and gains in consumption among workers who received
job offers. These effects are concentrated among landless workers, suggesting that employment
provision during the lean months alleviated a binding constraint for this subgroup.
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Chapter 1. Rural Road Infrastructure and Agricultural Production
1.1 Introduction
The provision of transport infrastructure has gained prominence in economic development policy
in recent decades, with substantial investments led by both local governments and international
organizations.1 Consequently, this has given rise to a growing literature that seeks to understand
the causal effects of transportation infrastructure on economic outcomes.2 A majority of these
works have focused on the effects of large-scale infrastructure systems - highways and railroads
that connect distant markets across regions - on the spatial distribution of economic activity and
on aggregate macro outcomes such as GDP growth. On the other hand, the effects of small-
scale infrastructure systems such as rural roads, which are essential for spurring local growth and
development, are less well understood.
In this paper, I exploit a natural experiment in a large-scale rural road building program to estimate
the causal effects of improvements in rural connectivity on households’ production decisions in
agriculture. Using a combination of program administrative records and a comprehensive panel
data set that is well-suited to study agricultural choices at the household level, I find that improved
rural road infrastructure led to diversification of crop portfolios, take-up of productive agricultural
1For example, the Indian government pledged USD 33 billion to transportation infrastructure investments in
the recent 2016-2017 Union Budget, and the World Bank allocated 14% of total lending in 2016 to transportation
infrastructure projects.
2Estimating the causal effects of infrastructure poses an empirical challenge as the placement of transport infras-
tructure is non-random and often driven by political and economic factors. For example, Burgess et al. (2015) find
strong evidence of ethnic favoritism in the provision of paved roads across the post-independence period in Kenya;
districts that shared the same ethnicity as the president had double the amount of expenditure on roads, and five times
the length of paved roads. The literature addresses this issue of endogenous placement by exploiting geographical
variation in the placement of large-scale infrastructure such as highway and railroad systems along trunk routes. For
example, Banerjee et al. (2012) exploit the fact that railroad networks built in the 19th and 20th century in China
connected historical cities. Faber (2014) uses a straight-line instrument based on the construction of least cost path
spanning tree networks to address non-random placement of trunk highways in China. Donaldson (forthcoming) argues
that military motives trumped economic arguments in the design and construction of railroad networks by the British
government in colonial India.
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inputs and commercialization of farm output. Further, I present suggestive evidence using a survey
I conduct in the field for these effects operating through an increase in mobility of agricultural
workers across connected labor markets.
Understanding the effects of improvements in rural connectivity on agricultural production is first
order given that agriculture remains to be the primary source of income for rural households.
Despite important innovations in recent decades that have led to significant increases in agricultural
productivity, such as the introduction of high-yielding varieties during the Green Revolution,3
traditional practices still dominate and take up of improved technologies by rural households is far
from universal. While poor transport infrastructure has been highlighted as a potentially important
barrier to the adoption of improved technologies in agriculture (Suri, 2011), there is no empirical
evidence to date that documents how households’ production decisions in agriculture respond to
improvements in rural road infrastructure.4
The program that I examine - India’s Prime Minister’s Rural Road Building Program - targeted
rural, unconnected villages i.e. villages that lacked any single, all-weather connectivity. Under the
program, a small hard-topped road was constructed with the goal of enabling access to the closest
market center,5 which served as a rural business hub. This was achieved through the construction
of a road that linked the village to either the closest village with an all-weather road, the closest
all-weather road, the block headquarters or directly to the market center. Program roads thus
enabled connectivity to the broader rural road network, and subsequently, to surrounding villages,
agricultural markets and towns. Further, program roads were equipped with the necessary cross-
3These new varieties were adopted in tandem with an expansion of irrigation infrastructure, modernization of
management techniques, as well as increased utilization of synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.
4The existing literature has examined the effects of rural roads on the movement of workers out of agriculture
(Asher andNovosad, 2016), on agricultural land values (Jacoby, 2000; Shrestha, 2015; Gonzalez-Navarro andQuintana-
Domeque, 2016) and on market prices of local crops (Khandker et al., 2009; Casaburi et al., 2013).
5Market centers were identified by the program as “centers of activities for marketing agricultural produce
and inputs, servicing of agricultural implements, health, higher education, postal, banking services etc." (PMGSY
Operations Manual)
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drainage structures so as to remain operable during all weathers; this was especially relevant as
the peak season in agriculture coincides with the onset of monsoon rains, and inadequate drainage
often led to water-logged, and subsequently, inoperable roads.
The order in which roads were built under this programwas determined by an unconnected village’s
population relative to that of other unconnected villages in the state. In every state, a priority ranking
was generated among unconnected villages based on village population size, with larger villages
ranked higher. Program roads were then constructed following this priority ranking. As such,
within a state, a larger unconnected village received a program road before a smaller unconnected
village. I exploit this exogenous variation in timing of road construction under the program in
a difference-in-differences framework, comparing the evolution of outcomes for households in
villages that received a program road to households in villages that had yet to receive a program
road.
I also take advantage of the fact that in some cases, program-ineligible villages were incidentally
treated as they were in the proximity of unconnected villages, and a new road was built connect-
ing them. Despite being ineligible for the program, these villages benefitted from an increase in
connectivity to the broader rural road network. I construct the relevant control group for these in-
cidentally treated villages, which consists of program-ineligible villages with unconnected villages
in their proximity that had yet to be treated under the program, in ArcGIS using a database spanning
the universe of geocoded villages in India. Estimating this spillover effect on incidental villages
has numerous important advantages: first, it abstracts from program rules and subsequently, is not
susceptible to any bias that could arise from deviations in program rules; second, it allows me to go
beyond estimating the effects of the program on the targeted program-eligible population; and third,
it can be used to rule out numerous channels that could be underlying the effects on agricultural
production.
Prior to estimating the effects on agricultural production, I first account for potential changes in
3
composition that may arise if improvements in road infrastructure induce the movement of workers
out of agriculture. Asher and Novosad (2016) examine the same program and find that rural road
construction led to a movement of households out of agriculture into wage labor, with effects being
strongest in villages close to major cities, suggesting the importance of access to external labor
markets. I document a similar movement of households out of agriculture in my sample, and I show
that this effect is driven entirely by households with access to the non-agricultural sector proxied for
by distance to the closest town. Subsequently, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects
of improved rural road infrastructure on households’ production decisions in agriculture, I focus
my analysis on households in remote villages far from towns, where I observe no movement out of
agriculture.
I find that households in remote villages who gain access to improved rural road connectivity
diversify their crop portfolio - in addition to cultivating staple cereal grains, they begin cultivating
higher return, non-cereal hybrid crops that are typically sold in markets. I find a 55% increase in
the share of total land cultivated under non-cereals. Households also significantly increase take up
of productive agricultural technologies such as high-yielding variety seeds, chemical fertilizers and
irrigation, and intensify hiring of agricultural workers. Lastly, I observe significant entry into sales
of farm output, with a 24 percentage points increase in households selling high-yielding variety
crops. I find significant heterogeneity by households’ landholdings, with effects largely driven by
small-scale cultivators.
I provide evidence in support of one channel underlying these effects: an increase inmobility of agri-
cultural workers across connected village labor markets, which subsequently enabled households
to engage in relative more input-intensive agricultural processes. The cultivation of commercial
hybrid crops is both labor- and capital-intensive, relative to traditional cereals. I find a substantial
52% increase in casual agricultural hiring, consistent with improved infrastructure facilitating the
movement of agricultural laborers across connected village labor markets. This increase in worker
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mobility is also reflected in a 35% increase in bicycle ownership among households who gain
access to improved rural road connectivity. I provide evidence to rule out alternative channels such
as a reduction in input prices and an increase in access to input and output markets. Finally, I
provide suggestive evidence from a field survey conducted across 18 remote villages in 3 districts
in rural Odisha, India, that suggests that the reliability of agricultural labor is a big concern among
cultivators.
This paper adds to a large literature that seeks to understand barriers to productive investments in
agriculture.6 Low take up of technologies that increase agricultural productivity has been attributed
to high costs, credit constraints, limited access to information, aversion to risk, and behavioral
biases, to name a few.7 This has given rise to recent micro studies that attempt to relax these
barriers through privately-provided interventions such as fertilizer subsidies (Duflo et al., 2011),
cash grants and rainfall index insurance (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), and agricultural
advice services (Cole and Fernando, 2016), with mixed success. While the role of infrastructure
as a barrier in take up has been discussed in this literature - Suri (2011) attributes the high costs
of acquiring new technologies to high transport costs that accrue due to poor infrastructure - there
exists no empirical evidence to date that estimates the causal effects of transport infrastructure on
subsequent productive investments. I add to this literature by documenting that improved rural road
connectivity leads to significant take up of improved agricultural technologies, with these effects
operating through increased integration of village labormarkets across space. In doing so, I examine
a unique setting - a large-scale intervention that is publicly provided by the Indian government -
6See Feder et al. (1985) for a survey of barriers to technology adoption in agriculture in low-income countries,
and Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) for a more recent survey on barriers to technology adoption generalized to a range
of technologies and settings.
7Suri (2011) demonstrates that low rates of adoption of technologies such as hybrid maize are correlated with
high costs of acquiring the technologies due to poor infrastructure, and Porteous (2016) shows using a counterfactual
estimation that agricultural technology adoption only increases farmers’ income when trade costs are low. Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995) document that information frictions serve as a barrier in adoption of hybrid seeds, and explore
the role of learning by doing and learning from others in alleviating this barrier. Munshi (2004), Bandiera and Rasul
(2006) and Conley and Udry (2010) further explore the role of social learning in the diffusion of new technologies.
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which contrasts with the privately provided micro interventions described above.
This paper also contributes to a growing empirical literature that estimates the causal effects of
transportation infrastructure investments on economic outcomes. A bulk of these studies have
evaluated large-scale transport infrastructure systems that reduce transport costs of goods and
travel times of individuals across regions, focusing on aggregate outcomes such as GDP levels,
real income, and trade volumes.8 The transport infrastructure that I examine in this paper is
a much smaller system of local roads that link villages to other nearby villages or to the local
road network. Such a system would be expected to generate effects on local economic growth
and development, in contrast to the macro effects that are observed with large-scale infrastructure
systems. I study India’s Prime Minister’s Rural Road Building Program as a natural experiment to
provide empirical evidence on the effects of improved rural road connectivity on household-level
production decisions.
Finally, this paper makes several contributions to a smaller literature on local intra-regional roads.
First, I use a household-level panel that is well-suited to studying agricultural outcomes in order
to examine how households’ production decisions in agriculture evolve over time in response to
improved infrastructure. Previous studies examining the impacts of local infrastructure provision
have used cross-sectional or aggregated panel data and have focused on outcomes such as land
values (Jacoby, 2000; Shrestha, 2015; Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque, 2016), market
prices of crops (Casaburi et al., 2013), wage labor market participation (Asher and Novosad, 2016),
employment in themanufacturing sector (Gertler et al., 2016) and farmland cultivated under hybrids
at the district level (Aggarwal, 2015). Second, I explore distributional effects across the population,
which bears important implications for policy. Third, I conduct a survey among cultivators in rural
8For example, Banerjee et al. (2012) estimates the effect of highways in China on per capita GDP levels and growth;
Allen and Atkin (2016) examine the effects of expanding India’s highway network on trade costs and subsequently,
farmers’ revenue volatility and portfolio choice; Jedwab and Moradi (2016) estimate the effect of colonial railroads
in Ghana on the spatial distribution and aggregate level of economic activity; Donaldson (forthcoming) estimates the
impact of railroads in India on agricultural trade costs, interregional price gaps, trade volumes and real income; and
Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) estimate the effect of the expansion of railroads in the US on agricultural land values.
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Odisha, India in order to provide suggestive evidence for a labor mobility channel underlying the
main effects.
The body of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the Indian setting and provides
institutional detail on the road-building program. Section 1.3 describes the data and presents
descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 details the empirical strategy. Section 1.5 presents the main
estimation results. Section 1.6 discusses potential channels and presents survey evidence. Section
1.7 presents robustness checks, and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Setting
This section describes the Indian context and provides institutional detail on the road-building
program. Program rules generated exogenous variation in the timing of road construction, which I
exploit to overcome the challenge of endogenous road placement. Program administration utilized
two key features of a village - baseline connectivity status and total population size - in determining
eligibility for a program road as well as the precise timing of program road construction.
In 2000, an estimated 330,000 of India’s 825,000 rural villages lacked any all-weather road access.9
Existing road infrastructure in these villages consisted of dirt or fair-weather roads - often filled with
potholes and equipped with poor drainage systems - rendering them prone to water logging once
the monsoon rains set in. This translated to approximately 300 million people living in villages
characterized by low spatial mobility, with little/no motorized traffic volume and the movement of
workers and goods mostly done on foot, by bicycle, or using hand-held carts.
In response to this lack of connectivity, the Central Government of India launched the Pradhan
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, or the Prime Minister’s Rural Road Building Program, hereafter
9To put this in a global context, the Rural Access Index developed at World Bank estimates that over one billion
people, 98% of them in developing countries, live more than 2 kilometers away from the nearest all-weather road.
Improving access and mobility through infrastructure thus remains a key priority in economic development policy not
only in India, but across many other developing nations.
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PMGSY, inDecember 2000, with the primary objective of providing single, all-weather connectivity
in targeted villages. PMGSYwas launched as a 100%Centrally-sponsored scheme, with the Central
Government providing full funding and State Governments managing project implementation.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the scale at which the program was implemented. Over the first decade of the
program, an average of 22,000 kilometers of roads were built annually. With 480,000 kilometers
of rural roads built to date,10 PMGSY has doubled the size of the existing paved road network in
rural India.
PMGSY envisaged the provision of single, all-weather11 connectivity in all rural villages across
India.12 Any village with a pre-existing all-weather road within 500 meters of its boundaries
was classified as connected, and subsequently, program-ineligible. Only unconnected villages -
villages located at least 500 meters away from an all-weather road or from another village with an
all-weather road - were deemed eligible for program roads. Program roads were constructed so as
to enable access to the closest market center, identified by the program as the “center of activities
for marketing agricultural produce and inputs, servicing of agricultural implements, health, higher
education, postal, banking services etc."
PMGSY was specific about the categories of rural roads that were eligible for construction under
the program and the possible linkages that could be generated by these roads. All program roads
had to fall under one of the two lowest categories of rural roads: they could be either Village Roads
(VR) that connected villages with each other or to the nearest road of a higher category, or Other
District Roads (ODR) that connected villages to other main roads, the block headquarters, or the
market center. All higher category rural roads (Major District Roads, State Highways and National
10September 2016 figures. The program is still ongoing, and is currently in Phase XI of implementation. The
program has an ambitious goal of completing road construction in the remaining 65,000 unconnected villages by 2019
(India Budget 2016).
11By definition, an all-weather road is a road that is equipped with the necessary cross-drainage structures that
allow it to be operable during all weathers throughout the year. (PMGSY Manual for the Preparation of District Rural
Road Plans)
12Rural and urban boundaries are well-defined in the Indian Census.
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Highways) were strictly excluded under the program. Program roads thus linked unconnected
villages to either the closest village with an all-weather road, the closest all-weather road, the
market center or the block headquarters. (PMGSY Manual for the Preparation of District Rural
Road Plans)
Implementation of PMGSY proceeded as follows: every state was required to draw up a priority
listing in which all unconnected villages within the state were ranked by village population size;13
a village with a larger population ranked higher. This priority listing determined the order in
which roads were to be constructed.14 Based on the amount of funding made available each year,
the State Level Standing Committee then shortlisted the planned road works from this priority
listing.15
1.3 Data
This section describes the datasets I use in my empirical analysis. The data is a combination
of a panel survey of rural households, the administrative PMGSY database, the Indian Popula-
tion Census and a database containing the universe of geocoded natural villages in India. This
highly disaggregated panel dataset allows me to estimate the causal effects of improved rural road
infrastructure on production decisions in agriculture.
13As recorded in the 2001 Population Census
14The initial goal of PMGSY was for all unconnected villages with a population of 1000 persons and above to be
covered by 2003 and for all unconnected villages with a population of 500 persons and above to be covered by 2007.
For certain Hill States (North-East, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Uttaranchal), as well as designated
Desert and Tribal areas, the program prioritized unconnected villages with a population of 250 persons and above.
Given that the REDS dataset used in this analysis only covers the 17 major states, the 250 persons cutoff is not relevant
to my empirical setting.
15In practice, program implementation first entailed having all districts create a District Rural Road Plan (DRRP)
- a complete mapping of all existing and planned roads that would provide connectivity to every village within the
district - along with an accompanying list of all unconnected villages. Once finalized by the District Panchayat (head),
the DRRP and village listing were then submitted to the State Level Standing Committee. This plan constituted the
extent of preparation of projects under PMGSY at the district-level. At the state level, a priority ranking of villages
across all districts was then generated.
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REDS Data. I use village- and household-level surveys from two rounds of the Rural Economic
& Demographic Survey (REDS), administered by the National Council of Applied Economic
Research (NCAER).16 This nationally representative survey of rural households in India spans 242
villages spread across 100 districts in 17 major states, as mapped in Figure 1.2. I use the two
most recent rounds - rounds 4 and 5, which correspond to years 1999 and 2006 respectively - to
construct a balanced household-level panel. I restrict my sample to households that were observed
in both periods.17 Further, some household units split over time, resulting in redistribution of
1999 household members across multiple households in 2006. To maintain balance, I aggregate
all 2006 households back to the original 1999 household unit level.18 All observations are at the
household-year level. Finally, given that NCAER over samples certain types of households, I weigh
all observations using sampling weights provided by NCAER.
I use the following REDS survey modules for my analysis - households’ landholdings, agricultural
material inputs and labor use (hired and family), agricultural outputs, crop sales, crop revenues
and profits, and households’ labor supply. Table 1.1 summarizes key variables for all households
in the balanced REDS panel. The average household size is 6. 79% of these households are
Hindu, and 69% of households own some land. 59% of households are cultivating land in 1999;
the average amount of land cultivated is 2.4 acres. 47% of households cultivate cereal crops,
and a smaller 33% cultivate non-cereals. In terms of farm input investments, 27% and 25% of
households purchase high-yielding varieties (HYVs) and irrigation respectively, and 55% and 45%
of households utilize family and hired labor respectively. Approximately 30% of households engage
in the casual agricultural and non-agricultural labor markets, working an average of 96 man-days
in agriculture and 85 man-days in non-agriculture.
16I thank Andrew Foster and NCAER for sharing the REDS secure data files with village identifiers.
17There is attrition across each round of REDS. In order to maintain representativeness, households were added to
the panel over time. In Section 1.7.4, I test for differential attrition across treatment and control villages.
18I followMunshi&Rosenzweig (2016), who perform a similar aggregation of households when creating a balanced
panel using the 1982 and 1999 REDS rounds.
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OMMS Data. I download administrative records of PMGSY from the Online Management
& Monitoring System (OMMS), an online reporting system used by PMGSY administration to
track and monitor road works.19 The administrative records contain the following information at
the village level: connectivity status and population size at baseline (which determine program
eligibility), dates at which the program road was sanctioned and a work order was issued, costs
associated with the program road, length of the program road as well as information on other
villages connected by the program road.
Census of India. I download Primary Census Abstract data from the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Indian
population censuses; I use this data to validate my parallel trends assumption in Section 1.7.1.
This village-level data contains demographic variables such as population, gender and caste ratios,
literacy rates, as well as a breakdown of the population across broad employment categories.
India Place Finder. I download the Hamlets database, which contains the universe of geocoded
natural villages in India, along with latitude and longitude coordinates of the REDS villages
from India Place Finder20 to construct my control groups using ArcGIS software. I describe this
construction in detail in Section 1.4.1.
I match across the multiple data sources outlined above using state, district and village-level
identifiers.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
This section describes my empirical strategy. In Section 1.4.1, I detail the construction of treatment
and control groups in my sample in order to estimate the causal effects of improved rural road
19This can be publicly accessed at http://omms.nic.in.
20This can be publicly accessed at http://india.csis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/, courtesy of the Mizushima Laboratory, Depart-
ment of Oriental History, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo.
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connectivity on agricultural production. In Section 1.4.2, I specify the difference-in-differences
framework. In Section 1.4.3, I account for compositional effects resulting from the movement of
workers out of agriculture.
1.4.1 Defining Treatment & Control Groups
In constructing treatment and control groups, I exploit rules outlined in Section 1.2 that governed
the timing of road construction under the program. Road construction in an unconnected village
was determined by its rank relative to that of other unconnected villages in the state, with ranks
generated using village population size. As such, within a state, larger unconnected villages
received program roads before smaller unconnected villages. The rollout of program roads based
on this rank ordering generated exogenous variation in the timing of road construction.
Figure 1.3 summarizes the timeline. I observe households inRound 4 of theREDS survey conducted
in 1999, prior to the start of the program. The program launched in December 2000, and road
construction commenced shortly after in 2001. I then observe households again in 2006, when
Round 5 of the REDS survey was conducted. By 2006, some of the larger unconnected villages
had received program roads, while the smaller unconnected villages had not.
I think about improvements in connectivity under the program in 2 ways. First, I exploit variation
in the timing at which unconnected villages were exposed to new roads under PMGSY. To identify
treatment and control villages, I match the REDS villages to OMMS administrative records so as
to determine program eligibility and timing of road construction in unconnected villages. Uncon-
nected villages that receive PMGSY roads prior to 2006 are classified as treated and unconnected
villages that receive PMGSY roads after 2006 are classified as control.
Second, I exploit a particular type of road linkage built under the program, which resulted in some
previously connected villages also being exposed to new roads under PMGSY. This occurred in
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cases where unconnected villages received a new road under PMGSY, and the program road linked
them to a nearby previously connected village with an existing all-weather road.21 This nearby
village thus gained an additional road linkage despite being previously connected and subsequently,
ineligible for the program.
Exploiting this second connection has numerous important advantages. First, it completely abstracts
from program rules that determine eligibility and timing of road provision. Thus, it would not be
susceptible to any bias that could arise due to deviations in project implementation from program
rules. Second, it allows for the estimation of spillover effects in addition to direct effects of program
roads. Despite having a pre-existing all-weather road, there can be substantial gains in agriculture
from an expansion of the rural road network. For example, additional road connectivity to a
previously unconnected village can potentially lead to: (i) access to new markets to hire farm labor;
(ii) access to new markets to sell farm output; (iii) access to traders who travel to villages to procure
farm output; and (iv) access to extension workers who travel to villages to promote/sell farm inputs.
Third, it informs the potential channels underlying the effects on agricultural production as it allows
me to rule out several classes of channels that might be at play.
To identify treatment and control villages, I spatially track the REDS villages and identify other
Census villages in their proximity. First, I geo-reference all the REDS villages by downloading
longitude and latitude coordinates from India Place Finder. Second, I identify all Census villages
within a five kilometer radius22 of each previously connected REDS village using a database
containing the universe of geocoded villages in India in ArcGIS software.23 Third, I match these
Census villages to the OMMS database in order to determine program eligibility as well as timing
21As detailed in Section 1.2, roads built under the program linked an eligible village to the closest: (i) village with
an all-weather road, (ii) all-weather road, (iii) market center or (iv) block headquarters.
22The mean PMGSY road length is 4.2 km. Results are robust to different specifications for this radius, and are
available upon request.
23I thank Jeremiah Trinidad-Christensen at the Columbia Digital Social Science Center for sharing the Census State
and District Boundaries shape files, as well as for his help with ArcGIS.
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of road construction.24 Previously connected villages with an unconnected village in its proximity
that receives a PMGSY road prior to 2006 are classified as treated.
Once all treatment villages are identified, the next step is to construct the relevant counterfactual
control group. Using all previously connected villages that did not receive this incidental treatment
would appear to be a natural control group; however, this group could easily violate the parallel
trends assumption. For example, a village within a densely connected area where all villages are
connected could possibly trend differentially from a village within a more sparsely connected area,
where some villages are connected, but there exists other unconnected villages in their proximity.
Instead, I construct a control group that is analogous to the control group in the first connection.
This group consists of all previously connected villages with unconnected villages in their proximity
that receive PMGSY roads after 2006.
1.4.2 Empirical Specification
I estimate the effects of improved rural road infrastructure on a set of household-level outcomes
in a difference-in-differences framework, where I compare the evolution of outcomes for treated
households in villages that have received a program road to control households in villages that have
yet to receive a program road.
Restricting the sample to unconnected, program-eligible villages, themost basic estimating equation
takes the form:
yivst = β DirectTreatv ∗ Post + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst (1)
where yivst are outcome variables for household i in village v and state s at time t; DirectTreatv
is an indicator that equals 1 if unconnected village v receives a program road before 2006; Post is
24One limitation here is that I am unable to directly observe the local road network. As such, I employ this
alternative method in order to back out treatment and control villages.
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an indicator for the year 2006; and β is the coefficient of interest. Any time-invariant or household
characteristics are absorbed by the household fixed effects ρi, and any annual shocks that are
common across villages in a state are captured by the state-year fixed effects, γst . Any trends
correlated with village population are picked up by the baseline number of households in village
v and its square Xv interacted with Post. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights.
To allow for serial correlation of ε ivst within villages over time, I adjust the standard errors by
clustering at the village level.
In restricting the sample to unconnected, program-eligible villages, I drop observations from all
program-ineligible villages, which are useful in estimating state-year fixed effects. To improve
statistical power, I augment Equation 1 to include this group:
yivst = β DirectTreatv ∗ Post + α Ineligiblev ∗ Post + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst (2)
Ineligiblev is an indicator that equals 1 if village v was deemed ineligible for a program road.
The coefficient of interest β is still estimated off the sample of unconnected, program-eligible
villages, as the Ineligiblev ∗ Post interaction term absorbs changes in outcomes for the program-
ineligible villages in the post period. I use Equation 2 as my main specification when estimating
the direct effect of road construction; results are robust to restricting the analysis to unconnected,
program-eligible villages in Equation 1.
Interpreting the coefficient of interest β as the causal effect of access to improved rural road
infrastructure relies on the assumption that within a state, the construction of program roads is not
correlated with time-varying village characteristics that affect outcomes through channels other
than the program road. I test the validity of this assumption in Section 1.7.
Table 1.2 presents baseline village-level characteristics of all unconnected, program-eligible vil-
lages, by treatment status. I look at characteristics such as village size, proximity to key infras-
tructure, aggregate agricultural activity, harvest prices as well as prevailing wages in the casual
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labor market. Consistent with the program rules, I observe that the mean population size is greater
in Treatment villages than Control villages, though this difference is not significant (p-value of
difference 0.677). Treatment villages are also relatively further away from key infrastructure such
as bus stops, banks, wholesale markets and towns; these differences are not significant. Agricultural
wages appear to be significantly higher in treatment villages at baseline.
Restricting the sample to previous connected villages, the most basic estimating equation takes the
form:
yivst = β IncidentalTreatv ∗ Post + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst (3)
IncidentalTreatv is an indicator that equals 1 if a previously connected village v receives a program
road before 2006. To improve statistical power, I augment Equation 3 to include all other villages
in my sample (indicated by NonIncv) which help in the estimation of state-year fixed effects. The
estimating equation takes the form:
yivst = β IncidentalTreatv ∗ Post + α NonIncv ∗ Post + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst (4)
The coefficient of interest β is still estimated off the sample of previously connected villages as
the NonIncv ∗ Post interaction term absorbs changes in outcomes for the other villages in the
post period. I use Equation 4 as my main specification when estimating the spillover effects of
road construction; results are robust to restricting the analysis to previously connected villages in
Equation 3.
Table 1.3 presents baseline village-level characteristics of all previously connected villages, by
treatment status. I look at the same set of outcomes as in Table 1.2; none of these outcomes are
significantly different across Treatment and Control villages.
Pooled Effect. To maximize power, I examine the pooled effect of treatment across the unconnected
and previously connected villages for several key outcomes. The estimating equation takes the
form:
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yivst = β Treatv ∗Post+η Ineligiblev ∗Post+ µ NonIncv ∗Post+ ρi+γst+δ Xv∗Post+ε ivst
(5)
Treat is an indicator that equals 1 if village v receives a program road before 2006.
1.4.3 Accounting for Movement out of Agriculture
In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of improved rural road infrastructure on house-
holds’ production decisions in agriculture, I have to first account for compositional effects as road
infrastructure may induce the movement of workers across sectors. Asher and Novosad (2016) find
that PMGSY led to a 10 pp reduction in the share of households in agriculture, with an equivalent
increase in participation in wage labor. As such, simply conditioning on households within a village
that remain in agriculture could lead to biased estimates as there may be selection in the types of
households that move out of agriculture.
To account for this potential movement, I use a proxy for households’ access to employment oppor-
tunities in the non-agricultural sector. Within village boundaries, non-agricultural opportunities
are limited. Workers often commute to nearby factories or towns25 when seeking non-agricultural
employment in low-skilled manufacturing or in construction. I thus use the distance between vil-
lages and their closest town to construct a proxy for access to the non-agricultural sector. Figure
1.4 plots the distribution of distances between each village in the REDS sample and the nearest
town at baseline; the median distance is 10 kilometers.
I define my proxy for access to employment in non-agriculture to be a binary indicator that takes
the value 1 when a village is within 10 kilometers of the nearest town. This cutoff is conservative
in the Indian context where daily commuting distances are low. Appendix Figure A.1 summarizes
information collected in the 2011 India Census on commuting patterns among non-agricultural
25A Census town is defined as: (i) Population exceeding 5000 and (ii) At least 75% of the male working population
employed outside the agricultural sector.
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workers in rural India. 38% of workers have no commute to work, 22% commute by foot, and 13%
commute by bicycle. Further, for over 80% of workers, the daily commuting distance is less than
10 kilometers. Using a 10 kilometer cutoff as a proxy for access to employment in non-agriculture
is thus reasonable in this setting. My results are robust to alternative distance cutoffs; I discuss this
further in Section 1.7.3.
I fully interact the variables in Equations 2, 4 and 5 with this binary proxy measure. The estimating
equations for the direct, spillover and pooled effects respectively take the form:
yivst = β1 DirectTreatv ∗ Post + β2 DirectTreatv ∗ Post ∗ Closev + α1 Ineligiblev ∗ Post
+ α2 Ineligiblev ∗ Post ∗ Closev + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst (6)
yivst = β1 IncidentalTreatv ∗Post+ β2 IncidentalTreatv ∗Post ∗Closev+α1 NonIncv ∗Post
+ α2 NonIncv ∗ Post ∗ Closev + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst (7)
yivst = β1 Treatv ∗Post+ β2 Treatv ∗Post ∗Closev+η1 Ineligiblev ∗Post+ µ1 NonIncv ∗Post
+ η2 Ineligiblev ∗ Post ∗Closev + µ2 NonIncv ∗ Post ∗Closev + ρi + γst + δ Xv ∗ Post + ε ivst
(8)
Closev is an indicator that equals 1 if village v is within 10 kilometers of the nearest town at baseline.
β1 + β2 captures the effect of access to improved road infrastructure for households that are in
close proximity to a town, and subsequently, to employment opportunities in the non-agricultural
sector, while β1 captures the effect of improved access to road infrastructure for households that
are further away from towns.
18
1.5 Results
This section presents the empirical results. In Section 1.5.1, I validate the use of program rules
in obtaining causal estimates by establishing that program rules were followed. In Section 1.5.2,
I show that the provision of improved rural road infrastructure led to crop diversification, take up
of productive agricultural inputs and commercialization of farm output. In Section 1.5.3, I explore
heterogeneous effects across the population.
1.5.1 Compliance with Program Rules
This subsection provides evidence for compliance of program implementation with the stated
program rules. Column 1 of Table 3.2 shows that villages that were deemed unconnected by
program administration were 55% less likely to report having any type of road in the village at
baseline.26 Next, Column 2 shows that for villages that were deemed eligible for a program road
i.e. unconnected at baseline with a village population greater than 500, there was a 38.8 percentage
points increase in the probability of having a program road in their village by 2006, significant at
the 1% level. This establishes that program rules were enforced, validating the use of these rules
in obtaining causal estimates of improved rural road infrastructure on agricultural outcomes.
1.5.2 Reduced Form Results
This subsection presents my main results on production decisions in agriculture. I begin by first
estimating the effects of improved rural road infrastructure on households’ activity status. As
discussed in Section 1.4.3, I have to account for the potential movement of workers across sectors
before estimating the effects on households’ production decisions in agriculture. To do this, I
26The program was very particular in the type of road it constructed - they had to be hard-topped, all-weather roads.
This implied that villages that with dirt/fair-weather roads at baseline were considered unconnected, for the purposes
of the program.
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look at two outcomes that reflect households’ activity status in Table 1.5: an indicator for whether
the household cultivates any agricultural land; and the total number of man-days worked by all
members of the household in the casual labor market for non-agriculture.
Panel A of Table 1.5 summarizes the pooled treatment effects of improved rural road infrastructure
on households’ activity status. Among households treated by the program, there is a 10 percentage
points decline in cultivation as shown in Column (1), though this effect is not significant.27 The
F-test p-value of 0.019 in Column (2) suggests that this decline is driven entirely by households
in villages close to towns: there is a 33.8 percentage points reduction - equivalent to a 57%
decline, relative to the baseline mean - in households’ engagement in cultivation. This decline is
accompanied by an increase of 44 man-days worked in non-agriculture for households in villages
close to towns, as shown in Column (4). Note that for households further away from towns, there is
no significant exit from cultivation and no change in the number of man-days worked in the casual
labor market for non-agriculture.
Panels B and C of Table 1.5 summarize the treatment effects for the unconnected and previously
connected villages respectively. In both panels, a similar pattern of results emerge for households
in villages close to towns - a reduction in households’ engagement in agriculture and an increase
in man-days worked in non-agriculture. The results in Table 1.5 demonstrate that households who
gain access to increased rural road connectivity exit from agriculture, and this effect entirely driven
by households with access to employment in the non-agricultural sector. Given this significant
movement of households out of the agricultural sector in villages within close proximity to towns, I
focus only on remote households further away from towns when analyzing the effects of improved
road infrastructure on agricultural outcomes. To maximize power, I use the pooled Equation 8 for
the remainder of my analysis, and I restrict attention to the coefficient β1, the treatment effect on
households further away from towns.
27This is similar in magnitude to effect sizes in Asher & Novosad (2016); they find a 10 percentage points reduction
in the share of households reporting cultivation as their primary income source.
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I now move to estimating the effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ crop choice.
Households often cultivate staple cereal grains such as paddy, wheat and maize for subsistence
use, and cultivate commercial non-cereal crops such as fruits, vegetables and fiber crops for sale
in the market. This is evident among households in my REDS sample at baseline - only 0.3%
of cultivators with no observed market activity grow non-cereal crops, while 64.2% of cultivators
engaged in some market activity grow non-cereal crops. Examining crop choice is thus indicative
of households’ intentions to retain their farm output for home consumption or to sell their farm
output in nearby product markets.
In the REDS agricultural modules, I observe for every season and for every crop grown by the
household the amount of land that is cultivated as well as the use of high-yielding varieties. I
aggregate this data to the household level in constructing the following outcomes: indicators
for whether the household cultivates any non-cereal and cereal crops; the share of land that is
cultivated under non-cereals; and indicators for the use of high-yielding varieties, broken down
into two categories - non-cereal and cereal.
Table 1.6 summarizes the pooled treatment effects of improved rural road infrastructure on house-
holds’ crop choice. First, there is a significant extensive margin response in non-cereal cultivation -
I find a 25.7 percentage points increase in households cultivating any non-cereals in Column (1). I
observe a non-significant decline in households cultivating any cereals in Column (2). Second, there
also appears to be a significant intensive margin response - conditioning on households cultivating
land in both periods in Column (4), I find a 55% increase in the share of land cultivated under non-
cereals, relative to the baseline mean. Third, there is substantial take up of high-yielding varieties
for non-cereal crops, significant at the 1% level, in Column (5). While take up of high-yielding
varieties is also positive for cereal crops in Column (6), this coefficient is not significant.28
28Panels A and B of Appendix Table A.1 summarize the treatment effects of improved rural road infrastructure on
households’ crop choice for the unconnected and previously connected villages respectively.
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The results in Table 1.6 demonstrate that households who gain improved road connectivity begin
cultivating hybrid non-cereal crops, and at the same time, continue to cultivate staple cereal grains
on some portion of their land. This shift towards cultivation of commercial, non-cereal crops is
suggestive of households’ intentions to market their farm output; I empirically examine households’
market activity in Table 1.8.
Next, I examine the effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ usage of agricultural
inputs. In particular, I focus on decisions to invest in productivity-enhancing agricultural technolo-
gies as well as farm labor use. To do this, I construct the following outcomes at the household level:
indicators for the purchase of high-yielding variety seeds, irrigation (pumps, storage tanks, water
etc.), organic manure and chemical fertilizers; and the number of labor-days utilized per cultivated
acre, broken down into 3 categories - total, hired and family.
Table 1.7 summarizes the pooled treatment effects of improved road infrastructure on households’
farm input decisions. There is a significant increase in households’ take up of material inputs such
high-yielding variety seeds, irrigation, manure and fertilizer, as seen in Columns (1)-(4). Further,
there is a substantial increase in farm labor use, with a 46% increase in the total number of labor
days invested per acre of cultivated land, significant at the 5% level in Column (5). This is driven
by a 52% increase in the number of labor-days hired per acre of cultivated land in Column (6). This
increase is accompanied by an increase in the number of family labor-days employed per acre of
cultivated land in Column (7), though this effect is not significant. Households are not substituting
between hired labor and family labor, but instead, increasing investments in both categories.29 This
increase in labor use is observed across all farm operations, as seen in Appendix Table A.3. Given
strong complementarities between high-yielding variety seeds and other inputs of production30
29Panels A and B of Appendix Table A.2 summarize the treatment effects of improved rural road infrastructure on
households’ farm input decisions for the unconnected and previously connected villages respectively.
30Previous work has documented that high-yielding varieties are more sensitive to modern inputs such as chemical
fertilizers, as well as traditional inputs such as water. The sowing of high-yielding variety seeds, the application of
chemical fertilizers and manure, and the management of irrigation systems are all labor-intensive processes. Further, as
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(Duflo and Pande, 2007; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010; Suri, 2011), this result is consistent with
households increasingly cultivating high-yielding variety crops and subsequently investing in the
complementary material and labor inputs required to cultivate these crops successfully.
The results in Table 1.7 are robust to alternative definitions of the farm input variables, as shown
in Appendix Table A.4, where I use the log of total expenditures for each of the inputs. Appendix
Table A.5 illustrates that these results are also robust to restricting the sample to villages further
away from towns (Panel A), to unconnected and previously connected villages (Panel B), and to
unconnected and previously connected villages further away from towns (Panel C).
It is worth noting that the effect sizes that I find - a 26pp (77%) increase in cultivation of non-cereals,
a 24pp (91%) increase in HYV use, and a 25pp (100%) increase in irrigation use - are larger than
effect sizes found in other micro studies. For example, Cole et al. (2013) find a 12% increase in
planting of higher-return/higher-risk cash crops among Indian farmers provided with rainfall index
insurance. Duflo et al. (2011) find a 47-60% increase in fertilizer adoption among Kenyan farmers
offered free fertilizer delivery early in the season. Cole and Fernando (2016) find a 60% increase
in irrigation expenditures among Indian farmers provided with mobile-phone based agricultural
advice.
Finally, I examine the effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ productmarket activity.
To do this, I construct the following outcome variables: an indicator for whether the household
engages in any crop sales; an indicator for whether the household engages in the sales of high-yield
variety crops; log sales revenues; log empirical profits; and log imputed profits, where I impute the
cost of family labor valued at the prevailing market wage at the village level. I find a 16 percentage
points, or 30% increase, in entry into sales of farm output among households that received a program
road in Column (1) of Table 1.8. Further, there is a 24 percentage points increase in households
yields are higher, the adoption of high-yielding varieties is also associated with an increased demand for labor during
harvests.
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selling high-yielding variety crops, significant at the 10% level, in Column (2). Improved rural road
infrastructure thus led households to transition from subsistence to market-oriented, commercial
farming. Results on farm sales revenue and profits are presented in Columns (3)-(5); while positive,
all three coefficients are imprecisely estimated.
1.5.3 Heterogeneous Results
This subsection explores heterogeneous effects of improved road infrastructure. This exercise is
helpful in understanding how gains from connectivity are distributed across households and has
potentially important implications for policy. Given that the adoption of agricultural technologies
is associated with high upfront fixed costs and scale effects, I separately test for treatment effects
among households in different subgroups of cultivated landholdings.
Table 1.9 reports the treatment effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ crop choice
and usage of agricultural inputs separately for two subgroups: non and below median cultivators in
Panel A, and above median cultivators in Panel B. I construct these groups using the within-district
gross cultivated land distribution at baseline.
I find that the large positive average treatment effects described above in Section 1.5.2 are con-
centrated among small-scale (below median) cultivators. First, in Column (1) of Table 1.9, I find
a significant extensive margin response in non-cereal cultivation for below median cultivators in
Panel A; this response is not significant for above median cultivators in Panel B. Second, in Column
(2), I find substantial take up of non-cereal high-yielding varieties for below median cultivators in
Panel A, significant at the 5% level. Take up of high-yielding varieties is also positive for above
median cultivators in Panel B, though this coefficient is not significant. Third, in Columns (3)-(7),
I find a significant increase in investments in material inputs and farm labor, concentrated among
below median cultivators in Panel A. This increase in farm labor is driven by a significant increase
in the number of labor-days hired per acre of cultivated land, as seen in Column (8). It is worth
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noting that baseline use of non-cereals and material inputs was much lower for the below median
cultivators, relative to the above median cultivators. These findings thus suggest that small-scale
cultivators were more likely to be constrained by the high costs associated with making productive
investments in agriculture in the presence of poor infrastructure.
1.6 Potential Channels
This section presents evidence that supports a channel through which improved rural road infras-
tructure led to crop diversification and take up of agricultural technologies: an increase in mobility
of agricultural workers across connected labor markets. Next, it rules out alternative channels
such as a decline in input prices and an increase in access to farm input/output markets. Finally,
it presents survey evidence which suggests that the reliability of agricultural labor is an important
concern among cultivators.
Labor Mobility Channel. As described in Section 1.5.2, the cultivation of commercial hybrid
crops is labor- and capital-intensive relative to traditional crops, and there exists strong comple-
mentarities between hybrid seeds and other factors of production such as material inputs and labor.
Thus, for a household to successfully cultivate these crops, it requires timely access to these com-
plementary inputs to production. In Column (6) of Table 1.7, I find that improved rural road
infrastructure led households to increase the intensity of farm labor use, particularly that of hired
labor – I find a substantial 52% increase in the number of labor-days hired per acre of cultivated
land. This is consistent with the idea that improved rural road infrastructure connected adjacent
village labor markets, increasing the mobility of agricultural workers across space. This in turn
enabled households to engage in relatively more labor-intensive cultivation practices, by drawing
labor from connected labor markets whenever needed to support farm operations.
To further explore this channel of increased labor mobility, I examine the reduced form effect of
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improved rural road infrastructure on households’ ownership of bicycles and scooters, two important
modes of transport in this setting.31 I construct indicators that equal 1 if the household reports
owning a bicycle and scooter respectively. In Column (1) of Table 1.10, I find a 35% increase
in bicycle ownership among households that received a program road, significant at the 5% level.
I find a non-significant increase in scooter ownership in Column (2). This is consistent with the
idea that households increasingly invest in assets that allow for greater mobility in the presence of
improved rural road infrastructure.
Alternative Channels. There are several alternative channels that could also explain my results.
While I am unable to rule out all possible alternatives, I consider the following: (1) a decline in
farm input prices; (2) an increase in access to input markets; (3) an increase in access to output
markets where farm output is sold; (4) an increase in access to credit; and (5) an increase in access
to information.
First, I estimate the effects of improved rural road connectivity on two key input prices – the
imputed price of high-yielding variety seeds and the casual daily agricultural cash wage. Given
that improvements in rural road infrastructure can alter both the supply and demand of these
inputs, the impact on prices is theoretically ambiguous. For example, increased connectivity across
connected labor markets may result in an increase in the agricultural labor supply flowing in to
a particular village, but this is subsequently counterbalanced by an increase in the demand for
agricultural labor among cultivators in the village, who are switching into more labor-intensive
cultivation practices. I find no significant changes in the price of hybrid seeds and agricultural
labor in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.10 respectively, suggesting that a reduction in farm input
prices is not a key channel driving the effects.32
31Car ownership is very low in this setting - only 0.1% of households own a car at baseline. Rural residents
commute short distances and predominantly rely on travel by foot or by two-wheelers such as bicycles and scooters.
This is consistent with evidence presented in Section 1.4.3 on commuting patterns among rural Indian workers.
32This null result on agricultural wages is also consistent with the presence of nominal wage rigidity in markets for
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Second, I focus on program roads that were built in previously connected villages, as described in
Section 1.4.1, in order to rule out a change in access to input and output markets. Given that these
previously connected villages had road connectivity and access to the market center at baseline,
any changes in access to input and output markets through a new road linkage to an unconnected
village would be second order. As shown in Appendix Table A.1 and A.2, the effects on crop
choice and usage of farm inputs are persistent when restricting to the previously connected villages,
suggesting that at least for this set of villages, a change in access to input and output markets is not
a key channel driving the effects.
Third, I estimate the effects of improved rural road connectivity on households’ demand for credit
from formal and informal sources – banks, local shopkeepers, moneylenders, and friends and
family networks. I find no significant change in households’ for demand credit from these sources
(Columns (5)-(9) of Table 1.10), suggesting that a change in access to credit is not a key channel
driving the effects.
Fourth, I test for heterogeneity in treatment effects across villages with different levels of non-cereal
cultivation at baseline. If the documented gains in agriculture are driven by information flows e.g.
learning how to cultivate non-cereals, I would expect to find larger effects in villages with low
levels of non-cereal cultivation relative to villages with high levels at baseline. Table 1.11 reports
the treatment effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ crop choice and usage of
agricultural inputs separately for two subgroups: villages with belowmedian non-cereal cultivation
at baseline in Panel A, and villages with above median non-cereal cultivation at baseline in Panel B.
I construct these groups by aggregating non-cereal cultivation across all households within a village
at baseline. I observe significant gains in agriculture across both panels in Table 1.11, suggesting
that a change in access to information is not a key channel driving these effects.
casual daily agricultural labor, which has been documented in this setting (Kaur, 2015).
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Survey Evidence. To provide supplementary evidence on the role of labor in agricultural pro-
duction, I surveyed 114 male cultivators in 18 rural villages across 3 districts in Odisha, India. All
villages surveyed have all-weather road access and are greater than 10km from the closest town.
The cultivators in my survey sample are similar on observables to cultivators in the REDS sample
at baseline; for example, the average amount of cultivated land in my sample is 2.52 acres (2.39
acres in REDS sample), and 53% cultivate non-cereal crops (56% in REDS sample).
I present cultivators with a series of questions to better understand their hiring practices. 92% of
cultivators report hiring laborers from inside the village first before hiring laborers from outside
the village. When asked why they choose to hire from inside the village first, 56% report knowing
laborers inside the village better, while 37% report that laborers from inside the village are more
reliable in terms of showing up to work. Further, when cultivators do hire laborers from outside
the village, only 32% report having to pay a higher wage in cash, while 82% report having to pay
more in kind. This increase in in-kind transfers could potentially explain why the casual daily
agricultural cash wage does not appear to respond in Table 1.10.
Despite having road connectivity, 42% of cultivators express facing difficulties in finding enough
hired laborers to work on their land in the past agricultural cycle. In contrast, only 5% and
7% of cultivators express having difficulty procuring agricultural inputs and selling farm output
respectively. This result is summarized in the top panel of Figure 1.5, and highlights that even
among cultivators with access to a road network, the reliability of agricultural labor remains to be
a concern.
I present cultivators with a hypothetical scenario where I describe the construction of a new road
that connects the village to a nearby village that was not easily accessible previously by road, and
elicit responses on how cultivation practices would be affected. 43% of cultivators report that it
would be easier for them to find workers to hire for work on their land and 29% report that they
would be able to hire workers more frequently, while only 8% report that it would be less expensive
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to hire labor (middle panel of Figure 1.5).
I present cultivators with a second hypothetical scenario where cultivators can choose to hire
workers from two equidistant villages - one with a hard-topped road and one with a dirt road. 99%
of cultivators report that workers from both villages would be equally hardworking. Despite the
lack of a quality differential across workers, 76% of cultivators express a strict preference for hiring
from the village with a hard-topped road (bottom panel of Figure 1.5). This suggests that improved
road infrastructure can play a role in alleviating a labor reliability constraint, even in villages that
have existing road connectivity at baseline.
1.7 Robustness Checks
This section details several robustness checks. First, I test the validity of the underlying parallel
trends assumption in my empirical strategy by looking at trends in outcomes using data from the
Indian Census as well as by conducting a placebo test. I find no evidence of violations of this
assumption. Second, I show that my results are not sensitive to alternate specifications of my proxy
for access to non-agriculture. Third, I test for differential attrition and splitting of households in my
constructed panel by treatment status, I find no significance differences. These robustness checks
validate the empirical strategy and the sample that I use in estimating the causal impact of improved
infrastructure on agricultural outcomes.
1.7.1 Pre-Trends
The difference-in-differences specification in my setting relies on the assumption that in the absence
of PMGSY, the evolution of outcomes in villages that received roads in earlier years would have
parallel trends with that of villages that received roads in later years; I empirically test the validity of
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this assumption by looking at trends in outcomes using data from the Indian Population Census.33
In particular, I use three rounds of the decennial census (1991, 2001 and 2011) to examine trends
in three outcomes - total village population, share of village population that is literate and the total
number of non-workers. Given that PMGSYwas launched in December 2000 and road construction
only commenced in 2001, I treat 1991 and 2001 as pre-PMGSY years. Next, I classify all villages
that received PMGSY roads between 2001-2010 as treated. One limitation of this exercise is that the
data only contains village demographic variables and a breakdown of the village population across
broad employment categories, so I am unable to look specifically at agricultural outcomes.34
Figure 1.6 plots the yearly means by treatment status for unconnected villages in Panel A, and for
previously connected villages in Panel B. There are two features worth highlighting. First, the
treated villages are larger than the control villages in Panel A; this is consistent with program rules
that dictated larger unconnected villages were to receive program roads before smaller unconnected
villages. Second, in all of the outcomes in both panels, the parallel trends assumption appears to
hold prior to 2011.
1.7.2 Placebo Test
To further validate my identifying assumption, I carry out a placebo test, whereTreat is an indicator
that equals 1 if the village received a program road between 2007-2010. I drop all villages that
received a program road prior to 2007; the relevant control group in this set up thus consists of
villages that received the program roads after 2010. If villages that were treated earlier by the
program were on differential trends from those that were treated later by the program, I would
expect to see significant effects for this placebo group. Appendix Table A.8 shows the results from
33There exists several earlier rounds of REDS which I do not use in this analysis. The surveys in Round 3 were
conducted in 1982, 17 years prior to Round 4. Given the long gap between the two rounds, the earlier rounds of REDS
are not ideal for pre-trend analysis.
34The Indian Government does conduct a separate Agricultural Census and Farm Inputs Survey, but this data is
aggregated to the block level, rendering it unsuitable for the purposes of this analysis.
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this placebo test on a subset of outcomes described in 1.5.2; none of the coefficients are significant
at the standard levels.
1.7.3 Alternate Specifications of Proxy for Access to Non-Agriculture
To validate the use of a binary proxy in my empirical strategy, I test the sensitivity of my results
to alternate specifications of this proxy. Throughout my analysis, the proxy I use for households’
access to employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector is a binary indicator that takes
the value 1 when a village is within 10 kilometers of the nearest town at baseline. I verify that my
results are robust to this proxy specification by repeating my analysis using two alternative distance
specifications: 5 and 15 kilometers.
Appendix Table A.6 estimates the effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ activity
status, using a 5 km cutoff in Columns (1) and (2), and a 15 km cutoff in Columns (3) and (4). I
find that the results are highly consistent with my findings in Table 1.5. Among directly treated
households in villages within 5 km of towns, I find a significant decline in households’ engagement
in cultivation (F-test p-value of 0.017), accompanied by an increase in man-days worked in the
casual labor market for non-agriculture (F-test p-value of 0.021). These effect sizes are larger in
magnitude than the effects I find with the 10 km cutoff in Table 1.5 - this is unsurprising and lends
further support to the spatial concentration of non-agricultural opportunities closer to towns. When
I move to the 15 km cutoff, the coefficients are imprecisely estimated but the sign of the effects
point in the right direction.
Appendix Table A.7 estimates the effects of improved road infrastructure on households’ crop
choices and farm input decisions using a 5 km cutoff in Panel A, and a 15 km cutoff in Panel B. As
before, I find that the results are highly consistent with my findings in Tables 1.6 and 1.7.
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1.7.4 REDS Sample Selection
There is some attrition between each round of the REDS survey. To maintain representativeness in
the sample, new households in each village were added every round. Further, household units split
over time. In constructing my balanced panel, I restrict my sample to households that appeared in
both Rounds 4 and 5, and aggregate them back to the original household unit level, as detailed in
Section 1.3. To ensure that the provision of rural roads under PMGSY did not generate selection in
this sample, I test for differential attrition and splitting of households, by treatment status. Appendix
Table A.9 shows that there was no differential attrition or splitting; none of the coefficients are
significant at the standard levels.
1.8 Discussion
In this paper, I provide causal evidence for the effects of improved rural road infrastructure on
households’ production decisions in agriculture. Using a panel of rural Indian households, I find that
the provision of rural roads led to crop diversification - households begin cultivating commercial
non-cereal hybrid crops in addition to staple cereal grains. It also led to the modernization of
cultivation practices through the adoption of improved technologies, an increase in labor hiring
and commercialization of farm output. I provide suggestive evidence using a survey in the field for
these effects operating through an increase in agricultural labor mobility across connected village
labor markets.
My findings suggest that poor rural road infrastructure which hampers the integration of labor
markets across space can serve as a substantial barrier to productive investments in agriculture.
There is a strong policy interest in both the provision of infrastructure and the adoption of agricultural
technologies as means towards sustainable poverty reduction - in the 2016-2017 Budget, the Central
Government of India allocated USD 14 billion to the roads sector and USD 11 billion to fertilizer
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subsidies for rural Indian farmers.35 This suggests that there are potential gains that could arise
from coupling infrastructure projects with other commonly used policy instruments such as fertilizer
and irrigation subsidies. Further, given heterogeneous effects of improved rural road connectivity
across space, my findings highlight the need to think about spatial targeting when designing such
policy interventions.
My findings also demonstrate that the gains that accrue to agricultural households extend beyond
the households targeted by the program, which suggests the importance of incorporating network
effects in the design of transport policy. Finally, my findings can be used to inform an ongoing
policy debate on whether costly infrastructure investments can be justified by the benefits that
accrue to agricultural households.
35The Central Government also committed USD 7.4 billion to a flagship irrigation scheme, the Pradhan Mantri
Krishi Sinchai Yojana, in 2015.
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Notes: The distance between a REDS village and its closest town is recorded in the REDS 1999 village survey. The
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of this distribution are 4, 10, and 19 kilometers respectively. The mean distance is
13.2 kilometers.
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Figure 1.6: Pre-Trends using Indian Census Outcomes































































































Notes: Means constructed using village-level data from the 1991, 2001 & 2011 Indian Census Primary Census
Abstracts. All villages that received program roads under PMGSY prior to 2010 are classified as treated.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of REDS Households
Demographics













Gross Amount of Land Cultivated (Acres) 2.39
(4.53)
Cultivates Cereal Crops 0.47
(0.50)
Cultivates Non-Cereal Crops 0.33
(0.47)
Material Input: High-Yielding Varieties 0.27
(0.44)
Material Input: Irrigation 0.25
(0.43)
Labor Input: Any Family Labor 0.55
(0.50)
Labor Input: Any Hired Labor 0.45
(0.50)
Engagement in Casual Labor Markets
Works in Casual Agriculture 0.29
(0.45)
Days Worked in Casual Agriculture 96.52
(181.12)
Works in Casual Non-Agriculture 0.30
(0.46)
Days Worked in Casual Non-Agriculture 84.80
(189.93)
Notes: Measured in the 1999 REDS household survey.
Table presents household-weighted baseline means, with
standard deviations reported in parentheses. N = 4246
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Table 1.2: Baseline Summary Statistics for Unconnected Villages
Control Treatment P-Value
(1) (2) (3)
Village Population 1512.6 1640.8 0.677
(947.1) (967.6)
Number of Households 369.4 313.1 0.586
(381.5) (189.9)
Distance to Bus Stop 2.8 4.4 0.215
(2.8) (5.6)
Distance to Bank 4.8 6.9 0.312
(4.8) (9.1)
Distance to Weekly Market 4.7 5.4 0.692
(4.6) (8.1)
Distance to Block HQ 12.8 16.2 0.315
(10.1) (11.4)
Distance to Town 16.3 22.9 0.278
(15.2) (24.7)
Gross Area Cultivated (Acres) 964.3 981.1 0.948
(854.1) (753.0)
Average Harvest Price of Paddy (Rs./quintile) 532.2 560.9 0.467
(85.0) (102.5)
Average Harvest Price of Wheat (Rs./quintile) 481.7 434.8 0.460
(184.7) (139.0)
Agricultural Wage, Male (Rs.) 42.9 52.2 0.021
(8.5) (16.8)
Agricultural Wage, Female (Rs.) 32.5 39.1 0.042
(8.6) (11.8)
Non-Agricultural Wage, Male (Rs.) 76.3 90.3 0.033
(15.0) (26.8)
Non-Agricultural Wage, Female (Rs.) 58.3 49.0 0.621
(70.7) (14.8)
Notes: Restricted to unconnected, program-eligible villages at baseline. Means and stan-
dard deviations (in parentheses) are shown in columns (1) and (2). Column (3) displays
the p-values of the comparison of means across the Treatment and Control villages. N=42
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Table 1.3: Baseline Summary Statistics for Previously Connected Villages
Control Treatment P-Value
(1) (2) (3)
Village Population 3598.8 2573.3 0.471
(4825.7) (3255.7)
Number of Households 694.6 489.1 0.495
(1040.4) (617.7)
Distance to Bus Stop 5.2 2.8 0.369
(9.5) (3.9)
Distance to Bank 5.3 5.2 0.953
(5.8) (6.1)
Distance to Weekly Market 6.5 10.2 0.386
(7.4) (22.2)
Distance to Block HQ 21.9 20.2 0.804
(23.0) (18.2)
Distance to Town 16.4 10.8 0.290
(18.4) (11.0)
Gross Area Cultivated (Acres) 1159.4 1460.5 0.483
(1200.8) (1561.8)
Average Harvest Price of Paddy (Rs./quintile) 549.5 542.0 0.823
(88.7) (85.9)
Average Harvest Price of Wheat (Rs./quintile) 478.2 503.4 0.689
(167.0) (94.3)
Agricultural Wage, Male (Rs.) 51.0 56.1 0.247
(12.9) (15.1)
Agricultural Wage, Female (Rs.) 39.3 41.2 0.603
(12.0) (10.1)
Non-Agricultural Wage, Male (Rs.) 90.5 94.6 0.712
(30.2) (44.0)
Non-Agricultural Wage, Female (Rs.) 49.7 55.9 0.368
(19.5) (24.7)
Notes: Restricted to previously connected villages with a neighboring unconnected,
program-eligible village at baseline. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are
shown in columns (1) and (2). Column (3) displays the p-values of the comparison of means
across the Treatment and Control villages. N=47
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Table 1.4: Compliance with Program Rules
Any Road in Village PMGSY Road in Village
at Baseline by 2006
(1) (2)
Unconnected at Baseline -0.409***
(0.0764)
Eligible for Program 0.388***
(0.0840)
State FE No Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.747 0.127
Observations 221 221
Notes: The dependent variable in Column (1) is an indicator variable that equals
1 if there is any (fair-weather or all-weather) road in the village at baseline. This
variable is recorded in the 1999 REDS village survey. The dependent variable in
Column (2) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a PMGSY road in the
village by 2006. This variable is constructed using information downloaded from
OMMS, the PMGSY administrative database. A village is classified by program ad-
ministration as unconnected at baseline if it is located at least 500m away from an
all-weather road or from another village with an all-weather road. A village is clas-
sified as program-eligible in the study period if it is unconnected at baseline and has
a village population greater than 500. The regression in Column (2) includes state
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Activity Status
Engaged in Casual Labor Days Worked
Cultivation in Non-Agriculture
Panel A: Pooled (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat x Post -0.099 0.005 13.124 -2.915
(0.093) (0.099) (30.675) (32.449)
Treat x Post x Close to Town -0.343** 47.358
(0.163) (53.919)
F-test p-value: Sum of coefficients 0.019 0.335
Panel B: Unconnected Villages
Treat x Post -0.115 0.032 43.827 -4.005
(0.120) (0.086) (41.284) (43.352)
Treat x Post x Close to Town -0.393** 101.132
(0.193) (61.590)
F-test p-value: Sum of coefficients 0.039 0.039
Panel C: Previously Connected Villages
Treat x Post -0.076 0.003 -9.425 -13.112
(0.118) (0.131) (34.996) (39.766)
Treat x Post x Close to Town -0.167 18.652
(0.224) (68.030)
F-test p-value: Sum of coefficients 0.402 0.923
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.592 0.592 84.799 84.799
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regressions (Equations 5 and 8) in Panel
A, the direct regressions (Equations 2 and 6) in Panel B, and the spillover regressions (Equations 4 and
7) in Panel C. Outcome in Columns (1)-(2) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household engages in
any agricultural cultivation. Outcome in Columns (3)-(4) is the total number of person-days worked in
the casual labor market for non-agriculture. Close to Town is an indicator that equals 1 for households
within 10km of a town. The p-value from a F-test of the joint significance of the two coefficients is re-
ported at the bottom of each panel. All regressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Ob-
servations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
43
Table 1.6: Crop Diversification
Indicator: Non-Cereal High-Yielding Varieties:
Non-Cereal Cereal Area Share Non-Cereal Cereal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat x Post 0.257** -0.105 0.227** 0.186** 0.313*** 0.191
(0.102) (0.107) (0.090) (0.086) (0.098) (0.124)
Household FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village FE No No Yes No No No
Dependent Variable Mean 0.334 0.472 0.341 0.341 0.217 0.239
Observations 8492 8492 5443 4400 8492 8492
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8, restricting attention
to β1, the treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Columns (1)-(2) is an indica-
tor that equals 1 if the household engages in cultivation of non-cereal and cereal crops, respectively. Outcome
in Columns (3)-(4) is the share of gross land cultivated under non-cereal crops. Outcome in Columns (5) and
(6) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household uses high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of non-cereal and cereal
crops, respectively. Cereal crops include paddy, wheat, maize, jawar, bajra, ragi and barley; non-cereal crops
include fruits and vegetables, pulses, oilseeds, fiber crops, sugarcane, spices, drugs and plantation crops. The
regression in Column (4) is conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All
regressions include state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Farm Inputs
Material Inputs Labor Days Per Acre
HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Total Hired Family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat x Post 0.243** 0.249*** 0.326*** 0.196* 26.918** 17.613* 9.305
(0.119) (0.091) (0.071) (0.115) (12.016) (10.324) (13.487)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.267 0.248 0.167 0.562 58.955 34.103 24.852
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492 4400 4400 4400
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8, restricting attention to β1, the
treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Columns (1)-(4) is an indicator that equals 1 if the
household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, irrigation, manure, and chemical fertilizer respectively. Out-
come in Column (5) is the total number of labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (6) is the total number of
hired labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (7) is the total number of family labor-days per cultivated acre.
The regressions in Columns (5) - (7) are conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All re-
gressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Market Activity
Product Market Revenues and Profits
Any Crop HYV Crop Sales Empirical Imputed
Sales Sales Revenues Profits Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat x Post 0.157** 0.238* 1.131 0.775 0.845
(0.072) (0.129) (1.193) (0.852) (0.858)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.515 0.305 9.613 5.391 5.164
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8135 7929
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8, restrict-
ing attention to β1, the treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in
Column (1) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household sells any crops. Outcome in Column
(2) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household sells any HYV crops. Outcome in Column (3)
is log(total sales revenues + 1) from crop production. Outcome in Column (4) is log(empirical
profits + 1), and the outcome in Column (5) is log(imputed profits + 1), where the price of family
labor is imputed using the prevailing market wage at the village level. All regressions include
household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneity by Landholdings
Crop Diversification Material Inputs Labor Days Per Acre
Non-Cereal HYV HYV
Indicator Non-Cereal Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Total Hired Family
Panel A: Below Median (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treat x Post 0.239** 0.231** 0.234* 0.207** 0.330*** 0.207 36.138** 25.635* 10.503
(0.105) (0.091) (0.128) (0.084) (0.064) (0.131) (17.184) (13.199) (18.990)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.227 0.141 0.189 0.184 0.122 0.427 55.982 25.725 33.220
Observations 5910 5910 5910 5910 5910 5910 2270 2270 2270
Panel B: Above Median
Treat x Post 0.056 0.243 -0.080 0.094 0.101 -0.225 14.751 6.252 8.499
(0.175) (0.176) (0.136) (0.226) (0.131) (0.220) (18.702) (10.560) (10.975)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.668 0.455 0.513 0.447 0.310 0.983 40.206 27.449 12.757
Observations 2582 2582 2582 2582 2582 2582 2130 2130 2130
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8 for baseline non-cultivators and below-median cultivators
in Panel A, and above-median cultivators in Panel B. I restrict attention to β1, the treatment effect on households further away from towns. I con-
struct these groups using the within-district gross cultivated land distribution at baseline. Outcome in Column (1) is an indicator that equals 1 if the
household engages in cultivation of non-cereal crops. Outcome in Column (2) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household uses high-yielding vari-
eties (HYVs) of non-cereal crops. Outcomes in Columns (3)-(6) are indicators that equal 1 if the household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV)
seeds, irrigation, manure, and chemical fertilizer respectively. Column (7) is the total number of labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column
(8) is the total number of hired labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (9) is the total number of family labor-days per cultivated acre.
The regressions in Columns (7) -(9) are conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All regressions include household
and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Potential Channels
Asset Ownership Farm Input Prices Sources of Credit
HYV Seeds Agri Wage Formal Shop Money Friends and Family
Bicycle Scooter (Rs./Unit) (Rs./Day) Bank Keeper Lender In Village Out of Village
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treat x Post 0.157** 0.004 0.490 -2.629 0.077 0.015 0.012 0.015 -0.012
(0.076) (0.005) (8.152) (6.388) (0.061) (0.011) (0.008) (0.029) (0.034)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.449 0.018 23.697 42.836 0.116 0.125 0.108 0.265 0.389
Household FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8492 8492 2443 4530 8492 8492 8492 8492 8492
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8, restricting attention to β1, the treatment effect on house-
holds further away from towns. Outcomes in Column (1)-(2) are indicators that equal 1 if the household owns a bicycle or scooter respectively.
Outcome in Column (3) is the unit price of HYV seeds. Outcome in Column (4) is the daily agricultural cash wage. Outcomes in Column (5)-(()
are indicators that equal 1 if the household borrows from formal banks, local shopkeepers, money lenders, friends and family within the village and
outside the village respectively. All regressions include state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Heterogeneity by Baseline Non-Cereal Cultivation
Non-Cereal Crops Purchases of Material Inputs
Indicator Area Share HYVs HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer
Panel A: Below Median (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat x Post 0.322*** 0.340*** 0.316*** 0.102* 0.141 0.169** 0.244
(0.110) (0.117) (0.106) (0.060) (0.180) (0.072) (0.150)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.086 0.047 0.072 0.170 0.255 0.078 0.480
Observations 3560 1406 3560 3560 3560 3560 3560
Panel B: Above Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat x Post 0.433** 0.317*** 0.609*** 0.459*** 0.307* 0.436*** 0.213
(0.195) (0.070) (0.069) (0.132) (0.169) (0.100) (0.163)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.499 0.415 0.204 0.208 0.358 0.166 0.671
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4932 2994 4932 4932 4932 4932 4932
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8 for villages below the median level
of baseline non-cereal cultivation in Panel A, and villages above the median level in Panel B. I construct these groups using
non-cereal cultivation levels aggregated across households within a village at baseline. I restrict attention to β1, the treatment
effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Column (1) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household engages
in cultivation of non-cereal crops. Outcome in Column (2) is the share of gross land cultivated under non-cereal crops. Out-
come in Column (3) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household uses high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of non-cereal crops.
Outcomes in Columns (4)-(7) are indicators that equal 1 if the household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, irriga-
tion, manure, and chemical fertilizer respectively. All regressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations
are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 2. Morale Effects of Pay Inequality
(with Emily Breza and Supreet Kaur)
2.1 Introduction
In traditional agency models, workers care about only their own wage levels when making labor
supply decisions. However, a long tradition in economic thought—as well as in psychology,
sociology, and organizational behavior—has advanced the notion that individuals also care about
their pay relative to that of their co-workers.36 This paper tests the empirical validity of this
view. In addition, it examines workers’ underlying notion of equity: specifically, whether perceived
justifications for pay differences mediate fairness concerns.37
Relative pay comparisons between workers have the potential to influence various labor market
features. For example, they could help explain why wage compression—when wages vary less than
the marginal product of labor—appears prevalent in both poor and rich countries (Frank (1984),
Dreze and Mukherjee (1989), Lazear (1989), Fang and Moscarini (2005), Charness and Kuhn
(2007)). They have also been proposed as a micro-foundation for wage rigidity (Akerlof and Yellen
(1990)). In addition, relative pay concerns could affect how workers sort into firms—for example,
leading some firms to specialize by worker ability, or mediating how productivity dispersion maps
to earnings inequality (Frank (1984), Song et al. (2015), Card et al. (2013)). Relatedly, they could
influence the decision to contract labor within or across firm boundaries (e.g., Nickerson and Zenger
(2008)).38
36In economics, see, e.g., Marshall (1890), Veblen and Almy (1899), Keynes (1936), Duesenberry (1949), Hicks
(1963), Easterlin (1974), Hamermesh (1975). In psychology, seminal work by Adams (1963) develops a theory of pay
inequity, building on Festinger (1954)’s cognitive dissonance theory. See Cook and Hegtvedt (1983) and Shaw (2014)
for reviews of work in social psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior.
37A long standing debate in this literature is on conceptualizing equity—whether individuals compare pay in levels,
or ratios of pay to productivity (e.g., Adams (1963), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Baron and Kreps (2013)).
38See Fehr et al. (2009) for a general discussion of how fairness considerations may affect the labor market.
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The existing behavioral economics literature has focused on the idea that agents’ own internal
preferences over relative pay can affect their utility. This idea has two related implications for
worker behavior. First, relative pay can act as a compensating differential—affecting thewillingness
to accept employment at a given absolute wage. Second, such utility effects could impact effort,
for example, in the presence of reciprocity.39 Work in social psychology and sociology suggests
that this exclusive focus on internal preferences may provide an incomplete view. These literatures
emphasize that pay disparity can foster “resentment, lack of cooperation, sabotage, and lack of
team potency” (Shaw (2015)). These forces have the potential to create social conflict, amplifying
effects on labor supply and output across all workers. For example, even if higher-paid workers
individually derive positive utility from being paid more than others, their outcomes could be
worsened due to discontent or hostility from their co-workers—who, mechanically, must be paid
relatively less (Schmitt and Marwell (1972), Deutsch (1986), Lazear (1989), Levine (1991), Duffy
et al. (2012)).
Figure 2.1 documents perceptions among Indian workers that pay inequality creates such morale
effects. Respondents predict that, for a given absolute wage level, a worker who is paid less than his
peers would be less likely to accept employment (Question 1) and would reduce effort (Question
2). In addition, 94% of respondents state that pay disparity will lead to conflict among co-workers
(Question 3). While only suggestive, these perceptions match those of respondents in other contexts
such as the U.S. (e.g., Bewley (1999)).
In this paper, we use a field experiment to test whether workers care about relative pay. We construct
a design that enables comparisons of workers who earn the same absolute wage, but differ in their
co-workers’ wages. In addition, we incorporate variation in the perceived justification for pay
differences. We examine the effects of relative pay on labor supply: the extensive margin decision
39Behavioral agency theory predicts that workers may reduce effort in response to fairness violations, especially
under incomplete contracting (Kőszegi (2014)). Fehr et al. (2009) argue that because most jobs contain some
incomplete contracting, maintaining morale is essential for effort provision. This view is espoused by Bewley (1999),
who documents managers’ perceptions that relative pay is important for worker motivation.
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to accept work (attendance) and effort provision (output). We also explicitly test for impacts on
group cohesion among co-workers.40
In the experiment, 378 workers in Odisha, India are employed full-time for one month in seasonal
manufacturing jobs—a prominent source of local employment. They work in small factories, which
are organized into distinct production units, with 3 workers per unit. All unit members produce the
same exact product (e.g. rope), while every unit within a factory produces a different product (e.g.
rope, brooms, incense sticks). Each unit sits together in a separate physical space in the factory,
both during work and lunch breaks. Thus, the other workers in one’s unit constitute a natural and
salient reference group for pay comparisons. Note that production is an individual activity, with no
joint production of any kind.
All workers are paid a flat daily wage for attendance, in accordance with the typical pay structure
in the area. The decision to come to work is therefore incentivized: being absent results in a loss
of earnings. However, there is incomplete contracting on effort: workers have some latitude to
select effort levels, which are reflected in output. To obtain measures of worker output, we bear
substantial overhead costs—in the form of extra staff and record keeping—to quantify each worker’s
daily individual production.
We induce exogenous variation in co-worker pay by randomly assigning units to one of four different
pay structures. In the Pay disparity condition, each unit member is paid a different wage—wHigh,
wMed , or wLow—in accordance with his respective productivity rank within the unit (determined by
baseline productivity levels). These pay differences are fairly modest: the difference between each
wage level is less than 5%. In the three Compressed pay conditions, all three unit members are
paid the exact same wage, which we randomly assign to be wHigh, wMed , or wLow.41 This allows us
40From the firm’s perspective, there are of course potential benefits of differential pay, such as incentive effects.
Optimal pay policies would balance such benefits against potential morale costs. Our goal in this paper is not to
evaluate this tradeoff. Rather, our design focuses on isolating the more basic question of whether workers care about
relative pay.
41At the beginning of the baseline (i.e. “training”) period, workers are told that they will receive a wage increase
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to compare, for example, workers with the same average baseline productivity level who both earn
an absolute wage of wLow, but differ in whether they are paid less than their peers (under the Pay
disparity treatment) or the same as their peers (under the Compressed Low wage treatment). Note
that managers maintain pay secrecy; any learning about peer wages is through self-disclosure.
To test whether perceived justifications mediate morale effects, we incorporate two additional
sources of variation into our design. First, while wage levels are fixed, underlying baseline
productivity is continuous. This induces variation in the extent to which pay differences among
co-workers overstate productivity differences.42 Second, co-worker output is far more observable
for some tasks relative to others. By randomizing units to production tasks, we generate variation
in the observability of co-worker productivity.43
Even though managers maintain pay secrecy, workers learn about co-worker wages. At the end of
the month, 86.6% of workers can accurately report the wages of both co-workers in their product
units. In contrast, they know the wages of those in other product units only 7.2% of the time. This
is consistent with the presumption that workers primarily compare their pay with that of co-workers
in their own unit.
For a given absolute pay level, output declines by 0.33 standard deviations (22%) on average when
a worker is paid less than both his co-workers.44 This is accompanied by a 12 percentage point
on a pre-specified date, and that the size of this increase may depend on their baseline productivity. Once they are
randomized into their wage treatment on this date, no additional future wage changes are possible. This shuts down
dynamic incentive effects; see below for a discussion of this.
42Workers are randomly assigned to units upon recruitment, making this a random source of variation.
43We quantified the observability of each of the ten tasks ex ante in a pilot. A different sample of workers—all of
whomwere in product units withCompressedwages—were asked after three weeks of work to rank their output relative
to that of their unit-mates. We use the mean accuracy of these responses for a given task as the observability value
for that task. This observability value is uncorrelated with other differences across tasks, such as output dispersion
or growth. In the experiment, we stratify wage treatments by production task, ensuring variation in task observability
within each treatment cell.
44This estimate compares low-rank workers in Pay disparity (wage wLow) with low-rank workers in Compressed
units where everyone is paid wLow . In general, all relative pay effects are identified off pairwise comparisons of
workers in Pay disparity with workers in Compressed units who have the same absolute wage level and same baseline
productivity rank.
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decrease in attendance. In addition, holding fixed the level of absolute pay, we find little evidence
that performance improves if a worker is paid more than his peers. In fact, in units where there is
Pay disparity, the highest and median wage workers also have substantively lower attendance than
their counterparts on Compressed units (10 and 13 percentage points, respectively). We also see
no evidence of positive impacts on output for these workers. Overall, we estimate that workers give
up 9.3% of their earnings to avoid a workplace where they are paid differently than their peers.
The negative effects of Pay disparity on labor supply persist over the duration of the employment
period and appear to strengthen in later weeks.
Perceived justifications play an important role in mitigating these morale effects. Each of our two
sources of variation in perceived justifications yields the same pattern of effects. First, when co-
workers’ baseline productivity levels are farther apart—so that differences in productivity swamp
differences in wages—workers in Pay disparity units have the same attendance and output as their
counterparts on Compressed units. Second, in production tasks where workers can easily see that
their higher paid peers are more productive than themselves, we also find no negative effect of pay
disparity. These findings indicate that fairness violations from Pay disparity are only triggered
when the rationale for pay differences is not extremely clear to workers.
If relative pay effects operate through emotions such as resentment or envy of co-workers, this could
generate hostility and reduce social cohesion among unit members. This could help explain, for
example, why workers in Pay disparity give up substantial earnings to avoid coming to work—even
those who are paid relatively more than their peers. We designed two cooperative endline games,
conducted on the last day of work, to investigate effects on group cohesion. The games have no
benefit for the firm, ruling out motives such as reciprocity or beliefs about the firm. In both games,
workers are paid group piece rates for performance. This enables us to test whether Pay disparity
induces a group dynamic that subsequently affects co-workers’ ability to cooperate in their own
self-interest.
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In the first game, workers are organized into their product units, and build towers out of raw
materials. Each unit is paid a piece rate based on the height of its tower. Pay disparity units build
towers that are 17% shorter on average than those withCompressedwages. However, in units where
pay differences are justified—based on baseline productivity differences or task observability—Pay
disparity units perform as well as Compressed units.
In the second set of activities, workers play cooperative puzzle games in pairs. Workers are randomly
paired with someone from either their own product unit or from another unit. Compressed unit
workers perform better on these games when paired with someone from their own product unit
than when paired with a “stranger” (someone from another unit). In stark contrast, Pay disparity
workers perform 28% worse when they are paired with someone from their own unit than with a
stranger. In addition, when in mixed pairs, there is no evidence that Pay disparity workers perform
worse than Compressed pay workers—their decrease in performance arises only when paired with
someone from their own unit. Finally, when pay disparity is clearly justified, we cannot reject that
Pay disparity workers perform similarly to Compressed workers—regardless of with whom they
are paired.
Data from an endline survey also suggests a decrease in social cohesion. Specifically, after over a
month of working together, Pay disparityworkers report fewer social network connections—defined
as a willingness to borrow or lend, seek or give advice, or visit one-another’s homes—than Com-
pressed workers. Survey responses also provide suggestive evidence about fairness perceptions.
Relatively lower paid workers in Pay disparity units are more likely to state that their wages were
set unfairly in relation to their unit-mates than low rank workers in Compressed units. In contrast,
Pay disparity workers with relatively higher wages do not believe their wages are unfair; however,
they are substantially less likely to report being happy at endline. While only suggestive, this is
consistent with a decrease in attendance for higher-paid workers being driven by resentment or
hostility in the work environment.
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This study builds on the literature on relative pay comparisons in the workplace. Two recent
field experiments have examined relative pay concerns. First, Card et al. (2012) document that
University of California employees report higher job dissatisfaction on surveys when they find out
they are paid less than their co-workers. Second, Cohn et al. (2012) show that random relative
pay cuts matter more than absolute pay cuts for effort; these effects persist strongly over a six-hour
period. Our results are consistent with those of both studies.45 In addition, our work relates to
the broader literature on fairness preferences and effort provision, such as gift-exchange (Akerlof
(1982)).46
Our study advances this literature. We find substantial impacts of relative pay comparisons on
output and labor supply, with workers giving up earnings to avoid a workplace with pay disparity.
We also document deleterious impacts of pay inequality on group cohesion and cooperation. This
dimension has been emphasized in social psychology and sociology—albeit with limited identified
evidence—but largely ignored in the empirical behavioral economics literature to date. In addition,
in our experiment, relative wages are not arbitrary, but rather reflect productivity differences; this
is important if justifications can undo fairness violations (Falk et al. (2008), Bracha et al. (2015))
and matches why pay disparity may arise in the labor market. We provide the first piece of field
45In addition, Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson (2015) use a field experiment with TaskRabbit workers to show that
relatively lower pay lowers productivity. Two recent studies also examine relative pay using natural experiments: Rege
and Solli (2013) find an increase in job separations after pay disclosures in Norway, and Dube et al. (2015) document
an increase in worker quits following differential pay increases in the US. In earlier work, laboratory studies have used
gift exchange games to explore effects of different pay levels (Charness and Kuhn (2007), Gatcher and Thoni (2010),
Bartling and von Siemens (2011), Bracha et al. (2015)) and ranks (Brown et al. (2008), Clark et al. (2010), Kuziemko
et al. (2014)), with mixed results. Finally, a number of other papers are also consistent with a relationship between
relative pay and worker satisfaction or behavior (Levine (1993), Pfeffer and Langton (1993), Clark and Oswald (1996),
Hamermesh (2001)). A set of related studies examines the effects of revealing performance ranks to piece rate workers,
indicating that social comparisons may matter for effort even in the absence of incomplete contracting (Blanes i Vidal
and Nossol (2011), Bandiera et al. (2013), Barankay (2016)).
46In contrast to our focus on relative pay, gift exchange posits reference dependence in a worker’s own absolute
wage (past or expected). A large body of work finds gift exchange in the lab (e.g., Fehr et al. (1993)). Field experiments
have found little evidence for sustained positive reciprocity and mixed evidence for negative reciprocity over one-day
periods (Gneezy and List (2006), Kube et al. (2013), Esteves-Sorenson and Macera (2015), DellaVigna et al. (2016)).
List (2009) and Charness and Kuhn (2011) present literature reviews.
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evidence that perceived justifications play an essential role in mediating morale effects.47 This
has bearing on understanding, for example, why wage compression may arise in some settings or
occupations and not in others. Finally, workersmake decisions for a job fromwhich they derive their
primary source of income over the one-month study period. Given low baseline levels of income
and employment, the decision to give up earnings is therefore meaningful. The time horizon also
indicates that impacts do not disappear once the novelty of wage changes wears off (Gneezy and
List (2006), Levitt and List (2007)).
While we find that pay disparity alters labor supply and group cohesion in our setting, one cannot
draw conclusions about optimal pay structure. One potential benefit to firms of differential pay is
dynamic incentives: workers know that if they work hard now, it could lead to higher pay in the
future. Our design intentionally shuts down this channel because after the baseline period, there is
no further chance of wage changes (or even of future employment). This is important for our goal:
cleanly isolating whether workers care about relative pay. It is also a realistic feature of seasonal
and other contract jobs—a common form of employment among the workers in our study. However,
in choosing the optimal pay structure, a firm would weigh any potential costs of differential pay
(e.g. morale effects) against the potential benefits (e.g. dynamic incentive or selection effects).
Our findings indicate that workers’ relative pay concerns could affect this calculus.
Section 2.2 below presents a brief framework. We lay out the experiment design in Section 2.3.
Section 2.4 outlines the empirical strategy and Section 2.5 presents the results. In Section 2.6, we
discuss potential alternate explanations and threats to validity. Section 2.7 concludes.
47Consistent with this, Pfeffer and Langton (1993) document that wage dispersion within academic departments is
negatively correlated with faculty satisfaction and co-authorships. They argue this correlation is weaker in fields with
more developed scientific paradigms and productivity- or experience-based pay.
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2.2 Framework
We adapt the framework of DellaVigna et al. (2016), in which workers’ social preferences affect
effort provision. We modify their approach to allow peer wages to affect morale.
We assume that a worker i receives a wage offer wi from the firm and makes two decisions: a)
whether to work, si ∈ {0, 1}; and b) if si = 1, how much effort ei ≥ 0 to exert. Effort is not
contractible by the firm. If the worker chooses not to work (i.e., si = 0), then he receives a
stochastic outside option, Ri = R + εi. His payoff from working is:
V (wi,wR, ei; θi) = wi − c (ei; θi) + M (wi,wR) ei,
where c (ei; θi) is a convex effort cost, θi is a worker-specific productivity parameter, and M (·) is a
morale effect term that depends on the worker’s own wage and a reference value, wR. The worker
chooses to supply his labor if the value from working is greater than his outside option, that is:
si = 1 (arg maxe V (wi,wR, ei; θi) ≥ Ri) . Note that this formulation leads to potential effects on
both effort ei and attendance si . A decrease in M(·) leads to lower benefits from exerting effort and
will decrease ei. Given the restriction ei ≥ 0, if M (·) falls far enough, the participation constraint
will no longer be satisfied, leading to si = 0.48
We conceptualize relative pay concerns as reference-dependence in utility, where the worker’s
reference value is a function of co-worker pay (and productivity):
wR = r (w−i, θi, θ−i) .
48An alternate way to generate effects on si would be to separately allow relative pay differences to shift V (·) in a
way that is independent of ei .
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We incorporate this into the worker’s morale effect term:
M (wi,wR) = α f (wi − wR |wi < wR) + β f (wi − wR |wi > wR) + g (wi) .
This formulation captures the idea that morale is at least partially determined by relative wage
differences. The function f (·) is monotonically increasing in the gap between the worker’s wage
and his reference value, and f (0) = 0. We allow for asymmetric effects of differences between
own and reference wages. Specifically, if the worker is paid less than the reference wage, wi < wR,
the morale component of his utility increases by α f ′ (wi − wR) per unit of effort, relative to the
case where wi = wR. Consequently, the direction of the effect on both ei and si is pinned down
by the sign of α. Similarly, if wi > wR, the direction of the effect on ei and si (relative to when
wi = wR) is pinned down by the sign of β. Finally, g (wi) captures peer-independent contributors
toward morale, such as gift exchange.49
Note that this is a reduced form specification of worker utility. The parameters α and β capture
both innate preferences and social dynamics in the work place. Prior work conceptualizing relative
pay comparisons predicts that α < 0, that is, individuals dislike being paid less than their peers (i.e.,
Adams (1963), Akerlof and Yellen (1990)). The prediction on the sign and relative magnitude of
β, however, varies. Preferences for status or advantageous inequality generate β > 0. However, if
workers have inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), or if pay disparity generates strife
or a breakdown in social relations in the workplace, then this could generate β < 0 (e.g., Shaw
(2014)).
In this simple framework, changes in 1 (wi < wr ) and 1 (wi > wr ), holding fixed wi, will affect
both the probability of accepting work and effort if α and β are non-zero. In the experiment, we
generate variation in w−i (i.e. co-worker wages). This enables us to construct test cases where the
49Alternately, g (wi) could capture other drivers of effort including monitoring norms for effort provision.
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value of 1 (wi < wr ) or 1 (wi > wr ) is clear. For example, we posit that wi < wr if a worker is
paid strictly less than his co-workers, but not when he is paid the same as all his co-workers. We
infer the sign of α and β by examining the impact on labor supply of changes in 1 (wi < wr ) and
1 (wi > wr ), respectively.
In addition, we use experimental manipulations to test whether workers care only about wage
differences in levels (i.e. wR = r (w−i)), or whether relative productivity also enters into workers’
assessments of pay equity (wR = r (w−i, θi, θ−i)). To accomplish this, we vary the composition of
co-workers, in terms of their productivity. Conceptually, this enables us to change θ−i, holding
fixed θi, generating orthogonal variation with respect to wi andw−i. The impact of this on behavior
provides insight into workers’ underlying notions of equity.
2.3 Experimental Design and Protocols
2.3.1 Experimental Design
We explore relative pay concerns using a field experiment with manufacturing workers. In our
setting, workers are paid a flat daily wage for attendance. Consequently, as in the framework
above, extensive margin changes in labor supply (i.e. attendance) affect earnings, whereas there is
incomplete contracting on effort.
Reference group We must first be able to isolate, for each worker, a clear reference group of
peers for pay comparisons. In the factories, we organize workers into production units of 3 workers
each. All workers within a unit produce the same exact product, while every unit in a factory
produces a different product. Production is strictly an individual activity. Because each worker’s
two unit members are the only other people at the factory making the same product, they constitute
the most salient reference group for wage comparisons. We empirically validate this intuition in
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Section 2.5.1.50
Wage treatments We construct wage treatments to generate variation in co-worker pay, holding
own absolute pay fixed. Using baseline productivity data (see below), we rank each worker as
the lowest, medium, or highest productivity worker within his respective unit. Each unit is then
randomized into one of four wage structures, as shown in Table 2.1:
• Pay disparity: Each worker is paid according to his baseline productivity rank within the
unit. In each unit, the lowest rank worker receives wL, the middle rank receives wM , and
the highest rank worker receives wH . Thus, all three co-workers in the unit always have a
different wage from each other.
• Compressed Low: All unit members are paid the same daily wage of wL.
• Compressed Medium: All unit members are paid the same daily wage of wM .
• Compressed High: All unit members are paid the same daily wage of wH .
The difference between each of the three wage levels is fairly modest: less than 5%.
This design enables us to compare workers who have the same expected productivity and are paid
the same absolute wage, but differ in their wage relative to their co-workers. For example, low rank
workers in Compressed Low are paid wL—the same wage as the other workers in their unit. The
low rank workers in Pay disparity also receive an absolute wage of wL, but earn strictly less than
their co-workers. If being on a unit where one is paid less than one’s peers reduces morale, low rank
workers in Pay disparity units will have worse performance than their counterparts in Compressed
Low units. The design generates three such pair-wise comparisons, illustrated in each respective
row of Table 2.1.
50This view is consistent with Card et al. (2012), who find that University of California workers are most likely to
compare pay with those in the same department.
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Perceived justifications We incorporate two sources of variation in the perceived justification
for pay differences. First, while wage differences are fixed at discrete intervals, underlying baseline
productivity differences among co-workers are continuous.This generates variation in the ratio of
{wage difference}/{productivity difference} within and across wage treatments. Because work-
ers are randomly organized into their product units, these baseline productivity differences are
exogenously determined.
Second, we exploit the extent to which workers can observe co-worker productivity. Ten different
products are manufactured in the factories. These products differ substantively in how easy it is
to observe the output of one’s unit-mates—for example, whether piles of output build up quickly,
clearly highlighting production differences across co-workers. To ex ante quantify the observability
of each production task, we used a pilot that was conducted with a different sample of workers
before the experiment began. These pilot participants were paid equal wages and asked to rank
their productivity relative to their co-workers at the end of three weeks. We use the accuracy of
responses to this exercise as a proxy for output observability for each product. We stratify wage
treatments by production task, enabling us to test for the effects of observability within and across
wage treatments.
We examine whether variation in perceived justifications mediates the effects of Pay disparity. This
provides insight into workers’ notions of what constitutes fairness in wages (e.g. Adams (1963)).
Figure 2.2 summarizes the sources of variation in the experiment design.
2.3.2 Context, Protocols, and Social Cohesion Tests
Context The experiment takes place across three factory sites in India, located in semi-rural areas
surrounding the city of Bhubaneswar, Odisha. Workers are employed in low skill manufacturing of
local products such as rope, brooms, incense sticks, candle wicks, disposable plates, and floor mats.
Using a partnership with local contractors—who provide expertise in production, set quality and
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training standards, and sell all output in the local wholesale market—we manage the operational
implementation of the experiment.
In this area, laborers work in agriculture during peak planting and harvesting, which comprise about
four months of the year. In the remaining lean agricultural months, they typically seek short-term
contract employment in non-agricultural jobs, such as manufacturing and construction. In our
experiment, workers are employed in such seasonal contract jobs full-time for one month. During
the period of employment, the job constitutes the primary source of household earnings. These
earnings are particularly valuable because of high unemployment in the agricultural lean season.
For example, before recruitment, the average worker reports involuntarily unemployment 15 of the
past 30 days (Table 2.2).
In accordance with the typical pay structure in the area, workers are paid a flat daily wage for
each day they come to work.51 There are no strict production minimums, but workers can be fired
for excessive absences (more than three days in a row) or disruptive behavior. All workers have
experience with flat daily wage pay. In addition, they are familiar with the concept of performance
pay—for example, because piece rates are often used during harvesting—and about 45% have
worked under piece rates themselves.52 All workers in the sample are adult males; see Table 2.2
for demographic descriptives.
Timeline& Protocols The experiment was run in 14 one-month rounds across three factory sites.
Figure 2.3 details the within-round timeline. For each round, workers are recruited from a different
local labor market (set of villages) within a 15 km radius of the factory. The position is advertised
as a one-time contract job. Each round requires hiring 30 workers; if more than 30 workers apply
51In general, firms in the area pay both flat daily wages and piece rates for low skill manufacturing. This often
corresponds to differences in quality grades, because quality for these tasks is difficult to quantify and costly to monitor.
Flat wages are more common across firms as a whole.
52In addition, factories will sometimes pay workers differential flat wages based on experience. In construction,
workers of different skill grades will usually receive differential flat wages.
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for the job, we randomly select among applicants.53
On the first day of work, workers are randomly assigned into one of the ten product units, with three
workers per unit.54 Each worker’s unit (and therefore production task) remains the same throughout
their employment. The workers within a unit sit together in a designated area—they work together
and also eat lunch together in their production area. Each unit is physically separated from other
units—often in separate rooms—due to space requirements for each production activity and for
storing inputs nearby.
Production is strictly an individual activity—all workers produce their product from beginning to
end on their own, with no joint production within units. We hire numerous additional staff, who
sit in the factories and count each worker’s individual production of goods of salable quality (e.g.
number of individual incense sticks or paper bags) in a separate back storage room. This enables
us to obtain daily measures of worker output.
Workers initially undergo a “training period” on how to produce their assigned product. Typically
after day four, output has reached a level of quality that can be sold in the market. However, we
elongate the training period to two weeks to obtain stable baseline productivity measures for each
worker once experience trends begin to flatten out. During training, all workers are paid a daily
wage that corresponds to the prevailing daily wage in the area (e.g. Rs. 250/day or ~$4/day). On
the first day of work, they are told that their post-training wage may depend on their productivity
during the training period. In addition, on Day 10, each worker is given private feedback on his
own productivity rank within his unit (as part of a routine check-in with the manager).55
53Four of the rounds involved fewer than 30 workers; the remaining rounds had 30 workers exactly.
54On the first day of work, we also conduct a very short baseline survey to capture demographic characteristics
including age, literacy, and basic employment history.
55This helps underscore to workers that we are paying attention to productivity. It also helps ensure our subsequent
wage treatment effects are not confounded by information revelation about relative ranks.
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On Day 14, each product unit is randomized into one of the four wage treatments in Table 2.1.56
For the wage assignments, each worker’s productivity rank within his unit is defined based on
performance in the final three days of the training period (Days 11-13).57 All workers get a pay
raise relative to the training wage—with wL, wM , and wH corresponding to a roughly 4%, 8%,
and 12% pay increase, respectively.58 Consequently, even wL constitutes a wage premium above
workers’ outside option. On Day 14, each worker is told his own post-training wage privately by
his manager. Managers maintain pay secrecy, so that workers are not informed of their co-workers’
wages. Consequently, to the extent workers learn about relative wages, it is through self-disclosure
among co-workers.59
After wage treatments are implemented, workers continue to work in their assigned units for an
additional 20 days—allowing us to observe subsequent output and attendance. On the final day
(Day 35), we conduct tests for social cohesion and administer an endline survey.
To ensure understanding of the timeline, each worker is given an individualized calendar on Day
1. The calendar highlights the date that training will end (and wages will increase) as well as the
last day of the work contract. On Day 1, the training wage amount (Rs. 250) is filled in on the
calendar for each of the training days, with the remainder of the days left blank. On Day 14, the
worker’s post-training wage is written on the calendar for each of the remaining days until the end of
employment. Each worker sees his individual calendar each day upon arrival to work. This makes
it clear to workers that: there will be a wage increase on Day 14 (which may depend on baseline
56An implication of our design is that within a factory, different units have differing pay structures and average pay
levels. This is not odd since every unit within a factory produces a unique product and is associated with a distinct
contractor.
57The three days before the wage change captures production levels after experience trends have flattened out.
Results are robust to dropping the small number of units where ranks are different within this window relative to the
full training period.
58For example, if the training wage (corresponding to the prevailing wage in the area) was Rs. 250/day, then wL ,
wM , and wH would be Rs. 260, Rs. 270, and Rs. 280, respectively.
59It would be odd for an employer to publicly list wages. We verify in Section 2.5.1 that workers shared wage
information. To the extent that sharing was imperfect, this will dampen our observed treatment effects.
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productivity); the post-training wage is fixed, with no further wage changes; and the employment
period ends on a pre-set date.
Endline Tests for Social Cohesion As discussed above, the impact of pay disparity can operate
through both individual preferences over relative pay as well as group-level dynamics such as social
cohesion and conflict. To the extent that pay disparity generates feelings such as envy or resentment,
these two channels are inherently related.
To explicitly test for effects on social cohesion, we design a set of cooperative games on the last
day of employment, as part of a “fun farewell”. In these games, workers are paid piece rates for
group-level performance. There is no benefit to the firm from the games—ruling out motives such
as retaliation against the firm in driving behavior.
We implement two types of activities, which we describe in detail in Section 2.5.5. In the first
activity, workers play in their assigned product units, enabling us to examine general effects on
team cooperation. In the second activity, we induce variation in whether workers are paired with
someone from their own product unit versus a “stranger” (someone from another unit). This
enables us to distinguish general changes in worker disgruntlement from dynamics that are specific
to working with one’s co-unit members. These activities allow us to test whether Pay disparity
affects workers’ ability to cooperate in their own self-interest.
Finally, we use an endline survey to obtain additional suggestive evidence on mechanisms. We ask
workers about social ties at endline—for example, whether, after working together for over a month,
they would visit the home of or borrow money from their co-workers. We also collect self-reports




Attendance is a binary variable capturing whether worker i is present on day t. We also record
the continuous, total output of salable products by each worker i on each day t.60 We code raw
production as zero when a worker is absent. We standardize output within each task—using the
mean and standard deviation for that task in the final three days of the training period.61 This
enables us to pool across tasks and measure output using consistent units: standard deviations from
the mean.
Table 2.2 presents baseline values of attendance and standardized production in the full training
period. Attendance is approximately 95%. Both baseline attendance and productivity are balanced
across the Compressed and Pay disparity units. Appendix Figure B.5 documents, within Com-
pressed units, both the stability of relative productivity ranks over time as well as the stability of
output levels even in the post period.
2.4.2 Empirical Specification
To test our key predictions, we compare outcomes between individuals in the Pay disparity and
Compressed units, holding fixed a worker’s production rank and wage. Recall from Table 2.1 that
the most direct comparisons are between the Low rank Pay disparity worker with the Low rank
Compressed Lowworker, theMedium rankPay disparityworker with theMedium rankCompressed
Medium worker, and the High rank Pay disparity worker with the High rank Compressed High
worker. We refer to this set of six rank-treatment cells, which are circled in Table 2.1, as the
60During training, workers learn how to create output so that it meets the quality standards required for it to be
salable. In Appendix Table B.2 we explore treatment effects on production quality.
61Recall this corresponds to the days used to compute productivity ranks. Standardized output over the full training
period is 0.2 standard deviations lower on average than during these final three days (Table 2.2).
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“relevant group”. To use all of the variation in our experimental data, we use a differences-in-
differences strategy that incorporates the pre-period production information.
The most basic differences-in-differences approach restricts the sample to the “relevant” group of
six rank-treatment cells:
yit = α1 [Postt × PayDispi × Lowi] + α2 [Postt × PayDispi × Medi]
+ α3 [Postt × PayDispi × Highi] + α4 [Postt × Lowi] + α5 [Postt × Medi]
+ α6 [Postt × Highi] + λi + τt + η1xkt + η2x2kt + εit .
(9)
In all specifications, i indexes the worker, k indexes the task, and t indexes the day-round.Postt is
a binary indicator that equals 1 on the days after the wage treatment takes effect within the round.
PayDispi is an indicator for being amember of aPayDisparity unit. The variables Lowi, Medi and
Highi are binary indicators for productivity rank, as defined in Section 2.3.2. Any time-invariant
unit or worker characteristics are absorbed by the worker fixed effects, λi, while any time trends are
captured by the day-by-round fixed effects, τt. Finally, xkt and x2kt allow for task-specific quadratic
experience trends.
The key treatment effects of interest are captured by α1, α2, and α3. The coefficient α1 measures
the average change in outcomes in the post period (relative to the training period) for Low rank
workers in Pay disparity units relative to those in Compressed L units. Similarly, α2 captures the
average treatment effect for Medium rank workers in Pay disparity vs. Compressed M units. α3
captures the average treatment effect for High rank workers in Pay disparity vs. Compressed H
units.
Note that by restricting the sample to the “relevant” workers, the above specification ignores
observations from the “irrelevant” workers (the complement of the “relevant” group). These
additional observations can be used to help estimate the controls: round-by-day fixed effects and
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experience trends. To improve precision, we augment Equation (9):
yit = α1 [Postt × PayDispi × Lowi] + α2 [Postt × PayDispi × Medi]
+ α3 [Postt × PayDispi × Highi] + α4 [Postt × Lowi] + α5 [Postt × Medi]
+ α6 [Postt × Highi] + ¯Irrel′itθ +
¯Neigh′itγ + λi + τt + η1xkt + η2x
2
kt + εit .
(10)
We define Irreli as an indicator for whether a worker is in the “irrelevant” group (not among the six
“relevant” rank-treatment cells). In Specification (10), ¯Irrel′it is a vector of interactions of Irreli
with Postt and each rank: ]. These interactions fully absorb the change in outcomes for “irrelevant”
workers in the post period; the main coefficients of interest—α1, α2, and α3—are therefore still
estimated off of only the “relevant” group. Consequently, this improves statistical power without
affecting identification.
In addition, we define Neighi as an indicator for whether a unit is located in the same physical
room or production space as another unit, facilitating conversation across units.62 In Equation (10),
the vector ¯Neighit
′ contains interactions of Neighi with Postt , the treatment and rank of worker i,
and the treatment of Neighi.63 Thus, the coefficients α1, α2, and α3 are identified off units with
no neighbors. In neighborless units, it is extremely clear that one’s two product unit co-workers
comprise the relevant reference group.64
To maximize statistical power, we use Equation (10) as our main specification. Our results are
similar if we exclude “irrelevant” workers or omit the ¯Neigh′it controls. Appendix Table B.1
documents robustness to these and other changes to our estimating equation.
62Usually, units were in separate physical rooms so this wasn’t possible. Seating charts available on request.
63Due to random assignment, Neighi is exogenous to both treatment status and worker characteristics.
64Our experiment isn’t powered to investigate whether workers respond to the wage levels of neighboring units;
such a question would require sufficient variation in the number of instances of neighboring units and in their wages.
We leave this for future work.
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We also examine the pooled effect of Pay disparity across Low, Medium, and High ranks:
yit = α [Postt × PayDispi] + ¯Irrel′itθ +
¯Neigh′itγ + λi + τt + η1xkt + η2x
2
kt + εit . (11)
The main coefficient of interest, α, is still identified off of comparisons within the “relevant” cells.
It therefore captures the average treatment effect of Pay disparity compared to Compressed pay
(holding fixed absolute pay) across all worker ranks.65
Finally, we test whether perceived justifications mediate the effects of pay inequality. As described
in Section 2.3.1, we built two sources of heterogeneity in perceived justifications into the design:
productivity differentials and output observability. To examine their role, we fully interact the
variables encoding treatment status, rank, and Postt in Equations (10) and (11) with each of the
justification measures.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Knowledge of Co-worker Wages
Given that managers maintain pay secrecy throughout the experiment, a necessary condition for the
wage treatments to affect productivity is that workers actually learn co-workers’ wages. We verify
this using the endline survey. Panel A of Table 2.3 reports that among Compressed unit workers,
95.8% correctly report the wage of at least one co-worker, and 90.9% correctly report the wages
of both co-workers. Workers from Pay disparity units are less accurate—with 87.1% and 74.2%
of respondents reporting the correct wage of at least one or both co-workers, respectively.66 These
findings indicate that overall, there is substantial learning within production units, but Compressed
65All variables are defined exactly as in Equation 10. Again, Postt is absorbed by the time fixed effects, τt .
66The accuracy of beliefs is similar across Low, Medium, and High rank workers. It is also worth mentioning that
only four workers on Pay disparity units believe that both their co-workers earned the same wage.
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unit workers have statistically significantly more accurate beliefs. This suggests that it may be
awkward for co-workers to discuss pay under pay dispersion.
For the treatments to have power, it is also important that workers consider their product unit as
their reference group.67 In the endline survey, each worker was also asked to list the wages of
each member of the incense stick, candle wick, floor mat, and paper bag production units—each
of which could be assigned to either Pay disparity or Compressed pay, depending on the round.68
In Panel B of Table 2.3, we examine how well individuals learn about the wages of other units.
Strikingly, the majority of workers have no opinion about the wages of any of the workers on these
other units. Approximately 87% of respondents are not willing to wager a guess about the wages
on Compressed units, and only 8.6% of respondents can accurately list all of the wages. It appears
even harder to learn about the wages on Pay disparity units, with only 1.9% of respondents able to
accurately list the wages of all workers on such units. These findings support our assumption that
workers primarily compared their wages with their two other unit-mates.
2.5.2 Effects of Pay Disparity
Figure 2.4 provides an overview of the patterns in the underlying production data. It plots average
standardized production on each day for each of the 3 sets of “relevant” pairwise comparisons.
Among Low rank workers in the baseline period, production in the Compressed Low and Pay
disparity units shows a common trend as workers gain experience. The treatment (“post”) period
begins on day 0, when each worker is told his post-training wage. Within about 5 days (i.e. by the
first payday following the wage change), differences in output start to emerge, with workers on Pay
disparity units (who are paid less than their peers) reducing output relative to the Compressed L
units. This delay in the onset of treatment effects is consistent with non-immediate diffusion of pay
67If workers instead compared themselves to those in other units, this should decrease the potency of our treatments
and make it harder to find treatment effects.
68For this exercise, we exclude observations where individuals were asked about their own units.
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information among unit members. In addition, there is no evidence of positive effects of being paid
relatively more than one’s peers: High rank workers in Pay disparity units appear to perform worse
than those in Compressed H units. This pattern also generally holds for Medium rank workers in
Pay disparity versus Compressed M units.
Panel B of Table 2.4 presents regression estimates of treatment effects separately for each rank.
Low wage workers in Pay disparity units reduce output by 0.385 standard deviations relative to
those in Compressed Low units (significant at the 1% level). This effect is robust to the inclusion
of individual fixed effects (Col. 2, our preferred specification corresponding to Equation (10)),
indicating that α1 < 0. The 0.332 standard deviation decrease in Col. 2 is equivalent to a 22%
reduction in output relative to the Compressed Low (control) treatment mean. In addition, we find
little evidence that performance improves when workers are paid more than their peers. In fact,
there are large, but statistically insignificant decreases in production for High rank workers in Pay
disparity units relative to their counterparts on Compressed High units. We find similar results for
the Medium rank workers on the Pay disparity units relative to those in Compressed Medium units.
In contrast, we see little evidence for changes in quality (Appendix Table B.2).69
In addition, Pay disparity reduces attendance for all ranks. Treatment effects for Low, Medium,
and High wage earners are -12, -12.9, and -10.4 percentage points, respectively (all significant at
5% level, Col. 4), off a base of 94% attendance among Compressed units.
Because we code a worker’s raw production as zero when he is absent, treatment effects on
standardized production combine the extensive margin attendance effects with any intensive margin
effort effects. We attempt to decompose these effects in two different ways. First, we regress output
conditional on positive attendance in Col. 5. Conditional on coming to work, Low rank workers
69It is difficult to quantify quality in our setting—one of the reasons for the prevalence of flat daily pay. For a subset
of rounds, tasks and days, we had management rate the quality of each worker’s output for that day on a scale of 1-5.
We do not see evidence for a change in these subjective quality ratings. It is possible, however, that this subjective
measure is too crude and noisy to enable us to examine such effects.
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in Pay disparity units produce 0.2 standard deviations less than those in Compressed Low units
(p-value 0.077). Because this is a selected sample, this result must be interpreted with caution.
However, if the most aggrieved workers are those who decide to skip work, this coefficient is
likely to underestimate the true intensive margin effect. Second, we use a back-of-the-envelope
calculation. Mean output conditional on attendance for Low rank workers in Compressed Low
units is 1.64. The attendance effect of Pay disparity for the Low rank is -12 percentage points. If
the full effect on production were coming through attendance, we would predict an output decrease
of −0.12 × 1.64 = −0.197 standard deviations. This corresponds to about half (59%) of the
total effect on output. While both these decomposition approaches have their limitations, they
suggest that in our setting, being paid less than one’s peers likely negatively affects effort as well as
attendance.
In contrast, the effects for the Medium and High wage earners appear to operate primarily through
attendance. For these workers, there is little evidence of conditional intensive margin effort effects
in Col. 5. Furthermore, the back-of-the-envelope decomposition suggests that the attendance
effects can fully account for the (statistically insignificant) coefficients on standardized output.
This suggests that Medium and High wage earners are less likely to show up to work, but there
is no evidence that they reduce effort while at the workplace. While we did not have strong ex
ante predictions for these workers, these effects may indicate a reduced desire to work alongside
disgruntled co-workers—consistent with resentment or hostility at work. We further explore this
idea below.
Given that the treatment effects of Pay disparity are negative in sign for all three ranks, the pooled
specification of Equation 11 may provide improved statistical power. These results are presented
in Panel A. Overall, individuals in Pay disparity units decrease production by 0.311 standard
deviations and reduce attendance by 11.5 percentage points relative to individuals of the same rank
and absolute wage level in Compressed units. We also report pooled regression results for all of
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the analyses that follow.
Finally, in Appendix Table B.1, we show that the results in Table 2.4 are robust to a number
of alternative specifications, including dropping “irrelevant” workers, omitting controls for the
presence of other units in close proximity, and estimating treatment effects using only post-treatment
observations. We also provide suggestive evidence in Appendix Figure B.2 that attendance effects
are driven both by increases in the number of days missed by the chronically absent and in the
likelihood of workers missing only a few days of work.
Earnings Consequences of Attendance Effects Because employees are not compensated when
absent, the attendance effects indicate that workers are willing to give up full-time earnings to
avoid a workplace where they are paid differently than their peers. However, the foregone factory
earnings may overstate this value if workers can find outside casual employment when absent. To
bound this value, we use survey data from individuals who applied for the factory jobs, but were
not hired in the randomization protocol. These respondents report finding paid work on only 23.7%
of days. Their average total cash plus in-kind wage, conditional on working, is Rs. 271. Thus, in
the experiment, workers are paid an average daily wage premium of Rs. 39.
If absentee workers find outside jobs at similar rates as the non-selectedworkers, then the attendance
treatment effect of Pay disparity causes workers to forego an average of Rs. 403 in earnings.70
This corresponds to 9.3% of potential earnings in the factory in the post period. Furthermore,
under the extremely conservative assumption that absentees find work at the prevailing wage every
day they are absent, they are still giving up the average wage premium of Rs. 39 each day. These
foregone earnings amount to 7.1% of wages earned over the same period by individuals who were
70The wage premium is calculated using the average factory cash wage plus an in-kind wage of Rs. 40 (the monetary
value of lunch), which is similar to the in-kind wage paid in the market. We assume a wage of 0 on days that workers
cannot find work; on days they can find paid work, they only forego the wage premium. We use the pooled treatment
effect on attendance of 11.7 percentage points and calculate that Pay disparity causes workers to miss 1.64 extra days
of work (based on the modal number of workdays in the post period).
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not selected for the factory jobs.71
Effects Across Time Table 2.5 examines the evolution of treatment effects over time. We
separately estimate Equation 10 over three parts of the post period—the days before the first
payday, between the first and second payday, and the days after the second payday—after wage
treatments took effect.72 Focusing on the pooled regressions in Panel A, the effects of Pay disparity
are only evident after the first pay day, post wage change. This is consistent with non-immediate
diffusion of wage information. It also matches supervisors’ informal observations that workers
were more likely to discuss wages on paydays, which occurred each Friday. Furthermore, we find
little evidence that the effects wane over time.
2.5.3 Perceived Justifications
We use the two (pre-registered) sources of heterogeneity built into our design to investigate if
perceived justifications mediate morale effects.
Baseline Productivity Differences We first examine treatment effects when workers’ higher-
ranked peers are substantially more productive than themselves. For each worker, we compute
average baseline output conditional on attendance; this corresponds to what is observed by workers
beforewages change.73 We then compare this baseline productivity averagewith that of theworker’s
next-higher ranked co-worker (i.e. for each low rank worker, the difference with his medium-ranked
co-worker; for each medium rank worker, the difference with his high-ranked co-worker). Note
71Non-selected workers earn an average of Rs. 899 over this period.
72The full pre-treatment period is included in all regressions.
73Specifically, we use the final six days of training—which are used to convey ranks to workers and compute ranks
for wage treatments. Results are robust to using only the final three days for this calculation.
75
that this variable is not defined for high rank workers. Recall that because workers are randomly
assigned to units, baseline productivity differentials are exogenously determined.74
We define the productivity difference between a worker and his higher-ranked peer to be “large”
when it is above 0.37 standard deviations, the mean difference among the “relevant” Compressed
workers. In Columns 1-2 of Table 2.6, we interact this binary variable with treatment status.
Panel A displays pooled treatment effects for Low and Medium ranks combined, while Panel B
decomposes the effects by rank. There are large negative impacts of Pay disparity when produc-
tivity differences are small: Low and Medium rank workers decrease output by 0.358 standard
deviations and attendance by 16.7 percentage points (both significant at 1% level). However, large
baseline productivity differences almost fully mitigate these negative effects. When a worker is
substantially less productive than his higher-paid peer, the total treatment effect of Pay disparity
is indistinguishable from zero. Note that the Post × Perceived justi f ication term in Panel A
reveals no detectable changes in the behavior of Compressed units when productivity differences
are large. These heterogeneous effects appear (though under-powered) for each rank separately in
Panel B.
In Appendix Table B.3, we show that the results are robust to alternate specifications, including
adding interactions of the worker’s own baseline productivity level with an indicator for post
treatment.75 Appendix Table B.4 explores a range of productivity thresholds, defined as the percent
74Baseline output differences among co-workers could also reflect team dynamics or culture. Note this does not
affect identification, because baseline characteristics are orthogonal to the wage treatments. However, this potentially
broadens the interpretation of the heterogeneous treatment effects presented here. The fact that baseline productivity
ranks have stable predictive power in other domains, such as the group cohesion games in Section 2.5.5, suggests that
these ranks do capture some inherent differences among co-workers.
75One potential concern is that when a Low rank worker has a large baseline difference with his Medium rank
peer, this may mean his absolute productivity level is extremely low—leaving him little room to fall in response to
Pay disparity, or indicating something else about his “type”. In Cols. 3-4 of Appendix Table B.3, we show robustness
to adding controls so that the bottom decile of Low rank workers are not used to estimate effects. Cols. 5-6 add full
interactions with own baseline productivity; here, the heterogenous effects are estimated off differences with one’s
higher-rank peer, holding fixed own productivity. While this demands a lot of statistical power, the results are robust
to the inclusion of even these controls.
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difference in baseline output between a worker and his next higher-rank co-worker.76 Productivity
differences need to be quite large (on the order of 20%) for us to detect a significant offsetting
response to Pay disparity. While this is substantially larger than the underlying difference in wages,
it may simply reflect observability: it is difficult for workers to recognize that their peers are more
productive unless differences are big.77
Output Observability We next check for mediating effects of whether co-worker output is
observable. We quantify observability using data from 3-week pilot rounds with a different sample
of workers (conducted before the start of this experiment). These workers were all paidCompressed
wages, and were never told their relative productivity ranks. On the last day of the pilots, we asked
workers to rank their co-workers by productivity.78 We use the mean accuracy of these responses
for a given task as a proxy for output observability. There is substantial variation across tasks in
accuracy rates—from essentially 0 to 0.88 (Figure 2.5). We define tasks with accuracy rates above
the sample median of 0.5 as “observable.”
Columns 3-4 of Table 2.6 present heterogeneous treatment effects by task observability. The results
mirror those in Columns 1-2. Panel A shows pooled effects across all three ranks. When co-worker
output is difficult to observe, Pay disparity sharply lowers production and attendance. In contrast,
there are no detectable total effects when co-worker output is easy to observe; the triple interactions
are large and statistically significant. We also find no evidence that task observability differentially
affects the performance of Compressed units post wage change. The same patterns emerge in Panel
B, when we estimate heterogeneous effects separately by rank. We show in Appendix Table B.5
that the results are robust to sequentially dropping each of the ten tasks.
76Note that this scaling of productivity differentials is highly correlated with that used in the main analysis.
77Alternately, this finding matches the predictions of Fang and Moscarini (2005), in which self-serving bias leads
workers to assume they are not less productive than peers unless this difference is extremely apparent.
78Two production tasks were added after piloting was completed; we followed a similar procedure with a separate
sample of workers to quantify observability for these two additional tasks.
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As with any heterogeneous treatment effects analysis, one might be concerned that observability
is correlated with other task characteristics. Appendix Figure B.3 plots the distribution of output
for each production task separately and shows that there is no discernible correlation between, for
example, a task’s observability value and output dispersion. More generally, for other correlated
task characteristics to pose a problem, they would need generate our pattern of results through
a different mechanism. One possible trait might be the amount of social cohesion naturally
developed during the training period. In Appendix Table B.6, however, we find that observability
is not correlated with turnover or attendance in the training period. Further, the fact that the pattern
of results for task observability matches that in the productivity differences regressions bolsters our
interpretation.
Note that observability and productivity differences derive from independent sources of variation –
productivity differences from the randomization of individuals to units and observability differences
from the randomization of units to tasks. Unsurprisingly, Appendix Table B.7 verifies that there
is substantial non-overlap among these two measures. Finally, we find no evidence to suggest
that observable tasks simply have more natural productivity dispersion, making it easier to learn
about productivity differences. In Col. (4) of Appendix Table B.6, we show that observability is
uncorrelated with the steepness of the learning curve.
Aggregate Perceived Justifications Finally, for parismony and power, we define an aggregate
perceived justifications indicator. This binary indicator equals 1 if any justification is present—i.e.,
if an individual has a large productivity difference with his next-higher ranked peer, or he is on an
observable production task.79 Not surprisingly, heterogeneous treatment effects using this indicator
are similar to those above (Table 2.6, Columns 5-6).80
79For high rank workers, this indicator always takes the value of task observability.
80Appendix Table B.7 verifies that the productivity difference results and observability results are identified off of
different sources of variation. There is substantial non-overlap among these two measures in the sample.
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2.5.4 Effects of Pay Disparity at the Production Unit-Level
Our key empirical tests are based on comparing workers who earn the same absolute wage, but
differ in co-worker wages. However, our design also enables us to examine the effects of Pay
disparity at the production unit level. Note that this exercise uses a different source of variation
than the analyses presented above; all workers in each production unit are used for identification.
Table 2.7 presents the results.81 Panel A reports comparisons between Pay disparity units and
all Compressed units combined. Panel B compares Pay disparity units with only Compressed
Low units. This latter test is strong given that all workers on Pay disparity units are paid weakly
more than those on Compressed Low units. Columns 1-2 present average treatment effects, while
Columns 3-8 present heterogeneous treatment effects.82
On average, Pay disparity units have lower rates of attendance relative to all Compressed units
pooled and to Compressed Low units. The average effects on production are also negative, but
not statistically different from zero. When output differences are not large or co-worker output
is not observable, compared to Compressed Low units, Pay disparity units have 0.306 standard
deviations lower output and 8 percentage points lower attendance on average (Panel B, Cols. 7-8).
However, when pay differences are clearly justified, no negative treatment effects are detectable.
We again show that Compressed units behave no differently in the post period when there are large
differences in productivity or when output is easily observable. These results suggest that in our
setting, Pay disparity is indeed detrimental to unit-level outcomes—even compared to Compressed
Low units which have weakly lower absolute wages for all workers—when perceived justifications
are not present.83
81This table uses the same specification as Equation 11, but eliminates all controls for “irrelevant” workers.
82Note that observability is already defined at the production unit level. We define large productivity differentials at
the unit level as an indicator for whether both the Low and Medium rank workers have large productivity differentials
with the worker of next higher rank.
83While not our primary goal, we can use wage variation across Compressed units to explore whether absolute pay
affects performance. We examine this using differences-in-differences regressions in Appendix Table B.8. If units
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2.5.5 Effects on Group Cohesion and Dynamics
The above results confirm our initial hypothesis that workers dislike disadvantageous inequality in
pay: workers who are paid less than their peers reduce output and attendance. Further, we find
striking evidence that even workers in a position of advantageous inequality forego wages to avoid
the workplace. Recall that workers spend the entire day with their unit co-workers—sitting in
close proximity and also eating lunch together at their stations. If Pay disparity fosters resentment
between workers, then it might create a negative or even hostile work environment that workers
would pay to avoid. Emotions such as acrimony or envy may also erode the ability of peers to
cooperate even when it is in their own self-interest. Such forces are of course impossible to examine
with just the output and attendance data alone. Consequently, we designed tests to enable us to
directly examine social cohesion and cooperation.
TeamworkGames Wedeveloped two sets of collaborative games that require teamwork. Workers
played these games at endline on the last day of work, as part of a “fun farewell” day. Workers were
paid their full wage plus piece rates based on performance in these games.84 Importantly, there was
clearly no benefit to the firm from worker effort on the games—ruling out reciprocity as a motive
for performance.
In the first game, workers were asked to build a tower with the other members of their assigned
reciprocate higher wages with higher productivity, then we should expect output to be increasing in pay. Further,
any positive peer effects from harder working co-workers should amplify such effects. However, consistent with
previous literature, we find no evidence of positive gift exchange on productivity at any time horizon—in the days
immediately following wage changes or in the longer-run. Relative to Compressed Low units, Compressed Medium
and Compressed High units do increase attendance in the short run—consistent with a simple substitution effect on
labor supply. However, even these effects disappear in the full sample period. Note that ours is not an ideal test for gift
exchangebecause workers were all expecting some wage increase, and thus we are not able to identify the worker’s ex
ante reference wage.
84At the end of the day, we randomly selected one of the games for each worker, and the worker received his piece
rate earnings for that game only. Workers were told we would randomly select one game for payment in advance. Note
that these endline games were only played in the final 8 rounds of the experiment (80 product units only).
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product units. Each unit was given the same set of raw materials (e.g., cardboard, pens, rubber
bands, playing cards) and was asked to build as tall a tower as possible within a 25 minute time
limit. The payment schedule was a linear piece rate for the tower’s height (in cm), paid equally to
each unit-member.
Pay disparity units build towers that are 9.376 cm (17.5%) shorter than those of Compressed units
on average (Table 2.8, Col. 1). However, as before, these negative effects are concentrated in cases
where Pay disparity is not clearly justified (Cols. 2-4). When it is, we detect no difference between
the performance of Pay disparity and Compressed units.
Do these results indicate general disgruntlement among Pay disparity workers, or are they driven
by a breakdown in within-unit cooperation? To understand this, we constructed a second set of
games in which workers solved two types of cooperative puzzles in pairs of two. In the “Spot the
Difference” game, each person in the pair received a printed sheet with nearly-identical pictures on
each sheet. The workers had to compare and circle any difference in the pictures on the two sheets
(Appendix Figure B.4, Panel A). In the “Symbol Matching” game, each pair member was given
a sheet with a grid of symbols. Workers had to match symbols—circling all instances where the
same symbol appeared in the same grid position in both of their respective sheets (Appendix Figure
B.4, Panel B).85 In both games, both members of the pair received the same payment, a piece rate
for every correct answer that was circled on both workers’ respective sheets. For these partnered
games, we constructed pairs by reshuffling workers across product units. Each worker played four
iterations each of Spot the Difference and Symbol Matching. We randomized pair construction
so that in 50% of cases, a worker played with someone from his own product unit, and 50% with
someone from another product unit for each of the games.
Table 2.9 presents effects on the cooperative pairwise puzzles. If both members of a pair are from
the same unit, they score 1.105 points (27%) lower if that unit had Pay disparity versus Compressed
85We thank Heather Schofield for providing us with the Symbol Matching game grids (see Schofield (2014).)
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pay (Col. 1). The F-test p-value of 0.0536 in Column 1 suggests that Pay disparityworkers actually
perform better playing with a stranger (i.e. someone from another product unit) than playing with a
unit co-worker. In addition, note that Pay disparityworkers do not perform worse than Compressed
workers in general—the point estimate for at least one Pay disparity worker in pair is actually
positive (though insignificant). Rather, these workers only perform worse when they are paired
with a unit co-worker. 86Finally, Columns 3-4 provide evidence that treatment effects are larger in
the absence of perceived justifications, and perceived justifications mitigate the negative treatment
effect. However, the mitigating effects of justifications are not statistically distinguishable from
zero.
It is worth noting that the worker productivity rankings in the main experiment have predictive
power in these endline games. On average, a pair with a Low or Medium rank worker scores 15.8%
and 13.8% less, respectively, than a pair with a High rank worker (Col. 2). This suggests that the
baseline rankings capture, in part, some stable differences in ability or effort across workers.
Overall, these findings indicate a decrease in Pay disparity workers’ ability to cooperate in their
own self-interest. This does not appear to result from general disgruntlement: low performance
only arises when they must work with the other people in their own product units. While in our
study, workers engage in individual production, the results suggest that the effects of pay inequality
may be exacerbated in settings with team production.
Network Formation Tension within Pay disparity groups might impede the formation of re-
lationships outside of work, and could represent an additional manifestation of a lack of group
86Because the endline games were conducted on the last day of work—when all workers received their final pay for
the contract job, attendance was high. In the tower game, units just played with whichever workers were present. In
the cooperative puzzles, if a worker was absent, then the person who had been paired with that worker for a pair-game
sat out during that round and their score for that pair-game is coded as 0. Appendix Table B.9 verifies that the endline
game results are not driven by differential absence across units. First, as expected on the last day, treatment status did
not affect worker attendance (Cols. 1-2). Cols. 3-4 replicate results for the tower game restricting the sample tounits
where all three workers. Cols. 5-6 replicate results for only those pair-games where both members of a pair were
present. The results are similar to those in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
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cohesion. In the endline survey, we asked each employee whether he would engage in the following
with each co-worker in his unit: seek or dispense advice; socialize; and borrow or lend .87We code
a worker as having a network link with a co-worker if he states that he and his co-worker would
engage in any of these activities.
In Table 2.10, the outcome variable in Columns 1-2 measures the number of co-workers with whom
the worker reports a link, with possible values of 0, 1, or 2. The outcome in Columns 3-4 indicates
whether the worker has a link with both of his unit co-workers. Consistent with the results of the
team cohesion games, workers in Pay disparity units appear substantially less likely to interact with
one another outside of work. On average, Pay disparity workers report .23 fewer friends from the
production unit (a 30% decrease, Col. 1) and are 12.7 percentage points less likely to be friends
with both co-workers (a 48% decrease, Col. 3). These effects are larger and statistically significant
in magnitude when no justification is present; as before, there are no detectable treatment effects
when disparity is clearly justified Cols. 2 and 4).
Fairness and Happiness In the endline survey, we asked workers to assess how fair their wages
were in relation to those of their peers. Panel A of Table 2.11 presents the results. Overall, Pay
disparity units are no more likely to believe that their wages were set unfairly in relation to their unit
co-workers than the Compressed units. However, this pooled result hides substantial heterogeneity.
Compared to their Compressed unit counterparts, Pay disparity Low rank workers are significantly
more likely to state that their wages were set unfairly in relation to their co-workers (Col. 4).
Moreover, Pay disparity High wage workers are significantly less likely to state that their wages
were set unfairly (Col. 2). Taken seriously, the survey responses of the High rank workers suggest
that inequity aversion does not play a very meaningful role in explaining the main attendance
87This method is based on four of the network elicitation questions used in Banerjee et al. (2013). We also asked
about familial relationships. Given that family relationships cannot change over time, we control for whether a worker
is related to any co-workers in his unit in the regressions.
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results, as no fairness violation appears to be triggered by the higher levels of pay.
In addition, we also asked respondents to report their happiness on a ten-step ladder.88 Panel B of
2.11 presents the results on this proxy of subjective well-being. Overall, Pay disparity units report
being less happy than their Compressed unit counterparts (Col. 1). Despite believing that their
wages are fair, High workers on Pay disparity units report the largest reductions in happiness (Col.
2).
2.5.6 Discussion
We find that Pay disparity causes all workers in our setting to decrease attendance and forego
earnings, regardless of whether they are paid more or less than their co-workers. Moreover, the
results paint a consistent picture of a drop in social cohesion within the production unit. Pay
disparity undermines cooperation between workers on the same unit, causes a decrease in social
ties outside of work, and leads to reports of more unhappiness at endline. These findings are
consistent with the view in the social psychology and sociology literature that inequality in the
workplace can lead to a break-down in social cohesion and an increase in social conflict.
This evidence also helps to shed light on why Pay disparityworkers decrease attendance even when
they are paid more than their co-workers. Our endline results suggest that while high rank workers
consider their wages fair, the condition of Pay disparity, nonetheless, makes them less happy. This
could reflect the fact that working in close proximity to aggrieved workers (i.e., those earning less
than their unit-mates) could be unpleasant due to hostility, resentment, or social awkwardness.
Our finding that co-workers in Pay disparity units are less likely to discuss their wages (Table 2.3)
suggests that Pay disparity may also give rise to awkwardness that all workers in a unit might seek
to avoid.
88The survey question was taken directly from the World Values Survey (WVS). See Frey and Stutzer (2002),
Luttmer (2005), and Benjamin et al. (2012) for previous work exploring the links between relative income and social
status with happiness.
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2.6 Threats to Validity
2.6.1 Internal Validity Concerns
We now consider whether an explanation other than relative pay concerns could produce our
findings.
Peer effects in attendance. Recall that in the endline games, Pay disparity workers perform worse
with their own co-workers than with someone from another unit, with whom they have not worked
at all. This implies that the decreased performance of Pay disparity units in the endline games
does not arise from the fact that they have had less time to work together (due to lower attendance)
than the Compressed units. However, could the main attendance results still be partly driven by
traditional peer effects in attendance, leading us to overstate the treatment effect of relative pay?
We explore this in Appendix Table B.11, taking advantage of the randomization of workers to units.
Because some villages have much higher attendance rates than others, the villages of one’s co-
workers strongly predicts co-worker attendance (Col. 1).89 If there were a causal attendance peer
effect, then the villages of one’s co-workers should also predict one’s own attendance. However, this
is not the case. Co-worker attendance—identified using the random composition of co-workers’
villages—does not predict one’s own attendance (Cols. 2-3).90
Career concerns. We stress to workers that this is a one-time contract job—a common form of
employment in this setting. Despite this, when a worker in Pay disparity observes he is paid less
than his co-workers, he may believe the firm is less likely to re-hire him and therefore may decrease
effort. However, such beliefs should be more likely when it is clear that the worker is much less
productive than his peers. In contrast, we find decreased performance when workers perceive that
89This is due to factors including distance to the factory, local social events, and local labor demand shocks.
90In addition, while one’s own education predicts output levels, co-workers’ education does not predict own output
in the post period. This indicates limited peer effects in output within the context of our experiment (e.g., Mas and
Moretti (2009),Bandiera et al. (2010),Guiteras and Jack (2014)).
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they are close in productivity to their higher-paid peers. In addition, a basic career concerns story
would not predict that workers would give up earnings while they have the job, or that higher-paid
workers would also reduce attendance. It also cannot explain the social cohesion results.
Learning about one’s outside option. It is also unlikely that Pay disparity causes workers to infer
that they could find higher wages at another firm. Even the lowest post-treatment wage, wL, is
above workers’ outside options. For example, Appendix Figure B.1 documents that only 1.7% of
workers state the prevailing wage in their local labor market to be above our training wage of Rs.
250. In addition, given that employment rates are low in the lean season (Table 2.2), it would be
surprising for workers to be absent to search for alternate work, rather than waiting for the current
contract to end. Finally, this hypothesis cannot explain why the higher-paid workers also attend
less or why Pay disparity units do not cooperate well in the social cohesion games.
Discouragement effects / self-signaling. Our results are not consistent with discouragement effects
from the Pay disparity wages revealing a worker’s type (i.e., productivity). Similar arguments to
those above make this explanation difficult to reconcile with our results. Namely, we find no effects
of Pay disparity in the cases with perceived justifications, when it’s easiest for a worker to learn
about his low productivity. In addition, we disclose information about relative productivity ranks to
workers on Day 10—before treatment. We find little evidence that this disclosure has a differential
impact on those who learn they are relatively less productive than their coworkers (Appendix Table
B.10).
Belief formation about employer. Finally, it is unlikely that Pay disparity affected performance
because workers found differential pay unusual. In our setting, all workers are aware of performance
pay regimes such as piece rates for harvesting, and about half of workers have worked under piece
rates themselves. Indeed, there are no differential effects of Pay disparity for workers who have
worked on piece rates versus those who have not. In addition, among local employers that pay flat
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daily wages, we observe differential pay based on experience or worker skill-levels.91 Finally, such
an explanation could not explain the impact of Pay disparity on workers’ ability to cooperate in the
endline games, which had nothing to do with the employer.
2.6.2 External Validity Concerns
Pay structure. Because output in our production tasks is in principle measurable, firms could
consider paying performance incentives like piece rates. However, doing so depends on the cost
of monitoring. In the experiment, we bear considerable expense to hire extra staff to measure each
worker’s output daily (e.g. count every single incense stick). Indeed, different local firms produce
the same retail good under piece rates or under flat wages—with implications for the quality grade
sold by the firm.92
Dynamic incentives and pay policy. One potential benefit to firms of differential pay is dynamic
incentives: workers know that if they work hard now, it could lead to higher pay in the future.
Our study design explicitly shuts down this channel because after the training period, there is
no possibility of a wage change.93 The objective of our study is not to identify the optimal pay
policy for firms, but rather, to isolate whether workers care about relative pay. Optimal pay policy
would depend on weighing the potential costs of differential pay (e.g. morale reductions) against
91It is not surprising that pay differentials are often based on clear rules or formulas based on experience, skill level,
or piece rates—our findings indicate the importance of such clear justifications.
92For example, the contractors with whom we worked sold the output produced as part of the experiment at a
relatively high quality grade (and therefore price premium). As another example, some employers pay piece rates while
others in the same village pay fixed daily wages to harvest a given crop—again, with implications for quality. There is
a large literature on such multitasking problems.
93Note that fixed wage setting based on prior (or expected) productivity is not uncommon in many settings. As
discussed above, workers in our study are routinely employed in one-time seasonal contract jobs, where the pay is fixed
for the duration of the contract. In other contexts, firms often set the pay of short-term consultants based on expected
productivity. Even for salaried workers, pay is usually based on ex-ante expectations, with stickiness throughout a
worker’s tenure at the firm (e.g. Fehr et al. (2009))—this is not adjusted with new information on ex-post performance,
but rather re-negotiated at infrequent intervals. More generally, explicit incentives like piece rates based on ex-post
output are not very common in our setting (e.g. Dreze and Mukherjee (1989), Kaur (2015)) or in the US (MacLeod
and Parent (1999)).
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the potential benefits (e.g. selection or increased effort). Our findings indicate that relative pay
concerns could affect this calculus.
Magnitude of effects and context. Of course, as with any empirical study, the effect sizes we
document are specific to our setting. While we cannot predict the magnitude of effects in other
populations, a growing body of work in economics lends credence to the view that concerns about
relative pay matter in a range of field settings including the US and Europe (Card et al. (2012),
Cohn et al. (2012), Rege and Solli (2013), Dube et al. (2015)).
2.7 Conclusion
The pattern of our findings broadly supports the view of pay disparity articulated in the psychology,
sociology, and organizational economics literatures. These literatures posit that the workplace is a
social organism, where the relational aspects of pay cannot be divorced from its economic value.
They predict that being paid less than one’s peers is a disamenity; this accords with our finding
that relatively lower paid workers substantially reduce output and attendance. These literatures
also predict that discontent among some workers can break down social cohesion and cooperation,
fostering social conflict and altering the dynamics of the group more broadly. This is consistent
with our findings that Pay disparity workers are unable to cooperate at endline—doing worse when
they work with co-workers from their own unit than with strangers.94 The fact that even relatively
higher-paid workers decrease attendance—coupled with their happiness responses on the endline
survey—also provides some suggestive evidence in support of this view. If lower-paid workers
were discontent or resentful, then working and eating lunch alongside them may have been socially
awkward or unpleasant for their relatively higher paid peers, dampening their desire to go to work.
Such externalities are in accordance with Frank (1984)’s observation that “Status is, like Coase’s
social costs, a reciprocal phenomenon...[O]ne person’s gain in status can occur only at the expense
94This finding also has bearing on the more general idea that inequality may generate discord in society.
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of a loss in status for others.” This underscores the reason why our empirical results do not allow
us to isolate workers’ individual internal preferences for relative pay. The effects we document are
a reduced form combination of internal preferences and group-level dynamics.
An important theme throughout our results is that negative morale effects disappear when the
reason for differential pay is extremely transparent. This could help advance our understanding
of when pay compression is more likely to arise in the labor market. Specifically, in settings
where it is difficult to quantify individual productivity, it will be challenging for an employer
to justify pay differences. For example, in our experiment, managers informed each worker of
his relative rank during the training period. Despite this, workers did not find pay differences
acceptable unless, for example, output differences greatly overstated pay differences (Appendix
Table B.4).95 This may help explain why, in the labor market, pay compression appears to be
especially common among flat (e.g. hourly or daily) wage workers, but not among performance pay
workers. Performance pay, such as piece rates or commissions, is possible only when it is feasible
to quantify important dimensions of output. In such settings, the pay structure embeds a clear
and justifiable mapping between output and pay; consequently, pay differentials across workers are
less likely to violate fairness norms. In contrast, flat wages tend to arise in those settings where
important dimensions of output are hard to quantify. Thus, even though managers may have a sense
of which workers are more productive than others on average, setting pay according to expected
output can be difficult to justify from the worker’s perspective. This suggests pay compression may
be optimal in flat wage occupations, even when signals of differential productivity are available to
employers—such as tollbooth attendants, supermarket cashiers, or agricultural day laborers (Frank
(1984), Dreze and Mukherjee (1989)). Furthermore, to the extent that wage compression plays
a role in generating wage rigidity (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen (1990)), our findings may have some
relevance for understanding why wages appear to be more rigid among flat hourly workers relative
95This matches the predictions of Fang and Moscarini (2005), who argue that self-serving bias will lead workers to
feel aggrieved unless it’s clear that their peers are more deserving than themselves.
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to salaried workers with bonuses (e.g., Kahn (1997)). More generally, while such implications
are only suggestive, our perceived justifications results have potential relevance for understanding
when relative pay concerns may affect wage structure and labor market outcomes.
In addition, our findings suggests that firms may have several potential tools at their disposal to
manage morale in the presence of pay dispersion. For example, increased transparency in output
could more easily allow firms to motivate workers through disparate wages—generating aggregate
output benefits not just through a reduction in moral hazard, but also through improved morale.
Firms could also potentially alter the organizational structure of the workplace itself—through job
titles, physical co-location of similar workers, or the construction of teams or “units” (as we did in
the experiment)—to affect who a worker views as being in her reference group.
While speculative, the above discussion suggests a variety of ways through which relative pay
concerns could influence labormarket phenomena—such as the returns to human capital investment,
wage compression, wage rigidity, firm boundaries, and unemployment. Theoretical and empirical




Figure 2.1: Perceived Impact of Pay Disparity on Labor Supply and Cohesion
1)
A)  Rs. 240/day.






B) Different wages based on their quality: Rs. 
250/day, Rs. 270/day, and Rs. 290/day.
Notes:  Surveys conducted with 200 laborers drawn from the same population as the experiment participants. Each respondent was asked 1 question out of 
each pair above. The x-axis in each chart shows the percentage of respondents choosing a given answer.
3 people from a village get hired to work on a 
construction site together.  The prevailing wage is 
Rs. 250. The contractor pays them: 
How well will they work together?
A laborer accepts a job from an external contractor at 
Rs. 240/day.  The work begins the next day.  At night, 
he learns that 2 other workers in the village have been 
offered the same job at:  
Do you think the worker would show up to work the 
next day?
There is a local soda factory that hires workers to load 
bottles onto trucks. Sunil accepts a contract to work at 
the factory for Rs. 240/day.  The next morning, he 
arrives at work.  He learns that other workers in his 
neighborhood have been hired for the same job at:
How carefully will Sunil do the work relative to his 










































Notes: Three steps of randomization design. All unit, task and treatment assignments are made on day one of the
experiment by the researchers. Factory management not informed of treatment status until the day of the wage change.
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Notes: This figure shows the timeline of activities in each of the 14 production rounds.
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Notes: Y-axis shows residuals of standardized output after removing individual fixed effects in the pre-period and
dummies for festivals. Each plot compares workers of same rank who earn the same wage, but are in Compressed vs.
Pay disparity units. Day=0 is when wage treatments took effect.
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Notes: Figure plots the correlation between actual productivity rankings and perceived rankings by the workers
(reported after 3 weeks of work). Note that this data come from four pilot rounds, using a separate sample of workers,
where all workers were paid the same wage and were not informed about their production rankings. In our analysis,
we split the tasks at the median level of observability (0.5 correlation).
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Notes: Wage data from 10-day recall surveys of 1207 workers conducted in 63 villages. Villages were randomly
chosen from the same sample frame as those from which workers were recruited for the main experiment. The figure
plots the distribution of reported daily wages minus the modal wage in the village.
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2.9 Tables






















Notes: Table presents randomization design. The key comparison groups in each row are highlighted. These six cells
combined form the “relevant” group of workers.
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Married 0.738 0.800 0.341
(0.440) (0.402)
Number of Children 1.531 1.698 0.418
(1.490) (1.502)
Hindu 0.996 1.000 0.319
(0.062) (0.000)
Owns land 0.522 0.461 0.381
(0.500) (0.501)
Sharecrops land 0.565 0.490 0.270
(0.497) (0.502)
Has missed at least one meal in last 30 days 0.112 0.105 0.881
(0.315) (0.309)
Number of days can't find work in last 30 days 14.612 15.260 0.474
(6.838) (6.972)
Number of days worked in past 10 days 2.707 2.441 0.461
(2.736) (2.585)
Number of days worked inside village in past 10 days 1.938 1.843 0.757
(2.436) (2.512)
Total wage earnings over past 10 days 543.768 438.559 0.164
(708.571) (587.394)
Typical wage in village during work period 216.464 211.505 0.383
(33.190) (35.138)
Has experience working with piece rates 0.413 0.473 0.391
(0.493) (0.502)
Baseline production (full training period) -0.218 -0.199 0.870
(0.688) (0.635)
Bseline attendance (full training period) 0.950 0.960 0.319
(0.082) (0.074)
Notes:  Responses taken from baseline surveys conducted on first day of work. Means and standard deviations are 
shown in cols (1) and (2) for Compressed and Pay Disparity units, respectively. Col (3) displays the p-values of the 
comparisons of means across Compressed and Pay Disparity production units obtained from a simple univariate 
regression, where standard errors are clustered by production unit.  N=378.
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Indicator for knows correct wage of both co-workers 0.909 0.742 0.003***
(0.288) (0.440)
Indicator for knows correct wage of at least one co-worker 0.958 0.871 0.031**
(0.200) (0.337)
Indicator for has an opinion of wage of both co-workers 0.921 0.871 0.203
(0.271) (0.337)
Indicator for has an opinion of wages of at least one co-worker 0.966 0.923 0.206
(0.181) (0.265)
Indicator for knows correct wage of all unit members 0.086 0.019 0.000***
(0.280) (0.138)
Indicator for has an opinion of wages of all unit members 0.117 0.143 0.237
(0.321) (0.351)
Indicator for has an opinion of wages of some unit members 0.134 0.174 0.070*
(0.341) (0.380)
Panel A — Own Unit
Panel B — Other Units
Notes:  Responses taken from endline surveys in which workers were asked to list the wages of the members of their own 
production units and also the members of a set of four fixed product units.  Means and standard deviations are shown in 
cols (1) and (2) for Compressed and Pay Disparity units, respectively.  Col (3) displays the p-values of the comparisons 
of means across Compressed and Pay Disparity units obtained from a simple univariate regression, where standard errors 
are clustered by production unit. Panel A describes beliefs about a worker's own production unit. N=358. Panel B 
summarizes beliefs about the wages of individuals in four other units. The dataset is a panel of worker x unit 
observations. Knowledge about the wages of Compressed units is reported in col (1), and knoweldge about the wages of 
Pay Disparity units is reported in col (2). Observations in Panel B only include instances of individuals evaluating the 
wages of units other than their own. N=1252.
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(std dev.) Attendance Attendance
Output | 
Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.311*** -0.242** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.0893
(0.110) (0.097) (0.026) (0.025) (0.094)
Post  x  Pay disparity x  Low wage -0.385*** -0.332** -0.113** -0.120** -0.204*
(0.134) (0.128) (0.055) (0.053) (0.114)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Med wage -0.262 -0.226 -0.126** -0.129** -0.0608
(0.201) (0.187) (0.056) (0.060) (0.138)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  High wage -0.288 -0.172 -0.106** -0.104** -0.00901
(0.199) (0.181) (0.053) (0.052) (0.152)
Individual fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No
Post-treatment Compressed mean -0.099 -0.099 0.939 0.939 0.015
N 8375 8375 8375 8375 7678
Notes : Difference in differences regressions. Panel A pools the treatment effects across the low, medium, and high rank 
workers, while Panel B shows the treatment effects separately by rank. Post is an indicator that equals 1 if the day is after 
workers have been randomized into wage treatments, and 0 during the baseline training period. Col (5) limits to observations 
where the worker was present. Regressions include day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and 
controls for neighboring production units. All coefficients are identified off comparisons of workers who earn the same absolute 
wage and have the same productivity rank within their production unit (see regression specification in text). Standard errors 
clustered by production unit. 
Panel A — Pooled Treatment Effects
Panel B — Treatment Effects Separately by Rank
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Table 2.5: Effects Over Time





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.0530 -0.309*** -0.294** -0.0260 -0.133*** -0.149***
(0.123) (0.114) (0.133) (0.037) (0.029) (0.042)
Post  x  Pay disparity x  Low wage -0.0607 -0.325** -0.461*** 0.0493 -0.103* -0.224***
(0.187) (0.151) (0.174) (0.087) (0.062) (0.079)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Med wage 0.0541 -0.343* -0.231 -0.0400 -0.153** -0.126
(0.169) (0.195) (0.283) (0.049) (0.063) (0.089)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  High wage -0.144 -0.259 -0.199 -0.0753 -0.144** -0.101
(0.235) (0.248) (0.203) (0.069) (0.066) (0.069)
Individual fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-treatment Compressed Mean 0.081 -0.028 -0.264 0.973 0.945 0.916
N 4565 4670 5654 4565 4670 5654
Notes : Difference in differences regressions. Post is an indicator that equals 1 if the day is after workers have been randomized into wage treatments, and 
0 during the baseline training period. All specifications include all of the pre-wage change observations.  Col (1) and (4) only include post observations 
before the first payday. Col (2) and (5) only include post observations after the first but before the second payday.  Col (3) and (6) only include post 
observations after the second payday. Regressions include individual fixed effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and 
controls for neighboring production units. All coefficients are identified off comparisons of workers who earn the same absolute wage and have the same 
productivity rank within their production unit (see regression specification in text). Standard errors clustered by production unit. 
Panel B — Treatment Effects Separately by Rank
Panel A — Pooled Treatment Effects
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Table 2.6: Mediating Effects of Perceived Justifications
Dependent variable Output Attendance Output Attendance Output Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.358*** -0.167*** -0.384*** -0.153*** -0.445*** -0.181***
(0.133) (0.039) (0.131) (0.031) (0.147) (0.037)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Perceived justification 0.292* 0.159** 0.395** 0.0996** 0.429*** 0.134***
(0.173) (0.061) (0.161) (0.046) (0.154) (0.045)
Post  x  Perceived justification 0.0483 -0.0500 -0.0518 0.0332 -0.0342 0.0160
(0.107) (0.032) (0.103) (0.028) (0.094) (0.025)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Low wage -0.448*** -0.168*** -0.513*** -0.158** -0.718*** -0.239***
(0.147) (0.061) (0.160) (0.071) (0.191) (0.091)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Low wage  x  Perceived justification 0.467** 0.181** 0.512** 0.121 0.712*** 0.225**
(0.231) (0.087) (0.220) (0.077) (0.230) (0.096)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Med wage -0.270 -0.170** -0.248 -0.157** -0.283 -0.187**
(0.224) (0.075) (0.227) (0.068) (0.280) (0.088)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Med wage  x  Perceived justification 0.127 0.150 0.0890 0.0876 0.0829 0.104
(0.267) (0.094) (0.293) (0.118) (0.311) (0.115)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  High wage -0.386 -0.139* -0.372 -0.137*
(0.242) (0.071) (0.242) (0.072)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  High wage  x  Perceived justification 0.582** 0.0884 0.564** 0.0845
(0.269) (0.078) (0.269) (0.082)
R-squared 0.436 0.171 0.436 0.172 0.437 0.173
Number of observations (worker-days) 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375
Panel B — Treatment Effects Separately by Rank
Notes:  Panels A and B show comparisons of each worker in Pay disparity production units with the relevant worker (who has the same rank and absolute earnings 
level) in the Compressed production units. In Cols. (1)-(2), the Perceived justification indicator equals 1 if the baseline productivity difference between a worker and 
his higher-ranked co-worker (for low and medium rank workers) is above the Compressed group mean. In Cols. (3)-(4), this indicator equals 1 if the observability 
correlation for the worker's production task (computed using a separate baseline sample) is above the mean. In Cols. (5)-(6), this indicator equals 1 if the baseline 
productivity difference between a worker and his higher-ranked co-worker (for low and medium rank workers) is above the Compressed group mean or if the 
observability correlation for the worker's production task is above the mean. Regressions include individual fixed effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific 
quadratic experience trends, and controls for neighboring production units. Standard errors clustered by production unit.
Baseline output difference 
between a worker and his 
higher ranked peer is large
Co-worker output is 
highly observable
Definition of Perceived Justification Indicator
Baseline differences are 
large or co-worker output is 
highly observable
Panel A — Pooled Treatment Effects
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Table 2.7: Effects of Pay Disparity: Unit Level Variation
Dependent variable Output Attendance Output Attendance Output Attendance Output Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.134 -0.0735*** -0.273** -0.116*** -0.125 -0.0797*** -0.273** -0.111***
(0.092) (0.026) (0.122) (0.032) (0.120) (0.027) (0.125) (0.033)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Perceived justification 0.383** 0.119** 0.241 0.0961* 0.379** 0.111**
(0.159) (0.047) (0.177) (0.051) (0.160) (0.047)
Post  x  Perceived justification -0.0375 0.0140 0.0345 0.0413 -0.0241 0.0289
(0.100) (0.028) (0.100) (0.030) (0.085) (0.024)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.148 -0.0597* -0.317** -0.0845** -0.136 -0.0605 -0.306** -0.0800*
(0.108) (0.035) (0.139) (0.042) (0.122) (0.039) (0.144) (0.045)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Perceived justification 0.465*** 0.0892* 0.127 0.106 0.432** 0.0848
(0.163) (0.051) (0.219) (0.070) (0.169) (0.053)
Post  x  Perceived justification -0.122 0.0465 0.147 0.0371 -0.0784 0.0577
(0.125) (0.035) (0.157) (0.052) (0.124) (0.035)
R-squared 0.432 0.165 0.433 0.167 0.432 0.166 0.433 0.167
Number of observations (worker-days) 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375
Panel B — Comparison with Compressed_Low Units Only
Notes:  Differences in differences regressions examining unit-level performance across wage treatments. Specifications are similar to the pooled individual regressions, but use variation 
from all workers, not only the "relevant" ones. Panel A examines the average performance of all workers on Pay disparity units relative to all workers in Compressed units. In Panel B, 
Pay disparity units are compared to the Compressed Low units only; these regressions include a dummy for being on a Compressed Medium or Compressed High unit, and an interaction 
of the dummy with the Perceived justification indicator (so the omitted category is Compressed Low).  In Cols. (3)-(8), the Pereceived justification indicator takes the same value for all 
workers in a unit. In Cols. (2)-(3), the Perceived justification indicator equals 1 if the worker was assigned to a production task where co-worker output is highly observable. In Cols. (5)-
(6), this indicator equals 1 if the baseline productivity difference between each worker and his higher-ranked co-worker (for both  the low and medium rank workers) is above the 
Compressed group mean. In Cols. (5)-(6), this indicator equals 1 if either the observability or large baseline productivity difference equals 1. All regressions include individual fixed 
effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and controls for neighboring production units. Standard errors clustered by production unit.
Definition of Perceived Justification Indicator
Co-worker output is 
highly observable
Large baseline output 
difference between 
co-workers
Co-worker output is highly 
observable or baseline 
differences are large
Panel A — Comparison with all Compressed Units
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Table 2.8: Effects on Group Cohesion: Endline Games 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pay disparity -9.376*** -18.89** -20.49*** -25.72***
(3.487) (8.068) (5.532) (6.923)
Pay disparity x Observable task 17.81*
(9.472)
Pay disparity x Large productivity difference 17.11**
(6.815)
Pay disparity x Perceived justification (aggregate) 19.66***
(7.445)
Dependent variable mean 53.97 53.97 53.97 53.97
R-squared 0.291 0.397 0.397 0.410
Dependent variable: Tower height
Notes:  Observable task equals 1 if the observability correlation for the unit's production task (computed using a separate 
baseline sample) is above the mean. Large productivity difference equals 1 if the difference between a worker and his higher 
paid peer is above average (>0.375 standard deviations) for at least one member of the unit. Perceived justification 
(aggregate) is a boolean that equals 1 if either of the perceived justification measure dummies -- Observable task or Large 
productivity difference -- equals 1. All regressions include round fixed effects. N=80 production units. Games were only run 
in later rounds of the experiment. Robust standard errors.
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Table 2.9: Effects on Group Cohesion: Endline Games 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Both workers from same unit x Pay disparity -1.105** -1.082** -1.480** -1.467**
(0.498) (0.499) (0.617) (0.616)
Both workers from same unit 0.350 0.498 0.502* 0.502
(0.295) (0.300) (0.300) (0.319)
At least one worker on Pay disparity unit 0.234 0.222 0.203 0.185
(0.413) (0.406) (0.504) (0.504)
Both workers from same unit x Pay disparity x Perceived justification 0.598 0.613
(0.558) (0.561)
At least one worker on Pay disparity unit x Perceived justification 0.0305 0.0221
(0.489) (0.484)
At least one low rank worker in pair -0.645** -0.659**
(0.261) (0.260)
At least one medium rank worker in pair -0.564* -0.587**
(0.286) (0.286)
F-test p-value: Sum of first two coefficients 0.0536 0.135 0.0593 0.0639
Fixed effects for all rank combinations? No No No Yes
Dependent variable mean 4.085 4.085 4.085 4.085
R-squared 0.123 0.129 0.130 0.132
Dependent variable: Number correct
Notes:  Dependent variable is the number of correct matches made by the pair. Perceived justification equals 1 if a worker on a pay disparity 
unit was assigned to an observable production task, or was substantially less productive than his higher paid peer, and equals 0 otherwise. This 
variable always equals 0 for workers in Compressed units. Regressions include fixed effects for the order in which a game was played during 
the day and the game station (location in worksite), as well as education controls (a dummy for whether both workers in the pair completed 
primary school, and a dummy for whether both can write a sentence in the local language). N=1904 pair-game observations. Games were only 
run in later rounds of the experiment. Standard errors are clustered by production unit.
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pay disparity -0.236* -0.349** -0.127* -0.173**
(0.124) (0.169) (0.070) (0.085)
Pay disparity  x  Perceived justification 0.208 0.0845
(0.245) (0.137)
Compressed mean 0.779 0.779 0.265 0.265
Notes:  Network links are measured from endline surveys.  We define a link if the worker reports that he would go to the co-worker 
or the co-worker would come to him for: advice, borrowing money, or visiting one another's houses.  In cols. (2) and (4), the 
perceived justification indicator equals 1 if the observability correlation for the worker's production task is above the mean or if any 
worker in the unit has a large productvity difference with his higher-ranked co-worker. Regressions include an indicator for haveing 
unit co-workers who are relatives. Standard errors clustered by production unit. N=358.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pay disparity -0.0143 0.363*** -0.163 -0.587***
(0.091) (0.120) (0.170) (0.186)
Pay disparity x Perceived justification 0.0154 -0.108 0.111 0.470*
(0.118) (0.190) (0.228) (0.252)
R-squared 0.0840 0.244 0.203 0.239
Pay disparity -0.292*** -0.448*** -0.241 -0.146
(0.111) (0.163) (0.172) (0.168)
Pay disparity x Perceived justification 0.298** 0.349 0.307 0.241
(0.133) (0.225) (0.220) (0.205)
R-squared 0.190 0.315 0.292 0.278
N 358 121 119 118
Notes : OLS regressions using endline survey responses. Panel A dependent variable is whether the worker viewed his wages as “fair” or “very 
fair” (relative to a 5 point scale).  Panel B dependent variable is an indicator for above-median happiness (World Values Survey). Perceived 
justification indicator equals 1 if the observability correlation for the worker's production task is above the mean or if the baseline productivity 
difference between a worker and his higher-ranked co-worker (for low and medium rank workers) is above the Compressed group mean. All 
specifications include task and round fixed effects. Col (1) includes all observations.  Cols (2) - (4) restrict the samples to the high, medium, and 
low rank workers. Standard errors clustered by production unit in Col (1). Robust standard errors are used in the single-rank specifications. 
Panel A — Believes wage set fairly relative to co-workers
Panel B — Above-median happiness (World Values Survey)
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Chapter 3. Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Short-Term Employment
3.1 Introduction
A majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas and engage in agriculture as a primary source of
income. Given their dependency on agriculture, consumption patterns for this rural population are
often characterized by seasonality in hunger and poverty (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Khandker
and Mahmud, 2012). This has resulted in a large number of anti-poverty programs in recent years,
targeted at raising incomes of agricultural households during the lean season.96 For example, in the
rural Indian setting, agricultural workers report having agricultural employment for only 44% of
days in a year (National Sample Survey). In response, the Central Government of India introduced
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) – a workfare program aimed at providing
rural households with 100 days of paid employment at the statutory minimumwage annually during
the agricultural lean season – in 2005. However, despite this big push for employment provision as
a social safety net for rural populations, there is limited empirical evidence on the causal impact of
providing households with jobs during the agricultural lean season.
In this paper, I use experimental evidence to understand the impacts of providing rural workers with
meaningful short-term employment during the agricultural lean months. I randomize job offers
across workers who express interest in a month-long employment opportunity, and examine the
effects of receiving a job offer on subsequent labor supply and consumption decisions. Given that
the employment opportunity results in an increase in wage earnings, effects on labor supply and
consumption, if any, could possibly operate through an income channel.
96For example, Banerjee et al. (2015) evaluate a multifaceted program aimed at increasing consumption of the poor.
The program randomized the provision of a “productive asset grant, training and support, life skills coaching, temporary
cash consumption support, and access to savings accounts and health information or services" to the poorest members
within villages across 6 countries. They find statistically significant impacts across a range of indices (consumption,
food security, mental health etc.) a year after the program intervention.
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By randomizing job offers, I overcome the issue of non-random allocation of jobs, which is
important for causal identification. For example, in an evaluation of the impact of NREGA
employment on consumption among households in Andhra Pradesh, Liu et al. (2010) find evidence
for the role of village leaders in influencing the allocation of NREGA jobs. As such, simply
comparing households who worked under NREGA to households who did not work under NREGA
leads to biased estimates. While this study does assign jobs among a selected group of individuals
who express interest in the employment opportunity – which is analogous to targeting mechanisms
in anti-poverty programs such as NREGA (Azam, 2011; Imbert and Papp, 2015) – the assignment
to a job offer is random within this group of selected individuals.
In this study, I track 1026 agricultural workers in rural Odisha, India during the agricultural lean
season. Rural labormarkets in Odishamirror other poor rural settings: seasonality from subsistence
agriculture leads to low employment levels for several months every year. All agricultural workers
in the study expressed interest in a month-long, full-time employment opportunity in low-skill
manufacturing. I generate exogenous variation in individual-level employment by randomizing
employment offers across these workers – I randomly assign close to half of them to a job offer in
a nearby factory, and the remainder to a control group. I then follow these workers several weeks
after the employment opportunity concludes.
I find that agricultural workers who received job offers worked 70% more days during the em-
ployment period, relative to workers who did not receive job offers. After employment concluded
at the factories, I find reductions in labor supply among workers who received job offers. These
workers report working fewer days as paid employees, reflected in both a reduction in days worked
in non self-employment activities as well as in self-employment activities. I also find evidence for
consumption gains – a 17% increase in the consumption of meat – among workers who received
job offers, relative to the control group. These results are consistent with a positive wealth shock
in effect – the provision of short-term employment led to an increase in wage earnings, which
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subsequently resulted in a reduction in labor supply and an increase in consumption. Finally,
workers who received job offers report greater life satisfaction, relative to workers in the control
group.
While there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of providing rural households with jobs
during the agricultural lean season, there is an existing literature that estimates the impacts of
interventions that stimulate employment. For example, Blattman and Dercon (2016) randomize
workers in Ethiopia into an industrial job offer, a control group, or an “entrepreneurship" program.
At the end of the study, they find that workers prefer entrepreneurial labor to industrial labor as
the latter is viewed as unpleasant and risky.97 There are important differences between their study
and this paper that are worth highlighting. Firstly, they show that workers assigned to the job
offer and to the control group had similar earnings at endline, due to the availability of informal
outside opportunities. In contrast, the employment opportunity provided in this paper generates
a large earnings shock for workers who are assigned to job offers, relative to the control group.
This is driven by the fact that in the rural Indian setting, outside opportunities are scarce during
the agricultural lean season. Second, their study examines impacts over a year following the
experiment, whereas this paper focuses on impacts in the weeks immediately following the end
of the employment opportunity. Thus, a key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how a
positive wealth shock impacts consumption and labor supply decisions in the short-run.
The body of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the experimental design. Section
3.3 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 presents the results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
97In related work, Blattman et al. (2014) study the impact of randomizing grant funding for vocational training and
business start-ups across young adults in Uganda; they find increases in work hours and earnings among those who
receive the grant relative to the control group.
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3.2 Experimental Design
I explore the effects of providing agricultural workers with short-term employment during the lean
season using an experimental design. In particular, I leverage an opportunity where agricultural
workers are recruited for a month-long, full-time job in low-skill manufacturing as part of another
field experiment (Breza et al., 2016). I generate exogenous variation in individual-level employment
by randomizing job offers across agricultural workers who express interest in the job opportunity.
Workers who accept the job offer are then hired full-time for one month at a factory site within
commuting distance of their villages. During the employment period, workers are paid a flat daily
wage that is greater or equal to the prevailing daily wage in the village (Rs. 250/∼US$4) for
attendance.
Context. Recruitment for the job takes place in local villages surrounding three factory sites
located in rural Odisha, India. For a large majority of households in these local villages, the
primary source of income is rainfed agriculture. Agricultural workers from these villages typically
engage in rainfed agriculture for approximately fourmonths in the year, and seek short-term contract
employment in non-agricultural jobs such as manufacturing and construction in the remaining lean
months. In this local context, males are more likely to take up tasks that involve low skilled manual
labor. Given that I am interested in studying agricultural workers who are active members of the
labor force, I restrict recruitment to male agricultural workers between the ages of 18-55.
Recruitment and Randomization Protocol. The recruitment process proceeds as follows. The
employment opportunity is first advertised in villages surrounding the factory site several days
prior to the start day of employment. Initial advertising of the job is done by word of mouth and
through the distribution of flyers. I hire local staff members to distribute flyers door-to-door to
every household in the village. These flyers contain a description of the employment opportunity
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as well as information on the employment start and end date, the location of the factory site, the
daily compensation, as well as the date and time of a village-wide meeting that will be held in the
subsequent days. Interested individuals are requested to attend the village meeting where they will
be given an opportunity to sign up to participate. These flyers also contain contact information of a
local staff member who individuals can reach out to prior to the village meeting if they have further
questions about the opportunity.
Several days after the flyers are distributed, a village-wide meeting is held in a public area within the
village. Any male individual who is a resident of the village is allowed to attend. At the meeting,
local staff provide further information about the employment opportunity and answer questions. At
the end of the meeting, interested individuals are given the opportunity to sign up. During the sign
up process, interested individuals provide the following information – their name, age, location of
household and primary occupation.
Next, I shortlist all eligible workers (male agricultural workers between the ages of 18-55) from the
list of interested individuals who sign up at the village meeting. I then randomize job offers among
those who are eligible for the job. Approximately half of the eligible workers are assigned to a job
offer in a nearby factory.
In the days before employment begins at the factory sites, the local staff return to the villages to
extend the job opportunity to those who are randomly selected to participate. This is done privately
with each individual at their home. Those who sign up but are not offered the job are not provided
any further information, and constitute the control group in our analysis.
Timeline. Recruitment was conducted in 12 one-month experimental rounds. In each round, a
maximum of 30 male workers were recruited from several villages within commuting distance of
the factory site. Across the 12 rounds, a total of 1026 eligible workers from 39 distinct villages
expressed interest in the employment opportunity, of which 467 workers were randomly assigned
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to a job offer.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the empirical strategy. In Section 3.3.1, I describe the survey instrument
administered to households from which I derive the main outcomes used in the empirical analysis.
In Section 3.3.2, I discuss attrition from the survey and report mean characteristics and a test
of balance across the treatment and control groups. In Section 3.3.3, I specify the regression
framework.
3.3.1 Outcomes
I conducted in-depth surveys with all eligible workers in our study approximately 2-4 weeks after
the employment period at the factory site concluded. The surveys were conducted in private in
each individual’s home. In each survey, I collected detailed recall data on employment, wages,
consumption, farm investments and self-employment activities. I also collected data on stress,
happiness and life satisfaction measures. All outcomes used in the analysis are self-reported.
3.3.2 Attrition and Balance Test
I was able to track 99% of workers who initially signed up for the employment opportunity, and
were able to conduct surveys with 81.5% (n=826) of them. 4.7% of workers refused to participate
in the survey. 13.4% of workers were not available in the village at the time of the survey due
to temporary migration for work in construction and manufacturing, which is common during the
agricultural lean season. 14.8% of workers in the control group were reported to have temporarily
migrated; this was 3.3 percentage points lower among workers in the treatment group, though the
difference is not significant.
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Table 3.1 reports mean characteristics and a test of balance for all eligible workers who expressed
interest in the employment opportunity. The sample was balanced by treatment status - the mean
differences for all covariates have a p-value greater than 0.1.
3.3.3 Empirical Specification
To estimate the impacts of employment on outcome Y , I calculate the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate
of a job offer via OLS:
Yivr = βJobivr + αr + ε ivr
where Jobivr is an indicator for worker i in village v and experimental round r being assigned a job
offer for month-long employment at the factory site. I control for experimental round fixed effects
αr and cluster standard errors at the village level.
3.4 Results
This section presents results from the empirical analysis. In Section 3.4.1, I document an increase
in employment among agricultural workers who were randomly assigned a job offer. In Sections
3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, I examine the impacts of receiving a job offer on labor supply, consumption,
and stress, happiness and life satisfaction measures respectively. In Section 3.4.5, I explore the
persistence of these effects over time. Lastly, in Section 3.4.6, I explore heterogeneous effects
across the study population.
3.4.1 Effects on Factory Employment
I examine the impact of being offered a job on the likelihood of accepting employment and on
the number of days worked at one of the factory sites in Table 3.2. I find that workers who were
111
assigned a job offer were 86 percentage points more likely to accept (Column 1) and worked an
average of 17.5 days at the factories (Column 2) relative to workers in the control group.
This increase in employment following the job offer is also reflected in Table 3.3. In the survey
conducted approximately 2-4 weeks after employment at the factory sites concluded, workers were
asked to recall their employment activities over the past 30 days. This 30-day recall period thus
overlaps with 2 weeks of the employment period at the factory sites.
Workers were asked to recall their participation in work for a paid wage as well as in work on their
own land, as well as the number of days worked for each category (if any). I find that workers who
were assigned a job offer were 32% more likely to have worked for a paid wage in the past 30 days
(Column 1), and reported 70%more days of work for a paid wage (Column 2) relative to workers in
the control group. Further, I find that workers who were assigned a job offer were 14% less likely
to have worked on their own land in the past 30 days (Column 3), and reported 30% fewer days of
work on their own land. Workers who were assigned a job offer thus substituted days worked on
their own land for days of paid employment at the factory sites.
3.4.2 Effects on Labor Supply
Next, I examine the impact of being offered a job on labor supply after the employment activity
at the factory sites concluded. In the survey, workers were asked to provide a daily recall of their
employment activities for the ten most recent days, prior to the date of the survey. Given that
the survey was conducted approximately 2-4 weeks after the employment activity concluded, this
captures their labor supply post employment at the factory sites.
In Table 3.4, I find that workers who were assigned a job offer worked fewer days for a paid wage
following the employment period at the factory sites (Column 1). I also find a significant reduction
in days worked in non self-employment (Column 2) and in self-employment (Column 3) for workers
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who were assigned a job offer, relative to workers in the control group. This result is consistent
with a wealth effect: an increase in factory wage earnings induces workers who were assigned a job
offer to reduce labor supply in the subsequent period, relative to workers in the control group.
3.4.3 Effects on Consumption
Subsequently, I examine the impact of being offered a job on consumption after the employment
activity at the factory sites concluded. In the survey, workers were asked to report their consumption
of meat in the past 2 weeks, any purchases of durables in the past month, and any outstanding
loans.
In Table 3.5, I find that workers who were assigned a job offer reported a 17% increase in meat
consumption (Column 1) following the employment period at the factory sites, relative to workers
in the control group. I find no significant differences in the purchase of durables (Column 2) and
in outstanding loans (Column 3) between the two groups. Relative to food consumption, adjusting
consumption along these two margins (durable goods and loans) might take a longer amount of
time due to the size of these investments. Since I surveyed workers very soon after employment at
the factory sites concluded, this might account for why I did not detect any significant changes in
consumption along these two margins.
3.4.4 Effects on Stress, Happiness and Life Satisfaction
Finally, I examine the impact of being offered a job on life satisfaction, happiness, and stress. In
the survey, workers were asked to respond to several subjective well-being measures that have been
previously used in the literature. In particular, workers were asked the following three questions:
(1) All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days, on a scale of
1-10?; (2) All things considered, how would you rate your happiness on a scale of 1-4?; and (3) On
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a scale of 1-4 (where 4 is very worried), how worried are you about your future?
In Table 3.6, I find that workers who were assigned a job offer reported greater life satisfaction
(Column 1), relative to workers in the control group. I find no significant differences in self-reported
happiness (Column 2) and stress (Column 3) levels.
3.4.5 Effects over Time
In order to understand if these effects are persistent over time, I exploit variation in the timing at
which the surveys were conducted relative to the end date of factory employment. In Table 3.7, I
separately test for treatment effects among workers who were surveyed within 2 weeks of factory
employment (Panel A), andworkers surveyed 2-4 weeks after factory employment concluded (Panel
B). I present results for five key outcomes: days worked for a paid wage, days worked in non-self
employment and days worked in self-employment following the employment period at the factory
sites, consumption of meat, and life satisfaction.
I find that the reductions in labor supply and the gains in consumption and life satisfaction de-
scribed in Sections 3.4.2-3.4.4 are concentrated among workers who were surveyed soon after the
employment opportunity concluded (Panel A). For workers who were surveyed later, the effects on
labor supply, consumption and life satisfaction are insignificant, suggesting that these effects are
transitory and dissipate over time.
3.4.6 Heterogeneous Effects
Initial Wealth. In this setting, land ownership is a good proxy for household wealth. Examining
heterogeneity in treatment effects along this dimension is useful as it has potentially important
implications for policy. In Table 3.8, I separately test for treatment effects among landless workers
(Panel A), and workers who own some amount of land (Panel B). I present results for five key
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outcomes: days worked for a paid wage, days worked in non-self employment and days worked in
self-employment following the employment period at the factory sites, consumption of meat, and
life satisfaction.
I find that the reductions in paid labor supply and the gains in meat consumption described in
Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 are concentrated among landless workers (Columns 1 and 4 of Panel
A). This suggests that the constraints faced by households during the agricultural lean season are
binding for low wealth workers, consistent with previous findings in the literature. For workers who
own some land, I do find a significant reduction in days worked in self-employment (Column 3 of
Panel B). Further, I find significant increases in self-reported life satisfaction across both subgroups
(Column 5). This suggests that employment provision has a positive effect on workers’ subjective
well-being, independent of initial wealth.
Size of Earnings Shock. Once employed at the factory sites, workers who were offered jobs
were randomly assigned to different wage regimes. This in turn generated variation in the total
amount of earnings that workers could possibly make during the employment period. In Table 3.9,
I separately test for treatment effects among workers who received a small earnings shock (Panel
A), a medium earnings shock (Panel B), and a large earnings shock (Panel C), 98 and present results
for the same five outcomes described in the previous paragraph. Note that the difference in the size
of the earnings shock between each group is approximately 4%.
The results in Table 3.9 suggest that the reductions in paid labor supply (Column 1), gains in meat
consumption (Column 4) and gains in life satisfaction (Column 5) are observed across all three
groups, though I am underpowered to detect significant effects in some specifications.
98For workers who were randomly assigned to job offers but chose not to accept employment at the factory sites, I
assigned them to all 3 categories.
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3.5 Conclusion
I generate random variation in job offers across workers in rural Odisha, India tomeasure the income
effects of meaningful, short-term employment during the agricultural lean season. I find reductions
in labor supply and gains in consumption among workers who received job offers in the 2-4 weeks
after employment concluded. These results are consistent with a positive wealth shock – the
provision of short-term employment led to an increase in wage earnings, which alleviated binding
constraints faced by these agricultural households. Further, I find that these effects are concentrated
among low wealth workers, which suggests an important role of targeting in anti-poverty programs
that serve as social safety nets during the agricultural lean season.
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3.6 Tables




Household size 5.00 4.98 0.825
(1.62) (1.66)
Participates in casual labor market 1.00 1.00 0.178
(0.07) (0.00)
Amount of own land (acres) 0.61 0.57 0.485
(0.74) (0.77)
Amount of cultivated land (acres) 0.58 0.52 0.240
(0.73) (0.72)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (reported in parentheses) are shown in
Columns (1) and (2) for the Control and Treatment groups, respectively. Col (3)
displays the p-values of the comparisons of means across the 2 groups. N=826
Table 3.2: Effects of Job Offer on Factory Employment
Accepted Job at Factory Days Worked at Factory
(1) (2)
Offered a Job 0.857*** 17.466***
(0.030) (0.824)
Dep. Variable Mean 0.397 8.050
Observations 826 826
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results of an OLS regression of each out-
come on an indicator for treatment status and experimental round fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. The dependent variable in Col-
umn (1) is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the job offer at the factory was
accepted. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the total number of days em-
ployed at the factory.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Effects of Job Offer on Employment in Past 30 Days
For a Paid Wage On Own Land
Indicator Days Worked Indicator Days Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Offered a Job 0.253*** 5.968*** -0.073* -1.168**
(0.032) (0.599) (0.038) (0.440)
Dep. Variable Mean 0.798 8.559 0.517 3.943
Observations 826 826 826 826
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome
on an indicator for treatment status and experimental round fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level. The dependent variables in Column (1) and
(3) are indicators that take the value 1 if the individual worked in the past 30 days.
The dependent variables in Column (2) and (4) are the total number of days worked
in the past 30 days.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4: Effects of Job Offer on Labor Supply
Paid Wage Non Self-Employment Self-Employment
(1) (2) (3)
Offered a Job -0.534** -0.302** -0.354*
(0.225) (0.148) (0.183)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.350 1.677 1.260
Observations 826 826 826
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome on an
indicator for treatment status and experimental round fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. The dependent variables in Column (1)-(3) are the total
number of days (in the past 10 days) worked for a paid wage, in non self-employment
and in self-employment respectively.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Effects of Job Offer on Consumption
Consumed Meat Purchased Durables Outstanding Loans
(1) (2) (3)
Offered a Job 0.084* 0.012 -0.052
(0.044) (0.026) (0.047)
Dep. Variable Mean 0.487 0.166 0.677
Observations 826 826 826
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome on an indi-
cator for treatment status and experimental round fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(3) are indicators that take the
value 1 if the individual consumed any meat in the past 2 weeks, purchased any durables in
the past month, and holds any outstanding loans respectively.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.6: Effects of Job Offer on Life Satisfaction, Happiness and Stress
Life Satisfaction Happiness Worried about Future
(1) (2) (3)
Offered a Job 0.070** 0.034 -0.038
(0.032) (0.039) (0.031)
Dep. Variable Mean 0.279 0.519 0.720
Observations 826 826 826
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome on
an indicator for treatment status and experimental round fixed effects. The dependent
variable in Column (1) is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports
7 or higher on a 1-10 life satisfaction scale. The dependent variable in Column (2)
is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports feeling quite or very
happy, all things considered. The dependent variable in Column (3) is an indicator
that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports feeling quite or very worried about
his future. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.7: Effects Over Time
Paid Wage Non Self-Employment Self-Employment Consumed Meat Life Satisfaction
Panel A: Within 2 Weeks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Offered a Job -0.708** -0.447** -0.550** 0.094 0.101**
(0.276) (0.192) (0.245) (0.066) (0.047)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.036 1.747 1.059 0.454 0.113
Observations 471 471 471 471 471
Panel B: 2-4 Weeks Later
Offered a Job -0.334 -0.010 -0.206 0.071 0.031
(0.320) (0.194) (0.258) (0.044) (0.027)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.766 1.583 1.527 0.530 0.093
Observations 355 355 355 355 355
Notes: Columns (1)-(5) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome on an indicator for treatment status and experimental
round fixed effects. The sample is restricted to workers surveyed within the first 2 weeks post factory employment in Panel A and to
workers surveyed 2-4 weeks post factory employment in Panel B. The dependent variables in Column (1)-(3) are the total number
of days (in the past 10 days) worked for a paid wage, in non self-employment and in self-employment respectively. The dependent
variables in Column (4) is an indicator that take the value 1 if the individual consumed any meat in the past 2 weeks. The dependent
variable in Column (5) is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports 7 or higher on a 1-10 life satisfaction scale.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneous Effects by Landholding Status
Paid Wage Non Self-Employment Self-Employment Consumed Meat Life Satisfaction
Panel A: Landless (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Offered a Job -0.611** -0.650*** -0.112 0.103* 0.072*
(0.274) (0.231) (0.185) (0.052) (0.038)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.117 1.748 0.947 0.552 0.106
Observations 377 377 377 377 377
Panel B: Own some Land
Offered a Job -0.435 -0.120 -0.390* 0.065 0.069*
(0.287) (0.206) (0.228) (0.050) (0.039)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.546 1.617 1.523 0.432 0.102
Observations 449 449 449 449 449
Notes: Columns (1)-(5) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome on an indicator for treatment status and experimen-
tal round fixed effects. The sample is restricted to landless workers in Panel A and to workers with some landholdings in Panel B.
The dependent variables in Column (1)-(3) are the total number of days (in the past 10 days) worked for a paid wage, in non self-
employment and in self-employment respectively. The dependent variables in Column (4) is an indicator that take the value 1 if the
individual consumed any meat in the past 2 weeks. The dependent variable in Column (5) is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the
respondent reports 7 or higher on a 1-10 life satisfaction scale. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Heterogeneous Effects by Size of Earnings Shock
Paid Wage Non Self-Employment Self-Employment Consumed Meat Life Satisfaction
Panel A: Small (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat -0.435 -0.232 -0.362 0.108** 0.093**
(0.308) (0.170) (0.215) (0.045) (0.043)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.472 1.750 1.322 0.480 0.099
Observations 627 627 627 627 627
Panel B: Medium
Treat -0.436* -0.159 -0.246 0.060 0.026
(0.229) (0.194) (0.217) (0.050) (0.032)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.487 1.780 1.362 0.466 0.079
Observations 622 622 622 622 622
Panel C: Large
Treat -0.375 0.044 -0.518** 0.056 0.074**
(0.266) (0.207) (0.230) (0.050) (0.034)
Dep. Variable Mean 3.498 1.836 1.283 0.463 0.093
Observations 615 615 615 615 615
Notes: Columns (1)-(5) report the results of an OLS regression of each outcome on an indicator for treatment status and experi-
mental round fixed effects. The dependent variables in Column (1)-(3) are the total number of days (in the past 10 days) worked
for a paid wage, in non self-employment and in self-employment respectively. The dependent variables in Column (4) is an indi-
cator that take the value 1 if the individual consumed any meat in the past 2 weeks. The dependent variable in Column (5) is an
indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent reports 7 or higher on a 1-10 life satisfaction scale. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure A.1: Commuting Patterns Among Rural Non-Agricultural Workers
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Source: 2011 India Census
Commuting Distance in Kilometers
Notes: These figures summarize information collected on commuting patterns among non-agricultural workers in
rural India in the 2011 Census.
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Table A.1: Crop Diversification
Non-Cereal
Indicator Area Share HYV
Panel A: Unconnected Villages (1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Treat x Post 0.127 0.009 0.013 0.189
(0.146) (0.137) (0.146) (0.177)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.104 0.078 0.078 0.085
Panel B: Previously Connected Villages
Incidental Treat x Post 0.395*** 0.328*** 0.263*** 0.382***
(0.105) (0.067) (0.069) (0.098)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.423 0.255 0.255 0.187
Household FE Yes No Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village FE No Yes No No
Observations 8492 5443 4400 8492
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the direct regression in Equation 6 in
Panel A, and the spillover regression in Equation 7 in Panel B. I restrict attention to β1, the
treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Column (1) is an in-
dicator that equals 1 if the household engages in cultivation of non-cereal crops. Outcome
in Columns (2)-(3) is the share of gross land cultivated under non-cereal crops. Outcome
in Columns (4) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household uses high-yielding vari-
eties (HYVs) of non-cereal crops. Non-cereal crops include fruits and vegetables, pulses,
oilseeds, fiber crops, sugarcane, spices, drugs and plantation crops. The regression in Col-
umn (4) is conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All
regressions include state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample
weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Farm Inputs
Material Inputs Labor Days Per Acre
HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Total Hired Family
Panel A: Unconnected Villages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DirectTreat x Post 0.036 0.060 0.317*** -0.110 23.449 -13.731 37.180
(0.092) (0.150) (0.094) (0.126) (25.057) (9.537) (22.760)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.135 0.258 0.046 0.424 50.984 22.630 28.354
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492 4400 4400 4400
Panel B: Previously Connected Villages
IncidentalTreat x Post 0.340** 0.332*** 0.287*** 0.395*** 27.386** 35.429*** -8.042
(0.155) (0.104) (0.097) (0.146) (12.209) (12.988) (7.437)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.173 0.320 0.110 0.580 47.663 23.695 23.968
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492 4400 4400 4400
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the direct regression in Equation 6 in Panel A, and the spillover regression in
Equation 7 in Panel B. I restrict attention to β1, the treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Columns
(1)-(4) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, irrigation, manure, and chemical
fertilizer respectively. Outcome in Column (5) is the total number of labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (6) is the
total number of hired labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (7) is the total number of family labor-days per cultivated
acre. The regressions in Columns (5) - (7) are conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All re-
gressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Labor Days Per Acre, by Operation
Land Seed Fertilizer Post-Harvest
Prep Planting Application Weeding Irrigation Harvesting Threshing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat x Post 0.515 2.004 2.692*** 6.667*** 2.741 5.084 5.720
(1.464) (1.950) (0.803) (2.408) (1.841) (3.571) (5.226)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 6.850 8.453 3.903 6.354 5.642 22.001 3.795
Observations 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8, restricting attention to β1, the treat-
ment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Columns (1)-(7) is the total number of labor-days (family
and hired) per cultivated acre, by agricultural operation. The regressions in Columns (1) - (7) are conditional on households
that are cultivating some land in both periods. All regressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations
are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Farm Inputs: Robustness to Alternate Definition of Outcome Variable
Log(1+ Expenditure in Rupees) HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Hired Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat x Post 1.806* 1.575** 2.490*** 1.612** 0.719
(0.941) (0.630) (0.627) (0.781) (0.974)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 1.059 1.842 0.563 3.722 2.834
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492 8492
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8, restricting atten-
tion to β1, the treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Columns (1)-(5) is the
log(total expenditures in Rupees +1) for high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, irrigation, manure, chemical
fertilizer and hired labor respectively. I impute the total expenditures for hired labor using the prevail-
ing agricultural wage at the village level, and the reported number of days of hired labor. All regressions
include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Farm Inputs: Robustness to Sample Restrictions
Material Inputs Labor Days Per Acre
HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Total Hired Family
Panel A: Villages Far from Town (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat x Post 0.317*** 0.325*** 0.338*** 0.132 30.798*** 18.684* 12.113
(0.113) (0.092) (0.070) (0.106) (10.795) (10.780) (11.391)
Observations 3516 3516 3516 3516 1954 1954 1954
Panel B: Unconnected & Previously Connected Villages
Treat x Post 0.149* 0.267*** 0.327*** 0.245** 32.588** 15.915 16.673
(0.086) (0.082) (0.076) (0.116) (13.738) (9.648) (14.380)
Observations 3100 3100 3100 3100 1720 1720 1720
Panel C: Unconnected & Previously Connected Villages Far from Town
Treat x Post 0.141 0.334*** 0.319*** 0.203 31.456 3.452 28.004
(0.086) (0.114) (0.105) (0.138) (22.164) (9.662) (20.379)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1436 1436 1436 1436 858 858 858
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. Outcome in Columns (1)-(4) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV)
seeds, irrigation, manure, and chemical fertilizer respectively. Outcome in Column (5) is the total number of labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column
(6) is the total number of hired labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (7) is the total number of family labor-days per cultivated acre. The regressions
in Columns (5)-(7) are conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All regressions include household and state-year fixed effects.
Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Activity Status: Robustness to Alternate Cutoffs for Close to Town Measure
Cutoff for Close to Town Measure: Distance to Town < 5km Distance to Town < 15km
Engaged in Casual Labor Days Engaged in Casual Labor Days
Cultivation in Non-Agriculture Cultivation in Non-Agriculture
Panel A: Unconnected Villages (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat x Post 0.006 15.558 0.009 94.457
(0.080) (39.629) (0.103) (73.395)
Treat x Post x Close to Town -0.423** 122.923* -0.244 -86.435
(0.178) (68.521) (0.177) (88.959)
F-test p-value: Sum of coefficients 0.017 0.021 0.107 0.867
Panel B: Previously Connected Villages
Treat x Post 0.005 -4.020 -0.023 0.013
(0.132) (39.494) (0.124) (42.811)
Treat x Post x Close to Town -0.296 -34.372 -0.107 10.073
(0.222) (76.812) (0.215) (65.523)
F-test p-value: Sum of coefficients 0.142 0.588 0.504 0.847
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the regression in Equation 6 in Panel A, and Equation 7 in
Panel B. Outcome in Columns (1) and (3) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household engages in any agricultural
cultivation. Outcome in Columns (2) and (4) is the total number of person-days worked in casual non-agriculture.
All regressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample
weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Crop Diversification & Farm Inputs: Robustness to Alternate Cutoffs for Close to Town Measure
Crop Diversification Material Inputs Labor Days Per Acre
Non-Cereal HYV HYV
Indicator Non-Cereal Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Total Hired Family
Panel A: Distance to Town < 5 km (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treat x Post 0.205** 0.275*** 0.263*** 0.206** 0.283*** 0.187* 21.418* 12.624 8.793
(0.081) (0.089) (0.098) (0.088) (0.070) (0.103) (11.669) (9.272) (12.519)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.334 0.217 0.267 0.248 0.167 0.562 58.955 34.103 24.852
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492 8492 8492 4400 4400 4400
Panel B: Distance to Town < 15 km
Treat x Post 0.172 0.338*** 0.253* 0.276*** 0.296*** 0.182 14.166 16.483 -2.317
(0.107) (0.115) (0.132) (0.104) (0.086) (0.122) (11.227) (12.240) (6.632)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.334 0.217 0.267 0.248 0.167 0.562 58.955 34.103 24.852
Observations 8492 8492 8492 8492 8492 8492 4400 4400 4400
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the pooled regression in Equation 8 with Closev equals 1 if village v is within 5 kilometers of the
nearest town at baseline in Panel A, and within 15 kilometers of the nearest town at baseline in Panel B. I restrict attention to β1, the treatment effect on
households further away from towns. Outcome in Column (1) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household engages in cultivation of non-cereal crops.
Outcome in Column (2) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household uses high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of non-cereal crops. Outcomes in Columns
(3)-(6) are indicators that equal 1 if the household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, irrigation, manure, and chemical fertilizer respectively.
Column (7) is the total number of labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (8) is the total number of hired labor-days per cultivated acre.
Outcome in Column (9) is the total number of family labor-days per cultivated acre. The regressions in Columns (7) -(9) are conditional on households
that are cultivating some land in both periods. All regressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999
sample weights. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Placebo Test: Program Road Constructed between 2007-2010
Engaged in Cultivation HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat x Post -0.085 0.001 -0.069 -0.048 0.041
(0.107) (0.089) (0.086) (0.080) (0.211)
Treat x Post x Close to Town 0.022 -0.179 0.043 0.120 -0.084
(0.211) (0.215) (0.270) (0.102) (0.278)
F-test p-value: Sum of coefficients 0.729 0.359 0.916 0.204 0.805
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7958 7958 7958 7958 7958
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I run the regression in Equation 6 with Treatv equals 1 if village v re-
ceives a program road between 2007 and 2010. I drop all households that received program roads before 2007. All
regressions include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Balance by Treatment Status: Robustness of Sample
Household Attrits Household Splits
Direct Incidental Pooled Direct Incidental Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.019 -0.075 -0.045 0.013 0.023 0.017
(0.101) (0.082) (0.064) (0.033) (0.052) (0.030)
Observations 1166 1468 2634 1166 1468 2634
Notes: Outcome in Columns (1)-(3) is an indicator that equals 1 if the household at-
trits between 1999 and 2006. Outcome in Columns (4)-(6) is an indicator that equals 1
if the household splits intomultiple household units between 1999 and 2006. Columns
(1) and (4) are restricted to households in program-eligible villages, Columns (2) and
(5) are restricted to households in incidental villages, and Columns (3) and (6) are
restricted to households in program-eligible and incidental villages. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A.10: Farm Inputs: Excluding Split Households
Material Inputs Labor Days Per Acre
HYV Seeds Irrigation Manure Fertilizer Total Hired Family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat x Post 0.277** 0.294*** 0.327*** 0.176 24.113* 12.557 11.556
(0.128) (0.092) (0.078) (0.118) (12.627) (10.364) (14.263)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.204 0.323 0.101 0.572 59.725 34.200 25.525
Observations 6898 6898 6898 6898 3494 3494 3494
Notes: Difference-in-differences regressions. I drop all households that split between 1999 and 2006. I run the pooled regression
in Equation 8, restricting attention to β1, the treatment effect on households further away from towns. Outcome in Columns (1)-(4)
is an indicator that equals 1 if the household purchases high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds, irrigation, manure, and chemical fertil-
izer respectively. Outcome in Column (5) is the total number of labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (6) is the total
number of hired labor-days per cultivated acre. Outcome in Column (7) is the total number of family labor-days per cultivated acre.
The regressions in Columns (5) - (7) are conditional on households that are cultivating some land in both periods. All regressions
include household and state-year fixed effects. Observations are weighted using 1999 sample weights. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Notes: Histogram plots distribution of the prevailing wage, as reported by workers. Responses from endline survey
responses of 356 individuals from 39 villages. Note only 1.7% of workers indicate a prevailing wage above Rs. 250,
which is the training wage in all rounds. The modal village wage is always ≤ Rs.250.
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Pay Disparity Compressed
Notes: Kernel density plots of worker attendance rates during the post-wage change period among “relevant” workers,
separately for Pay disparity and Compressed production units. Attendance rate is measured as the fraction of days
worker was present in the post-wage change period.
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Figure B.3: Density of Raw Production by Task, Scaled by Mean
(a) Correlation = 0 (b) Correlation = 0.15
(c) Correlation = 0.39 (d) Correlation = 0.41
(e) Correlation = 0.42 (f) Correlation = 0.50
(g) Correlation = 0.52 (h) Correlation = 0.62
(i) Correlation = 0.75 (j) Correlation = 0.88
Notes: Density plots of raw production, scaled by mean. Subfigures ordered by task observability.
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Figure B.4: Cooperative Puzzle Games - Examples
Panel A: Spot the Difference - Example
Panel B: Symbol Matching - Example
Notes: Examples of the cooperative pair games. Each worker in a pair would receive one of the sheets. Workers had
to compare their respective sheets, and circle items that were different (Spot the Difference) or matched (Symbol
Matching) on both their sheets.
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Day
High rank workers Medium rank workers
Low rank workers
Notes: The y-axis shows the residual of standardized output after removing individual fixed effects in the pre-period
(before day 0) and dummies for festival days. The figures plot, for each day of the experiment, the average of the
residuals for each group of workers restricting to members of the Compressed production units. Day=0 is the day
wage treatments took effect (i.e. when workers were told their post-training wage).
144









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.222*** -0.0961*** -0.272*** -0.124*** -0.242** -0.117*** -0.272** -0.115***
(0.070) (0.019) (0.086) (0.022) (0.097) (0.025) (0.111) (0.028)
Post  x  Pay disparity x  Low wage -0.279** -0.100** -0.400*** -0.115** -0.332** -0.120** -0.292** -0.0987*
(0.110) (0.043) (0.120) (0.049) (0.128) (0.053) (0.134) (0.054)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Med wage -0.180 -0.0995** -0.278 -0.148** -0.226 -0.129** -0.291 -0.146**
(0.127) (0.045) (0.194) (0.065) (0.187) (0.060) (0.198) (0.062)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  High wage -0.205 -0.0882** -0.145 -0.111** -0.172 -0.104** -0.238 -0.103**
(0.140) (0.037) (0.174) (0.052) (0.181) (0.052) (0.202) (0.052)
Sample Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevant Full Full Full Full
Include Pre-treatment observations? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Include "Irrelevant" workers? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighbor Controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Post-treatment Compressed Mean -0.099 0.939 -0.099 0.939 -0.099 0.939 -0.099 0.939
N 4307 4307 4307 4307 8375 8375 5283 5283
Panel A — Pooled Treatment Effects
Panel B — Treatment Effects Separately by Rank
Notes : Difference in differences regressions are presented in Cols (1)-(6). Cols (7)-(8) only include post-training, post-treatment observations.  Panel A pools the treatment 
effects across the low, medium, and high rank workers, while Panel B shows the treatment effects separately by rank. Post is an indicator that equals 1 if the day is after 
workers have been randomized into wage treatments, and 0 during the baseline training period. Regressions include day*round fixed effects, and task-specific quadratic 
experience trends,. Cols (3)-(8) include controls for neighboring production units. All coefficients are identified off comparisons of workers who earn the same absolute 
wage and have the same productivity rank within their production unit (see regression specification in text), i.e., from the so-call "relevant" workers. Standard errors 
clustered by production unit. 
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Post  x  Pay disparity -0.0128 -0.0907 -0.0123
(0.026) (0.092) (0.017)
Post  x  Pay disparity x  Low wage 0.00705 -0.0471 0.0187
(0.050) (0.173) (0.021)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Med wage -0.0361 -0.183 -0.0396
(0.046) (0.164) (0.039)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  High wage -0.0182 -0.109 -0.00563
(0.026) (0.110) (0.018)
Post-treatment Compressed mean 0.823 0.842 0.012
N 3868 3868 1669
Panel A — Pooled
Panel B — Separately by Rank
Notes : Difference in differences regressions. The sample is restricted to days when a worker was 
present. Cols. (1)-(2) show effects on supervisors' subjective daily assessment of the quality of each 
worker's output (collected in only a subset of days and rounds). Quality rating is a proportion: the 
rating score divided by the maximum possible rating (either 3 or 5). High quality rating is a boolean for 
whether the worker's quality rating on that day was above 0.8. The dependent variable in Col. (3) is the 
proportion of output that was rejected due to substandard quality; this is only measured for the two 
production tasks where quality standards were quantifiable (candle wicks and incense sticks).  Panel A 
pools effects across the low, medium, and high rank workers, while Panel B shows effects separately 
by rank. Post is an indicator that equals 1 if the day is after workers have been randomized into wage 
treatments, and 0 during the baseline training period. Regressions include individual fixed effects, 
day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and controls for neighboring units. 
Note that caution must be used when interpreting these coefficients, since the sample conditions on 
attendance. Standard errors clustered by production unit. 
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Table B.3: Perceived Justifications: Robustness of Relative Productivity Results
Dependent variable Output Attendance Output Attendance Output Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.353** -0.158*** -0.413*** -0.179*** -0.456*** -0.178***
(0.137) (0.042) (0.134) (0.042) (0.144) (0.042)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Perceived justification 0.299* 0.152** 0.292* 0.162*** 0.221 0.129*
(0.177) (0.063) (0.171) (0.061) (0.178) (0.068)
R-squared 0.436 0.173 0.438 0.172 0.439 0.175
Number of observations (worker-days) 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375
Notes:  Table shows comparisons of each worker in Pay disparity teams with the relevant worker (who has the same rank and absolute earnings 
level) in the Compressed teams. The Perceived justification indicator equals 1 if the baseline productivity difference between a worker and his 
higher-ranke co-worker (for low and medium rank workers) is above the Compressed group mean. Cols. (1)-(2) include time- and rank- varying 
controls for baseline productivity. Cols. (3)-(4) include time- and treatment- varying controls for whether the worker's baseline productivity was 
in the lowest 10% of the distribution (for Low workers).  Cols. (5)-(6) add time-, treatment-, and rank- varying controls for the worker's baseline 
productivity. Regressions include individual fixed effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and controls for 
neighboring production units. Standard errors clustered by production unit.
Controls for own 
baseline productivity
x post x rank
Controls for baseline 
productivity lowest 10%
x post x treatment
Controls for own baseline 
productivity
x post x treatment x rank
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Table B.4: Perceived Justifications: Robustness to Alternative Cutoffs for Relative Productivity Thresholds
Dependent variable Output Attendance Output Attendance Output Attendance Output Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) (6)
Post  x  Pay disparity -0.270 -0.122** -0.321** -0.156*** -0.355*** -0.177*** -0.351** -0.173***
(0.170) (0.052) (0.145) (0.040) (0.135) (0.037) (0.138) (0.039)
Post  x  Pay disparity  x  Perceived justification 0.00679 -0.00936 0.151 0.0790 0.332** 0.178*** 0.313* 0.171**
(0.187) (0.076) (0.164) (0.064) (0.166) (0.060) (0.175) (0.067)
R-squared 0.434 0.170 0.435 0.170 0.436 0.172 0.436 0.172
Number of observations (worker-days) 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375 8375
>25% difference
Notes: Regressions show comparisons of each worker in Pay disparity teams with the relevant worker (who has the same rank and absolute earnings level) in the 
Compressed production units, heterogeneously by Perceived justifications. Results are pooled across the Low and Medium rank workers. Perceived justifications 
indicator equals 1 if the difference between a worker and his higher-ranked peer (for low and medium rank workers) is greater than X%, where X is stated at the top of 
each column. Regressions include individual fixed effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and controls for neighboring production 
units. Standard errors clustered by production unit.
Definition of Threshold for Relative Productivity Fraction
>10% difference >15% difference >20% difference
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Table B.5: Perceived Justifications: Task Observability Robustness
Sample restriction: drop tasks Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Task 5 Task 6 Task 7 Task 8 Task 9 Task 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pay disparity -0.359*** -0.381*** -0.423*** -0.385*** -0.391*** -0.115 -0.399*** -0.533*** -0.516*** -0.378**
(0.125) (0.130) (0.137) (0.129) (0.135) (0.121) (0.129) (0.145) (0.149) (0.151)
Pay disparity x Perceived justification 0.393** 0.386** 0.453*** 0.373** 0.430** 0.177 0.313* 0.563*** 0.513*** 0.351*
(0.180) (0.164) (0.171) (0.167) (0.183) (0.156) (0.160) (0.166) (0.177) (0.184)
Pay disparity -0.143*** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.144*** -0.156*** -0.205*** -0.139*** -0.125***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.041) (0.029)
Pay disparity x Perceived justification 0.141*** 0.101** 0.0901* 0.103** 0.105* 0.0871* 0.0672 0.155*** 0.0885* 0.0719
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.056) (0.047) (0.055) (0.046) (0.053) (0.047)
N 7459 7638 7453 7638 7511 7500 7482 7573 7565 7556
Panel A — Output (std. dev)
Panel B — Attendance
Notes:  Table shows specification for main observability regressions, but sequentially drops each production task from the regression. Comparisons are between each worker in Pay 
disparity production units with the relevant worker (who has the same rank and absolute earnings level) in the Compressed production units. Treatment effects are pooled across the 
Low, Medium and high Rank workers.  The Perceived justification indicator equals 1 if the observability correlation for the worker's production task (computed using a separate 
baseline sample) is above the mean. Regressions include individual fixed effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and controls for neighboring 
production units. Standard errors clustered by production unit.
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Table B.6: Absence of Correlation Between Task Observability Measure and Training Outcomes
Attendance Attendance




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observable task -0.0107 -0.0103 -0.00476 -0.0125
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.151)
Sample All hired workers Training completors All hired workers Training completors
Frequency of data Daily Daily Worker-level Worker-level
Pre-treatment Mean 0.914 0.954 0.019 0.233
N 3557 3092 415 378
Notes : OLS regressions are presented in Cols (1)-(4) to measure pre-treatment correlates with observability. The 
regressor in all specifications is an indicator for whether the production task has above-median observability. Cols (2) and 
(4) restrict the analysis to only workers who completed the training period and were thus available to be randomized into 
treatments. Cols (1)-(2) use daily attendance as the dependent variable. Col (3) captures whether a worker terminated his 
employment before the end of the training period. Col (4) measures output growth in the training period by taking the 
difference between standardized output on days 8 and 3.  This captures the steepness of the learning curve for each 
worker. Regressions include round fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by production unit. 
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Notes:  Tabulations of overlap between the two sources of 
variation for perceived justifications: baseline 
productivity differences between a worker and his higher 
ranked peer, and the observability of co-worker output.  
The binary splits for each meaure shown here are the 
same as those used in the tables in the analysis.  The table 
shows the percentage of observations in each cell.
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Table B.8: Effects of Higher Absolute Pay among Compressed Units
Output (std dev.) Attendance
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post  x  Compressed Medium 0.00218 0.0875 0.0184 0.0411 0.0570* 0.0225
(0.144) (0.129) (0.138) (0.044) (0.033) (0.039)
Post  x  Compressed High -0.00447 0.0274 -0.00973 0.0691* 0.0768** 0.0321
(0.109) (0.099) (0.099) (0.037) (0.031) (0.034)
Post-treatment Compressed Low Mean -0.212 -0.237 -0.292 0.891 0.894 0.899
N 2807 3620 6107 2807 3620 6107
Notes : Difference in differences regressions restricting the sample to only Compressed teams. Post is an indicator that equals 1 if the day is after 
workers have been randomized into wage treatments, and 0 during the baseline training period. Regressions use unit-level variation, so all Compressed 
wage unit workers are included. Omitted category is Compressed low wage units. All specifications include the full training period. Cols (1) and (4) 
include only the first two post wage change days. Cols (2) and (5) include only the first work week post wage change.  Col (3) and (6) include the full 
sample. Regressions include individual fixed effects, day*round fixed effects, task-specific quadratic experience trends, and controls for neighboring 
production units. Standard errors clustered by production unit. 
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Table B.9: Robustness: Effects on Group Cohesion - Conditional on Attendance









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pay disparity -0.0106 -0.00889 -10.18** -12.98**
(0.031) (0.034) (4.354) (6.241)
Compressed_Medium pay 0.0198 -7.400
(0.044) (6.429)
Compressed_High pay -0.0150 -0.936
(0.053) (8.362)
Both workers from same unit x Pay disparity -0.939**
(0.431)
Both workers from same unit 0.404*
(0.227)
At least one worker in pair was on Pay disparity unit 0.203
(0.325)
At least one low rank worker in pair -0.604** -0.714***
(0.236) (0.252)
At least one medium rank worker in pair -0.387* -0.398*
(0.219) (0.216)
Dependent variable mean 0.921 0.921 54.17 54.17 4.695 4.695
Observations 240 240 65 65 1632 1632
R-squared 0.170 0.172 0.318 0.338 0.203 0.105
Notes : This table replicates results for cooperative games, conditional on attendance. Cols 1-2 include the full sample of workers who participated in endline games 
(run only in the later rounds of the experiment). Cols. 3-4 limit analysis to units where all 3 unit members were present on the day of endline games. Cols. 1-4 
include round fixed effects. Cols. 5-6 limit analysis to pair-games where both workers in an assigned pair were present the day of endline games. Col. (5) includes 
fixed effects for the order in which a game was played during the day and the game station (location in worksite) as well as education controls. Standard errors are 
clustered by production unit.
Game: Game:
Tower building in teams Cooperative puzzles in pairs
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post rank disclosure x Low rank (pre disclosure) 0.00346 0.00801 -0.000635 0.00146
(0.089) (0.093) (0.094) (0.024)
Post rank disclosure x Medium rank (pre disclosure) 0.00828 -0.00984 -0.00891 0.00303
(0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.020)
Experience x task controls? No Quadratic trends Fixed effects Fixed effects
Mean of dependent variable: 3 days prior to ranking treatment -0.322 -0.322 -0.322 0.969
F-test p-value: Post ranking x Low = Post ranking x Medium 0.943 0.814 0.911 0.935
N 3060 3060 3060 3060
Notes: Difference in differences regressions presented to test whether workers of different ranks respond differently to the information about their 
relative productivity that was revealed four days (on average) before the end of the training period.  Here, rank is calculated based on production 
during the three days prior to the release of the ranking information.  Regressions only contain data from the training period,  and Post rank 
disclosure is an indicator for the four days (on average) following disclosure before the end of the training period. All regressions include individual 
fixed effects as well as worksite x day fixed effects.  The coefficients are all relative to the output and attendance of the person with the highest 
rank. Regressions include individual fixed effects and day*round fixed effects. The specifications that include experience x task fixed effects are 
identified using variation in the lengths of the training periods across rounds.  Standard errors clustered by production unit.
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Predicted attendance of co-workers 0.600** 0.0035
(0.278) (0.169)
Actual attendance of co-workers (instrumented) 0.0063
(0.279)
F-stat: First stage excluded instrument 4.65
Number of observations (worker-days) 6020 6020 6020
Notes:  Table shows peer effects regressions instrumenting actual peer attendance with predicted peer 
attendance.  Predicted attendance is calculated using the average attendance of all workers from the same 
village excluding the worker and others from his production unit (i.e., a jack-knife or leave-one-out 
strategy).  Observations limited to workers on Compressed pay units.  Column 1 presents the first stage 
regression of actual peer attendance on predicted peer attendance.  Column 2 presents the reduced form 
regression of own attendance on predicted peer attendence. Column 3 presents the IV estimation of the 
effects of peer attendance on own attendance. All specifications include fixed effects for round, calendar 
month, and day of round, and indicators for being assigned to a unit with one or more co-workers from the 
same village. Standard errors clustered at the production unit level.
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Table B.12: Supplemental Survey: Fairness of Different Wage Regimes
A) flat daily wage B) piece rate
(1) (2)
1 98% 0%
A) flat daily wage
B) piece-rate
2 16% 4%
A) flat daily wage
B) piece-rate
Outcome: Percentage of respondents saying the scenario is "Unfair" or "Very Unfair"
A brick factory in an area pays its workers a:
for laying bricks. Balu and Mohit are both laborers who have 
worked in the factory for 6 months. Balu earns Rs. 20 more per day.
A brick factory in an area pays its workers a:
for laying bricks. Balu and Mohit are both laborers who have 
worked in the factory for 6 months. Balu, who makes more bricks 
than Mohit, earns Rs. 20 more per day.
Pay type
Notes: Survey conducted with workers who were not a part of the experiment, but drawn from a similar population in 
the area where the experiment was conducted. N=200 workers. Each worker was only asked one of the 4 questions 
shown in the table. Respondents were given one of the 4 scenarios, and asked to rate them as "Completely fair", 
"Acceptable", "Unfair", or "Very unfair". 
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